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In accepting the invitation of France to attend a Congress you were instructed to say, that "Her Majesty's Government, in adverting to the correspondence which has passed between the Governments of Great Britain and France since the signature of the Preliminaries of Villafranca, find that the Emperor of the French has repeatedly declared himself opposed to the employment of force for the purpose of restoring the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena.

"Her Majesty's Government rely implicitly upon these declarations, and they consider that an interference by external force to restore the authority of the Pope in Romagna would be no less opposed to the views and intentions of the Emperor of the French, than forcible intervention in the Duchies."

When your Lordship read this despatch to Count Walewski, and placed a copy of it in his Excellency's hands, no exception was taken to this statement. On the contrary, you report that when you placed a copy of the despatch in Count Walewski's hands, his Excellency, in thanking you for the communication, expressed the pleasure which the assent of Her Majesty's Government gave him.

The accuracy of the representation of the intentions of the Emperor of the French, given in my despatch, is thus amply confirmed.

Upon this foundation, Her Majesty's Government rest their hope that propositions to the following effect might be accepted by the Emperor of the French: ·

1. That France and Austria should agree not to interfere for the future by force in the internal affairs of Italy, unless called upon to do so by the unanimous assent of the Five Great Powers of Europe.

2. That in pursuance of this agreement the Emperor of the French should concert with His Holiness the Pope as to the evacuation of Rome by the troops of France. The time and manner of that evacuation to be so arranged as to afford the Papal Government sufficient opportunity to garrison Rome with the troops of His Holiness, and to take every precaution against disorder and outrage.

We trust that by previous arrangement and due preparation, the security of His Holiness might be fully provided for.

Arrangements to be made for the evacuation of Northern Italy by the. troops of France at a convenient period.

3. The internal government of Venetia not to be in any way matter of negotiation between the European Powers.

4. Great Britain and France to invite the King of Sardinia to agree not to send troops into Central Italy until its several States and Provinces shall, by a new vote of their Assemblies, after a new election, have solemnly declared their wishes as to their future destiny. Should that decision be in favour of

annexation to Sardinia, Great Britain and France will no longer require that Sardinian troops should not enter those States and Provinces.

You will read this despatch to M. Baroche, and give him a copy of it.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. Russell.

Dispatch of Lord John Russell to Sir James Hudson, British Minister at

SIR:

Turin 1

Foreign Office, February 6, 1860.

You will observe that the French Government, in agreeing to the fourth roposal of Her Majesty's Government, make a reserve as to the mode in vhich the vote of the people of Central Italy is to be taken.

So far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, our views would be satisfied if the actual law or practice of Tuscany, Modena, Parma, and Romagna were observed.

We have never adopted universal suffrage for ourselves, and if that suffrage is proposed by France, we should leave the different States and Provinces to decide for themselves, both as to who should be the electors, and as to the mode of election.

We have chiefly in view an election, not carried by intimidation, nor partaking of the excitement of the first outburst of the national feeling for independence.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Proposition made by Thouvenel to Talleyrand for Transmission to the Sardinian Government 2

Paris, le 24 février, 1860.

M. LE BARON,

En calculant toutes choses, M. le Baron, avec la ferme intention de rechercher entre toutes les solutions

Paris, February 24, 1860. M. LE BARON,

Taking everything into consideration, M. le Baron, with the firm intention of selecting among all solu

1 British Parliamentary Papers, Affairs of Italy [2636], p. 36. 2 Ibid. [2638], pp. 10-12.

celle qui se concilie le mieux avec les circonstances pressantes du moment, et les convenances d'un avenir plus calme, on arrive à reconnaître qu'il est grand temps de s'arrêter à une combinaison que l'on puisse offrir à l'agrément de l'Europe, avec quelque chance de la lui faire accepter, et qui conserverait à la Sardaigne l'entier exercice de l'influence normale qu'elle a le droit de revendiquer dans la Péninsule.

Cette combinaison, dans l'opinion mûrement pesée du Gouvernement de l'Empereur, serait la suivante :

1. Annexion complète des Duchés de Parme et de Modène à la Sardaigne.

2. Administration temporelle des Légations de la Romagne, de Ferrare, et de Bologne, sous la forme d'un Vicariat exercé par Sa Majesté Sarde au nom du Saint Siége.

3. Rétablissement du Grand Duché de Toscane dans son autonomie politique et territoriale.

Dans cet arrangement l'assimilation bornée à la Lombardie, et aux Duchés de Parme et de Modène, ne serait plus une oeuvre à laquelle la Sardaigne serait tenue de consacrer exclusivement tous efforts; le Cabinet de Turin conserverait sa liberté d'action et pourrait l'employer à consolider aussi, pour sa part, la tranquillité en Italie, pendant qu'il organiserait solidement. en un Royaume compact, les territoires ajoutés aux possessions héréditaires du Roi Victor Emanuel.

Le Vicariat s'accorderait avec

tions the one best suited to the pressing circumstances of the moment and the prospects of a calmer future, it will be admitted that it is high time to agree on a combination that may be offered to Europe with some chance of being accepted, and which would preserve to Sardinia the full exercise of the normal influence which she has a right to claim in the Peninsula

Such a combination, in the opinion, maturely weighed, of the Government of the Emperor, is as follows:

1. Complete annexation of the Duchies of Parma and Modena to Sardinia.

2. Temporal administration of the Legations of the Romagna, of Ferrara, and Bologna, under the form of a Vicariat exercised by His Sardinian Majesty, in the name of the Holy See.

