inevitably be urged again in answer to its opponents. These reasons will now be summarized.

Title rests for its final sanction on public opinion. History would seem to prove that, in questions of territorial sovereignty, public opinion bases its judgment on an unexpressed major premise, namely, that no title acquired either through treaty, conquest or occupation, or based on economic, racial or historical arguments, or arguments of military necessity, is valid, no matter how many centuries it has run, unless it has behind it the consent of the majority of the inhabitants of the territory. Of this fact Ireland, Poland, Italy, Bohemia and Alsace-Lorraine are sufficient proof.

The doctrine of national self-determination was born of the chief contribution of the eighteenth century to political thought, the assertion of the right of the individual to freedom from despotic control. It is an axiom of the twentieth century that the individual's right to self-government must yield to the welfare of society as a whole. One must, therefore, ask how far the doctrine is consistent with our present philosophy. It is often asked whether or not the national aspirations of one group should outweigh the economic desires of another, if it should appear that satisfaction of those desires is for the good of society. The answer is that the main requisite of society is order, to which validity of title and territorial sovereignty is essential. If this is so, then it appears that the interest of the world and that of the group are one, and that only by basing title on the principle of national self-determination can there be a presumption of stability for the State or for the world-wide society of States.

The principle of national self-determination once accepted, there are practical reasons why the plebiscite should be resorted to in order that the will of the majority may be ascertained in a definite statistical fashion. The purpose might be thought to be served either by mere imagination or by indirect consultation through an international commission collecting evidence. of the desire of the inhabitants by a survey of history, literature, economic ties and interests, statistics as to race, language and religion, and by receiving deputations and petitions. Even were it possible by these means to hear from unorganized masses and interests, it can be easily shown that the criteria of racial and geographic determination are not sufficient guides for judgment regarding national sentiment. This was particularly true in AlsaceLorraine in 1870, when many believers in determination through language and race thought that language and race required the return of the provinces. to Germany; 1 and it is true to-day in the case of Schleswig. It is a method subjective, not objective, too likely to be based upon inadequate generalization.

1 The Germans adduced common origin of races, similarity of language and customs, geographical configuration and historical rights to support their conquest. Fusinato, p. 1.

Further, even though the inadequate generalization may happen to reach the right result, there has been no proof that the result is right or desired. Inevitably there will be disaffection in the territory in question and in the State from which it is separated, or the State whose claim is not satisfied. The real problem is not only to ascertain the existence of a majority, but also to establish the incontrovertible fact of that majority in order to devitalize potential sources of agitation.

Again, the advantage to be acquired by the annexing State through enlisting that loyalty to the State which is the normal psychological result of participation in the processes of selection is another consideration and a strong one.1

That these advantages will accrue from an actual vote, if charges of fraud are not too serious, is shown by the Italian votes of 1860, '66 and '70, which effectually silenced the claims of Austria, the petty princes, the republicans and the Pope. It is shown by the votes of Savoy and Nice themselves, for whatever the pressure, it was obvious that it could not account for the overwhelming majority cast for cession. The result of the votes made the protests of Great Britain, Switzerland and the other Powers appear as weak as they were futile. It is significant, too, that a disaffected party has not survived in those territories or in Italy. Yet it may be asserted that in each case there were other factors which accounted for the permanence of the solution. This is undoubtedly true, but here is an instance where the cumulative force of the invariable condition of stability following the votes can not be ignored, and where, consequently, one can not fairly accuse the argument of being an example of “ post hoc, ergo propter hoc."

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Doubtless to be suited to the use of the twentieth century, the plebiscite must be modernized. The old methods of partisan administration would not satisfy the more sophisticated political standards of to-day. The plebiscite must be under international and obviously impartial auspices. The accumulated political experience of a century of representative government must be applied to commissions which should oversee and police the registration, and guarantee the secrecy of the ballot.

