induced by any uncandid design or intention. I have supposed it possible that they would delay it as much as could be made to appear legitimate, with the hope that in the meantime their other foreign relations would take such a turn as would enable them promptly to abandon the idea of a vote.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SIR: Last Saturday, the 10th instant, at an interview appointed by Count Frijs, he expressed his preference that, without agreeing in the treaty to submit the question of cession to a vote of the people of the islands in such form as to make the vote decisive as a condition, yet to allude to it in such manner as to show the fact of the intention of the Government of Denmark to take the vote.

I declined to agree to this, upon the ground that any such reference or statement in the treaty might be construed as an agreement to submit. He thought it could be so worded as to avoid that construction, and very much prefers its insertion for political and diplomatic reasons, and asked me if I would take it ad referendum. I agreed to do so, but again urged the necessity of so conducting the negotiation as to have all things accomplished and the treaty ready for submission at both capitals in December, and that, for the sake of certainty and dispatch, I would much prefer to have, as nearly as possible, the exact form of words in which he would propose to insert it, so that I could submit a definite question. He then proposed to have that ready by next Saturday (to-day).

General Raasloff informs me that he has recently conversed with an officer from St. Thomas, and learns from him, without in any way indicating the negotiation, that the people are discussing the subject of annexation, and are very well inclined to it, and that indeed the most of them look upon it as a foregone conclusion.

In view of the fact that this Government will probably order the vote to be

taken, I would be obliged for your opinion of the views I expressed in my No. 81, of 12th of July, last paragraph, in relation to who shall vote.

The Danish negotiators insist upon inserting in the convention a clause to the following effect: "It is, however, understood and agreed that His Majesty the King of Denmark, before proceeding to the ratification of this convention, reserves to himself to give to the native population of the abovenamed islands an opportunity of expressing their adhesion to his cession" (or, their wishes in regard to this cession). They consider this as an invitation to the people to affirm the cession, and not as a condition precedent, or a negative power, over the subject. They deem it a proper deference to modern European custom, and necessary in the present attitude of their other foreign relations. I am not able to express any decided opinion whether the negotiation can be concluded without it. I have urged against it every possible argument and consideration, and so far without avail.

SIR: I have the honor herewith to inclose a confidential note of this date, just received from General Raasloff which speaks for itself. His suggestion is interesting in itself and in its relations to the negotiation. He, of course,

understands that the United States will not send an agent to take any official part in conducting the election; but for suggestion and friendly influence and cooperation the measure would be beneficial.

MY DEAR SIR: I shall send you this note the moment I arrive in town, which will be a little after 2 P. M.

I feel confident that we shall be able to sign the convention in a week or so (if we can agree, which I hope), and that a commissioner will then be sent immediately from here to the West Indies. Let me, therefore, suggest to you that you write by this mail and request Mr. Seward to cause ships of war to be sent at once to the same place, and an agent or agents properly provided with instructions and all that may be useful to assist the Danish commissioner in his work, and to do whatever else circumstances may require.

I think it is necessary that this should be done at once, because, once the convention signed here, time will be scarce and action must be had without delay.

SIR: Yesterday, at the request of Count Frijs, I had another interview with him in regard to the pending negotiation. He assured me that he very much desires the accomplishment of the cession; that he fully appreciates its importance to the United States, its financial advantages to Denmark and its political advantages in cementing the friendship between the United States and Denmark, and which he thought material. But he observed that the most important and vital question now pending in the foreign relations of Denmark was that concerning the retrocession of the Danish or north portions of

Schleswig by a fair execution of the fifth article of the treaty of Prague; and that however great to Denmark might be the advantage of a cession of the Danish West Indies, it could not possibly outweigh the disadvantages that would result from doing anything that would injure the position of Denmark in the Schleswig affair by weakening her claim to vote in Schleswig, or by lessening the moral force of a popular expression. For these reasons he found it necessary not only to ask the approbation of the people of the islands, but also equally necessary that their consent or approval should be referred to in the treaty, though not agreed upon as a condition precedent. It is to be, in his language, "unilateral," but he regards it as so indispensable that he can not advise the King to make a treaty without it. General Raasloff would yield the point, and has exerted himself to have it yielded by the count, but he seems immovable. I have no doubt of his sincerity, both in desiring to make the cession and in thinking the vote necessary in the present attitude of the relations between Denmark and Prussia.

I have constantly opposed this vote, giving what I thought good reasons for my opposition, especially as to the insertion in the treaty. But I am convinced, by information from the islands, and the tendency of public sentiment here, that the annexation would be voted willingly and by a very large majority. And whether the people would vote thus or not, the point now is and this is the only way to get the islands—and we had better get them that way than not at all had we better risk an unfavorable vote than to refuse to negotiate on account of the vote. I am sure you will not deem it amiss in me to express my opinion thus freely. Yesterday I sent you by cable the following telegram in cipher :

"Denmark quite ready to conclude, if vote mentioned in treaty. Considers favorable vote sure. Desire explicit acceptance of Santa Cruz."

Saturday, the 5th instant, I received from you a telegram, which

I translate as follows:

"No condition of vote in treaty. If Denmark wants to negotiate for Santa Cruz by separate treaty, send draft here for consideration."

Upon the receipt of this I promptly advised Count Frijs and General Raasloff that I proposed at once to close the treaty by inserting a clause simply stating the fact that the King would afford the people an opportunity of freely expressing their approbation of the cession.

After my dispatch 107, of the 3d, and my hasty private notes of 3d and 4th instant, inclosing note from General Raasloff, I learned that the interviews of the French minister had assumed a more serious aspect, and that Count Frijs was really astonished that the British and Spanish ministers had not approached him, and expected their remonstrances daily. I then sent you the following telegram in cipher:

"France knows our offer, and remonstrates. Denmark expects other remonstrances. Prompt action desirable. Vote in treaty indispensable."

SIR: I recur to your dispatch No. 106, and to your two letters of the 3d and 4th instant, which have also been received.

Each of the letters is accompanied by a private and sealed communication, addressed by General Raasloff to myself. The burden of the several papers thus received is that my early instructions declining a stipulation to submit to the people of the two islands the question whether they shall be transferred to the United States constitutes a serious and insurmounable barrier to the negotiation on the part of Denmark.

On the 5th of October, one day after the latest date in these communications from Copenhagen, I instructed you by telegraph to waive the objection referred to and consent that a popular vote be taken in the islands at the instance of Denmark.

I have this day reiterated that instruction by telegraph, and have asked you to report progress. It is very desirable that the treaty, if one is concluded, should be submitted to the Senate as early as possible, to the end that if it be ratified, as I trust it will be, Congress may in that case be immediately invited