Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral DynamicsCambridge University Press, 28 ago 1992 - 316 páginas In recent years renewed attention has been directed to the importance of the role of institutional design in democratic politics. Particular interest has concerned constitutional design and the relative merits of parliamentary versus presidential systems. A virtual consensus has formed around the argument that parliamentary systems are preferable overall to presidential systems, due largely to the loss of power to the executive and assembly in presidential systems. In this book, the authors systematically assess the strengths and weaknesses of various forms of presidential systems, drawing on recent developments in the theoretical literature about institutional design and electoral rules. They develop a typology of democratic regimes that are structured around the separation of powers principle, including two hybrid forms, the premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems, and they evaluate a number of alternative ways of balancing powers between the branches within these basic frameworks. They also demonstrate that electoral rules are critically important in determining how authority can be exercised within these systems, describing the range of electoral rules that can be instituted and the effects they have on the shape of party systems, on the political agenda, and on the prospects for cooperation between presidents and assemblies. |
Índice
Basic choices in democratic regime types | 1 |
Defining regimes with elected presidents | 18 |
Criticisms of presidentialism and responses | 28 |
The premierpresidential and presidentparliamentary experiences | 55 |
The constitutional origins of chief executives | 76 |
Constitutional limits on separate origin and survival | 106 |
Legislative powers of presidents | 131 |
Assessing the powers of the presidency | 148 |
Electoral rules and the party system | 206 |
Electoral cycles and the party system | 226 |
Electoral cycles and compatibility between president and assembly | 259 |
Conclusions | 273 |
Electoral rules for oneseat districts and coalitionbuilding incentives | 288 |
Theoretical explanation for models predicting number of parties in presidential systems | 293 |
Bibliography | 301 |
313 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todo
Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics Matthew Soberg Shugart,John M. Carey No hay ninguna vista previa disponible - 1992 |
Términos y frases comunes
appointment assembly elections assembly majority authority Bolivia Brazil cabinet censure Chapter Chile Chilean choice coalition collegial Colombia concurrent elections congress congressional elections consider Costa Rica critics of presidentialism decree powers delegation dent discussed dismiss dissolution District magnitude dominant Dominican Republic Ecuador effective number efficiency elec electoral college electoral cycle electoral system Federalist Papers formation honeymoon elections institutional legislative powers Lijphart major parties majoritarian majority runoff midterm elections nominations number of parties override parliament parliamentary systems partial veto party system Peru plurality rule political popularly elected presidents potential premier premier-presidential regimes premier-presidential systems presiden president and assembly president-parliamentary president's party presidential candidates presidential election presidential powers presidential regimes presidential systems prime minister proportional representation reelection regime type representation representative score seats separation of powers Taagepera Taagepera and Shugart term tial tialism tion tive Uruguay Venezuela vote voters Weimar Weimar Republic
Referencias a este libro
Systemwechsel 3: Parteien im Transformationsprozeß Wolfgang Merkel,Eberhard Sandschneider No hay ninguna vista previa disponible - 1997 |
Constitutional Engineering in Brazil: The Politics of Federalism and ... Celina Souza No hay ninguna vista previa disponible - 1997 |