it is fortunate for their fyftem that there is not; for a more unquestionable truth can hardly be conceived. If a being can act, in the proper fenfe of the word, at one time and in one place, when and where it is not prefent, what is to hinder it from acting at all times, and in all places, when and where it is not prefent? in other words, what is to hinder it from acting when it does not exift? Mr. Scott is evidently misled by confounding the relation of an agent to his action with that of a phyfical caufe to its effect, Between these two relations there are, indeed, many striking analogies; but there are likewife between them many ftriking differences, of which the most important is, that as a phyfical caufe is no agent, what may be predicated of an agent cannot be predicated of it.

"The origin of this prejudice, that all action is the effect of contact, it is not difficult," fays Mr. Scott, "to affign. This is the only manner in which we ourselves can act upon external objects; and it is the manner in which all our external fenfes are acted upon by thofe objects, either immediately, or by the intervention of fome medium, fuch as the rays of light, the undulations of the air, or the effluvia of odoriferous bodies. Yet, after all, when we come to examine the matter a little more nearly, we no more understand how bodies act upon one another when in contact, than when at a distance; and we should never have found out, independently of actual experience, that motion is the effect of contact or impulfe. Nay, if the fyftem of Benewich be true, there is no fuch thing as real contact in nature, nor is fuch a thing poñible. Again, there are many natural phenomena, fuch as thofe of gravitation, magnetifm, electricity, &c. which appear to be produced by the mutual action of bodies at a distance from one another. For though we have various hypothefes of intervening media, ethers, or effluvia, which are intended to explain these phenomena,- all these are mere fuppofitions, deftitute of the leaft fhadow of proof. The inference is, that the maxim above stated, (the axiom in queftion) is to be ranked among thofe vulgar prejudices, which, though very generally received, are without any real foundation in nature." P. 89.

The inference is by no means fairly drawn. That all action is the effect of contact, taking contact in the proper fenfe of the word; and that this is the manner in which we ourselves act on external objects, if they be the prejudices of any man, are very vulgar prejudices indeed, and can be cherished only by fuch as conceive the human mind to be a corporea', though fubtile, fluid. By confcioufnels and experience we know, that, by an act of volition, we move our own arms, and by the intervention of them external

Q4

bodies;

bodies; but volition is not impulfe, nor fimilar to impulfe; nor can we conceive the mind to be in contact with the body which it moves, as we conceive one billiard ball to be brought into contact with another, againft which it is forcibly impelled. Volition producing effects we apprehend to be the only action of which the human mind can form any notion; but how volition operates on the body we know not, though we cannot doubt of the fact, and are fure that it is not by impulfe. Bodies, therefore, which have neither intelligence nor volition, cannot be conceived as acting upon one another. They may be inftruments employed by fome intelligent and powerful Being; and fuch they must be conceived to be, when one event is conftantly perceived to follow another; but the apparent action is not the action of them, but of the agent by whom they are employed. Mr. Scott will furely admit that there cannot be an action where there is not an exertion of power, and we hardly think that he will contend for the existence of power without a fubflance of which that power is an attribute. Wherever there is an action, therefore, there must be an agent; but if this be admitted, the axiom that nothing can act, or be acted upon, but when and where it is prefent," is incontrovertible, and has accordingly, as Mr. Stewart obferves, been always admitted with refpect to metaphyfical or efficient caufes*.

66

In the fourth chapter the author feems to contend for the doctrine of abftraction, as taught by Locke and Reid, and other Conceptualifts; but he certainly has not confuted the arguments of Berkeley, Campbell, and Stewart, for the doctrine of the Nominalifts. Thefe arguments we believe to be indeed unanswerable, while we willingly acknowledge that in oppofing them Mr. Scott difplays confiderable ingenuity. His reply, however, to Mr. Stewart's illuftration of the doctrine of the Nominalifts by the characters of algebra, is by much too confident; for a happier illuftration we have not met with in a metaphyfical difquifition on any fubject.

On the fifth chapter, which treats of affociation, we have no remarks to make. It is not profound, but it is perfpicuous, and very proper for an elementary treatise. The fame character might be given of the fixth chapter, had not Mr. Scott adopted from Dr. Reid the moft palpable miftake which

See Elements of the Philofophy of the Human Mind, Chap. 1, Sect. 2, where the difference between the relation of an agent to his action, and that of a phyfical caufe to its effect, is ftated with uncommon perfpicuity.

is to be found, we believe, in the writings of that juftly celebrated philofopher.

"A very fingular error on the fubject of conception, which appears to have pervaded the writings of the ableft metaphyfical philofophers, was firft fuccefsfully refuted by Dr. Reid. It is, that our conception of things is a teft of their poffibility; fo that what we diftinctly conceive, we may conclude to be poffible; while of what is impoffible we can form no conception." P. 226.

So far from being a fingular error, we apprehend this to be an incontrovertible truth. Many things, indeed, are poffible; nay, many things undoubtedly exift, of which we can form no conception; but whatever we diftinctly conceive mufl be admitted to be poffible, unlefs we fuppofe the power of the human imagination to be more comprehenfive than the power of God. But, fays Mr. Scott,

"Every propofition, which is true, ftands oppofed to another which is falfe; but no one will deny that the falfe propofition may be as readily conceived as the true one. If the propofition exprefs a truth which is neceffary, as is the cafe with mathematical propofitions, its oppofite muft neceffarily be falfe, that is, impof fible. Thus, the propofition, any two fides of a triangle are equal to the third fide, is not only falfe, but impoffible, and inconfiftent with the very notion of a triangle: yet this propofition may be as distinctly conceived as the oppofite true one, viz. any two fides of a triangle are greater than the third fide. Indeed, the demonftratio ad abfurdum proceeds upon the affumption, and confequently complete conception, of a falfe and impoffible propofition; and thence, by legitimate inferences, arrives at the demonftration of the truth. It may therefore be held as clearly established, that the faculty of conception furnishes no teft, either of poffibility or impoffibility." P. 228.

