after a long death-bed suffering. But what does it signify now? He was like me—a pariah."

I offered the Count a waterproof to shield him from the rain as he walked home. Oh, it is nothing," said he, waving his hand. "I pass."

"I am a pariah and I pass," he called out to me over the dark cobbles in the wet as he hastened away.

VII

THE COMMUNIST RISING

SINCE Soviet Russia as at present constituted has no ice-free port in the Baltic, there is a constant assumption that some time or other she will make a bid to regain at least the city of Reval (Tallin). This assumption in itself is a standing menace to Esthonia, and is only made light of by Esthonian statesmen in order to convince Western Europe of Esthonia's stability.

It is urged that by the Dorpat Treaty of February 1920 Soviet Russia is guaranteed free access to Reval, and that she has therefore no economic reason for desiring possession of that port. Quite obviously, however, a great power like Russia is likely to be considerably harassed by its Esthonian doorkeeper. The treaty is a useful instrument for the waiting-time of Russia's economic recovery. But should that recovery become complete, either under the Bolshevik

Government or under any other Government, one can quite understand that Russia would begin to have strong cause of complaint in the Baltic, having lost the harbours of Reval, Riga, Libava, and the rest. She would hardly be likely to rest content with Esthonian permission to use Reval, but would be likely to proceed to take possession of a port which was of such vital necessity to her.

We have in Esthonia a transitional regime. Esthonia's raison d'être is that she could be a link in the cordon of obstructions between Russia and Western Europe. Good-will towards Esthonia has been balanced by ill-will towards Soviet Russia. But the recognition of Soviet Russia by France and England greatly affects the balance. If illwill towards Russia disappears, then as a natural consequence some indifference toward the sanitary

cordon will set in.

Meanwhile, however, the Esthonians, having taken Europe at her word, have been making plans for making the State of Esthonia permanent. A strong patriotism has developed. And there has developed also a strong material interest on the part of the newcomers to power in Esthonia. Esthonians would therefore naturally be indignant at any weakening in Europe's loyalty

G

towards their nation and the integrity of their territory.

Yet who believes that the League of Nations or the Powers of Western Europe would stir a finger to save Esthonia if the Red Army descended upon it with intention of conquest? Esthonia's only hope would be in her Baltic cousins, the Finns and the Letts, who are themselves not immune from danger of invasion, and certainly not strong enough to lend with safety a portion of their own means of defence.

In 1923 Latvia and Esthonia entered into a defensive alliance and are bound to come to one another's help in case of an unprovoked attack. Should Esthonia under these circumstances break off diplomatic relationship with Soviet Russia and declare a state of war, Latvia would automatically do the same. But while this is a prudent agreement, it by no means follows that its provisions would be adequate or effective.

Soviet Russia certainly does not seem disposed at this juncture to send an armed force against Esthonia. War of this old-fashioned kind has been repeatedly denounced by the Communist leaders. "Down with war; hail to the struggle of the classes!" is the cry. If Esthonia is to be destroyed the forces of destruction will be made

to appear to come from within Esthonia itself. Only when a new revolution had been achieved would the moment of opportunity for the Red Army have arrived, and then it would be too late to seek military help from Latvia or Finland. Western Europe might also be persuaded to think that what had taken place was merely a domestic revolution, an insurgence of a naturally wild proletariat against an inefficient administration.

My impression is that Soviet Russia would cloak the iniquity of her conquest by establishing a new republic of Esthonia, a mock republic kindred to the republics of Ukrainia, Georgia, Moldavia, and Karelia, part of the United Sovietistic Socialist Republics, and that their imperialistic conquest would be hailed as a triumph of the proletariat of Esthonia over their bourgeois masters.

For the republic of Esthonia to-day, though founded on measures of expropriation and ultrademocratic reform, is a bourgeois one, and is engaged in daily warfare with the Communistic ferment in the masses. It has recognised Soviet Russia, and has let in with diplomatic privileges not its commercial allies but its political foes. From the Red headquarters the work of undermining the present republic goes steadily on. The Esthonian police are vigilant, the Government is