3. Re-establishment of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany in its political and territorial autonomy.

In this arrangement, the assimilation confined to Lombardy and to the Duchies of Parma and Modena would no longer be a work to which Sardinia would be bound to devote all her efforts exclusively; the Turin Cabinet would preserve its liberty of action and might exercise it in establishing also, for its part, tranquillity in Italy, while organizing firmly in a compact kingdom the territories added to the hereditary possessions of King Victor Emanuel.

The Vicariat would be in harmony

l'esprit municipal qui est une tradition séculaire dans les Romagnes, comme avec l'influence naturelle que doit désirer exercer la Puissance devenue maîtresse de la plus grande partie du bassin du Po.

Ce que j'ai dit, M. le Baron, de la nécessité de prévenir les dangers auxquels la Sardaigne se trouverait exposée, si elle poursuivait d'autres agrandissements, s'applique plus particulièrement à la Toscane. L'idée de l'annexion du Grand Duché, c'està-dire, de l'absorption dans un autre Etat d'un pays doté d'une si belle et si noble histoire, et si attaché jusqu'ici à ses traditions, ne peut parvenir assurément que d'une aspiration dont il est impossible au Gouvernement de l'Empereur de méconnaître le danger, et qu'il est loin de croire partagée par la masse de la population. Cette aspiration il ne faut pas s'y tromper, quelles que soient aujourd'hui, je n'en doute pas, les intentions correctes du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Sarde, révèle, de la part de ceux qu'elle entraîne, une arrière-pensée de guerre contre l'Autriche pour la conquête de la Vénétie, et une arrière-pensée, sinon de révolution, tout au moins de menace pour la tranquillité des Etats du Saint Siège, et du Royaume des Deux Siciles. L'opinion ne s'y tromperait, ni en Italie ni ailleurs, et les questions qu'il s'agit d'apaiser ne feraient que se rouvrir avec une violence nouvelle.

with the municipal spirit which is a secular tradition in the Romagnas, as well as with the natural influence which the Power ought to wish to exercise that has become mistress of the greater portion of the valley of the Po.

What I have said, M. le Baron, of the necessity of anticipating the dangers to which Sardinia might be exposed if she sought further aggrandizements, is more particularly applicable to Tuscany. The idea of the annexation of the Grand Duchy, that is to say, the absorption in another State of a land gifted with so beautiful and so noble a history, and so attached, hitherto, to its traditions, cannot assuredly emanate except from an aspiration, the danger of which it is impossible for the Government of the Emperor to disown, and which it is far from believing to be shared by the mass of the population. That aspiration, there must be no delusion, whatever may be at the present moment, I doubt not, the correct intentions of the Sardinian Government, reveals on the part of those whom it carries along with it an arrière-pensée of a war against Austria for the conquest of Venetia, and an arrière-pensée, if not of revolution, at least of menace for the tranquillity of the States of the Holy See and of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Public opinion would not be deceived in Italy or elsewhere, and the questions which it is our object to settle, would only be reopened with fresh violence.

Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur, sans se dissimuler les difficultés qui resteraient à résoudre pour amener le triomphe de la situation, à laquelle, si le Cabinet de Turin y adhérait, il consacrerait ses efforts les plus énergiques et les plus persévérantes, à la confiance que ces difficultés ne seraient pas insurmontables. Certain d'aild'ailleurs d'opérer sur une base de nature à satisfaire complètement la France et la Sardaigne, à pacifier l'Italie pour une longue période, et enfin à ne contrarier d'une façon trop absolue aucun des intérêts que l'Europe a le droit et le devoir de placer moralement sous la sauvegarde, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté non seulement n'hésiterait pas à s'engager à prendre dans une Conférence ou dans un Congrès la défense d'une semblable combinaison, mais il la proclamerait comme étant inattaquable, à ses yeux, par une intervention étrangère. Dans cette hypothèse donc, la Sardaigne serait sure de nous avoir avec elle, et derrière elle. Vous êtes autorisé à déclarer formellement à M. le Comte de Ca

vour.

The Government of the Emperor, without overlooking the difficulties which would remain to be overcome to secure the triumph of the solution to which, if the Turin Cabinet would assent, it would devote its most energetic and persevering efforts, entertains the confidence that those difficulties would not be insurmountable. Certain, moreover, of operating upon a basis of a nature to satisfy completely France and Sardinia, to pacify Italy for a long period, and finally, not to clash in too absolute a manner with any of the interests which Europe has the right and duty morally to watch over, the Government of His Majesty would not only not hesitate to engage to take, in a Conference or Congress, the defence of such an arrangement, but it would proclaim it as unassailable, in its eyes, by foreign intervention. In this hypothesis, then, Sardinia would be sure of having us with her and behind her. You are authorized to declare this formally to Count Cavour.

Do I need now, M. le Baron, very long details to explain what would be our attitude if the Turin Cabinet, free in its option, should prefer to run all the risks which I have pointed out while advising it to avoid them? The hypothesis in which the Government of His Sardinian Majesty would have to rely only on its own forces develops itself, so to say, naturally, and it would be painful for me to dwell upon it. Je it. I therefore confine myself to say

Ai-je besoin maintenant, M. le Baron, de bien longs détails pour expliquer quelle serait notre attitude si le Cabinet de Turin, libre dans son option, préférait courir tous les hasards que j'ai signalés en le conjurant de les éviter? L'hypothèse dans laquelle le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Sarde n'aurait qu'à compter sur ses seules forces, se développe, en quelque sorte, d'elle-même, et il me serait pénible de m'y appesantir. Je

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