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AN

ESSAY

ON THE

ORIGIN of EVIL.

BY

Dr. WILLIAM KING,
Late Lord Archbishop of Dublin.

Tranflated from the LATIN with large NOTES.

To which are added,

Two SERMONS by the fame Author,
The former concerning DIVINE PRESCIENCE, the latter
on the FALL of MAN.

THE FOURTH EDITION CORRECTED.

By EDMUND LAW, D. D.
Master of St. PETER'S College, CAMBRIDGE.

VOL. II.

CAMBRIDGE,

Printed for W.THURLBOURN & J. WOODYER in Cambridge,
and J. BEECROFT in Pater-nofter-Row, London.

M.DCC.LVIII.

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BJ

.K 54 3

1758

SUBSECT. II.

An Opinion is proposed in general, afferting a
Freedom from Neceffity as well as Compulfion.

THI

HIS Opinion determines almoft the fame This awith the former concerning the Goodness grees with or Agreeablenefs of Objects to the Appetites, nor the former is there much difference in what relates to the di

in moft cafes ef

NOTES.

ftinction

pecially in thofe

or preference of the Mind, and only relates to the execution of relating to fuch choice by an inferior faculty. † But then, befides this Idea the Appeof Liberty, which is nothing to the prefent Queftion, there is tites, to another previous and equally proper one, which regards the Good, very determination, preference or direction of the Mind itself; Pleafant, and may be called its Power of determining to do or forbear any Profitable particular Action, or of preferring one to another; and if Free- and Hondom can with any propriety of Speech be attributed to one of eft; but thefe Powers as he has conftantly attributed it, why may makes this it not with equal propriety be applied to the other? He pro- to be the ceeds therefore to ftate the Question concerning the latter, difference which he would not have put, whether the Will be free? but between a whether the Mind or Man be free to will? both which I think Man and amount to the fame thing with common Understandings, fince Brute, in the first place we only afk, Whether this Will be properly viz. that an active power of the Mind (i. e. as oppofed to Mr. Locke's the one is paffive Power) and in the second, Whether the Mind be active deteror indifferent in exerting this Power called Will? and both mined by which will be equally improper Queftions with regard to his its bodily former fense of the Word Free, i. e. as only applicable to the Appetite, Actions fubfequent on Volition. However, he goes on in the the other fecond place to enquire, whether in general a Man be free by him• To Will or not to Will, when any Action is once propofed felf. to his Thoughts, as presently to be done.' In which refpect he determines that a Man is not at liberty, because he cannot forbear Willing or preferring the one to the other: which tho' it be scarce confiftent with his other Notion of Sufpenfion, whereby a Man either avoids a particular determination in the cafe, and continues in the fame ftate he is in [not by virtue of a prefent Determination of his Will, but of fome precedent one] or elfe wills fomething different from either the exiftence or non existence of the Action propofed*, and tho' it should

*

See Note 42. § 16. || $23, 24. See Note 48.

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