In this reafoning, which is very fimilar to that which was employed for the fame purpose by Dr. Reid, conception and Suppofition are confounded; and from that confufion proceeds the miftake into which both writers have inadvertently fallen. A man may fuppofe, for the fake of argument, that a propofition, which he does not thoroughly understand, is true, while another man, more converfant with the subject and with the language in which the propofition is expreffed, knows it to be 'abfurd and impoffible. This is indeed the cafe with respect to all thofe affumed propofitions from which proceed the mathematical demonftratio ad abfurdum; but fo far is it from being true that the affumed propositions are diftinctly conceived by any man that the object, and even the fole object of the demonstrations, of which they form the

bafis, is to fhow that they are utterly inconceivable. Pure mathematics, as Mr. Scott knows well, are converfant only about ideal exiftence, or in other words, about human conceptions of meafurable quantity; and therefore whatever the mathematician proves to be impoffible, he proves to be impoffible in idea or conception. The man, who diftinctly conceives a triangle, ftands not in need of a demonftration to convince him, that any two of its fides are greater than its third fide; and all that any demonftration can do in this cafe is only to enable him, who has no distinct and complete conception of a triangle, to form fuch a conception. This is indeed all that mathematical demonftration can do in any cafe; for it is to be remembered that demonftration does not make truth, but only points it out to him from whom it is concealed. Accordingly there have been men, fuch as Sir Ifaac Newton and Bifhop Berkeley, who having made themfelves mafters of Euclid's definitions, axioms, and poftulates, no fooner read with attention the enunciations of his theorems, than they difcovered their truth; and, without reading his demonstrations, were able to demonftrate them to others.

In this chapter on conception, the realer will find fome very ingenious thoughts on fympathy, and the illufions of the theatre, which we regret that our limits will not permit us

to transcribe.

In the feventh chapter we have met with nothing particularly new or profound. It contains, indeed, fome ufeful obfervations on the cultivation of the memory, principally by giving attention to what we wish to remember, and by marking the affociations; and thefe we recommend with carneftnefs to our younger readers.

The eighth chapter, which treats of reafon, is on the whole good, and fome parts of it are eminently good Locke and Reid, however much they feem to differ on fome points of importance, agree in the diftinction which they make between judgment and reafon, as if they were different faculties. Mr. Scott, having confidered the diftinction as ftated by them, as well as the realons by which they fupport it, fays,

"I am inclined to infer from these confiderations, as well as from the illuftrations which are to follow, that the diftinction which has been made between judgment and reafoning, is not founded in any natural diverfity of the nature or objects of the faculties; and has no other foundation than the various manner in which the fame faculty is occafionally applied. When the truth which is afferted, or the falfity which is denied, are perfectly obvious, and require little or no examination, the faculty is then called judgment; but, when they are (it is) more remote from.

common

common apprehenfion, and require a careful investigation, it has been dignified with the name of reasoning (reafon). In fact, in the very definition which the logicians give of judgment, it is, allowed that two things or ideas are compared together, viz. the fubject and predicate of the propofition expreffed; and, in a procefs of reafoning, each step confits of nothing more than a like comparison of the agreement or difagreement of the propofitions which immediately follow one another.

"This will be rendered ftill more apparent, if we take for, an example any clear and indifputable procefs of reafoning, and examine what is the evidence by which we are led to infer one step from the immediately preceding one; or the conclufion from the general premifes; when it will appear that this is accomplished by the application of fome felf-evident truth, or necessary first principle, i. e. by the intervention of what is called judgment alone. Thus, in the first propofition of Euclid's Elements, inwhich two circles are defcribed having a common radius, we infer, that the radii of the one circle, are all equal to those of the other, because each of them, according to the definition of a circle, must be equal to this one common radius. What then, I afk, is the principle which leads us to make this inference? Euclid will inform us, that it is the felf-evident truth or axiom, that, when two magnitudes are feverally equal to fome third magnitude, they must be equal to one another. But this truth is among those which are allowed to be known by the faculty of judgment; fo that, in this inftance, the procefs of reafoning is nothing more than a particular application of an intuitive jndgment; nor wouid it be difficult to extend the illuftration to a variety of examples.

"If this account of the matter be jut, it would feem advifable to lay afide the diftinction between judgment and reafoning (reafon) as void of any natural foundation; and to fubftitute in the room of both the term reafon, which has been indifcriminately used for either. It is not, however, so easy to say what is the precife office of this noble faculty, or accurately to afcer tain the peculiar objects on which it is properly exercifed. From what has been just stated, it seems natural to infer, that the objects of reafon are no other than those self-evident truths or axioms, to which we find ourselves compelled to affent by a kind of neceffity, infomuch, that we cannot conceive that their oppofites fhould be true. Admitting this to be the cafe, reafon may be defined, that faculty by which we are made acquainted with abstract or neceffary truth; but this definition I propose with much diffidence, as it is not fupported by the concurrence of any au. thority." P. 313.

To the language, in fome parts of this extract, objections might certainly be made; but no man will mistake the author's meaning who wishes to find it. His object is to prove that in reafoning on matters which admit of demonstration,

We