The real problems are, however, of a more general nature, and involve, among other questions, delimitation of the territory in which the vote shall be taken, electoral qualifications, and the drawing of the frontier line after the vote. It is obvious that a rigid plan to fit all cases is impossible. Special conditions necessitate special provisions. The conditions must be studied with infinite care, and the solutions must bear promise of justice to all parties, including both the majority and the minority. In cases of a mixed population and an indistinctly indicated frontier line, the international commis1 Cf. Fusinato, p. 135.

sion will be forced to follow the proposal made by La Tour d'Auvergne in the Conference of London and draw a line based on the vote, in the way that shall most nearly satisfy the obvious desires of the inhabitants of the region. Here is the proper place for the clause of option, a place first accorded it in the Treaty of Mulhausen of 1798. It is properly a measure to protect the dissatisfied minority.

The chief theoretical opposition to the doctrine comes now from the apprehension that, once admitted, small units, even so small as cities, may demand self-determination. Although this difficulty has so far been an academic one it has now become one of importance. No rule is, of course, possible. The question is one primarily of proportion, of geographic position and economic relation; in a word, it must be settled according to the specific case. No group, however small, should be without its day in court. The court should be an international commission to whose judgment the matter must be left. With the resources of customs zones and internationalization of rivers, ports and the like, the desires of the several parties in interest, even in the case of a single city, should be capable of being harmonized and the will of the majority satisfied.

The chief practical opposition to the doctrine comes at present from those who fear, and with reason, that application in various regions where the conqueror has bent every effort to denationalize the people and has resorted to restrictions on language, to deportation and to massacre, would sanction the former conquest. It is obviously necessary that such methods should fail of their object and that their results should be neutralized. To arrive at a just solution in such a case is not easy. There are, however, means of solution which suggest themselves. It might be well to let only those vote who are native-born, or who were domiciled in the region before the conquest, and even to let those children of emigrants or optants vote who will give pledge to live in the territory if the vote goes in their favor. Finally, by letting the women vote, not only would there be a more comprehensive expression of opinion but there would also be secured representation for the men who have been killed in war or have perished through deportation.

Solution of these problems is not easy, nor should one attempt it without full knowledge both of the special cases at issue and of the problems, failures and successes of the past.

THE PLEBISCITES OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

AVIGNON AND THE COMTAT VENAISSIN, 1791

In 1789 Avignon and the neighboring Comtat Venaissin were still a part of the patrimony of the Holy See, an alien dominion in the heart of France,

an enclave, surrounded by the departments of Bouches-du-Rhône, Bases and Hautes Alpes, Drôme and Gard, and itself encircling, or nearly so, the French communes of Suze and Mondragon and the tiny principality of Orange. The Papacy had acquired the two bits of territory by somewhat dubious title in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. After Avignon had ceased to be the papal residence both it and the Venaissin had been left in the hands of a vice-legate, under whom the two territories were separately administered.

By 1789 the ninety-eight communes of the two territories contained over 130,000 inhabitants.1 The people were French in race and language, and enjoyed the privilege of regnicoles, sharing freely in the holding of offices under the French government. To France the inconvenience of this situation was great, for the region was a refuge for fugitives from justice and a base for smugglers. History, too, had shown it to be of great strategical importance in case of invasion from Savoy or Lombardy. The Kings of France had always considered that as heirs to the Counts of Provence they had a claim to the territory. Before 1789 it had been occupied and annexed at various times during the quarrels with the Popes, but had always been restored, though the restoration had been accompanied by the statement that actual sovereignty lay with the crown and that the Pope held merely a mortgage. The method by which the papal title had been acquired enabled those opposing it to question its validity. The Venaissin had been taken in 1274 from Raymond of Toulouse by Philip the Hardy and given to Pope Gregory X in return for his aid against Raymond. Avignon had been sold to Clement VI in 1348 by Jeanne, Queen of Naples and Countess of Provence, in order, as the story runs, to gain absolution for the murder of her husband. It was further asserted that Jeanne was a minor at the time and that the property was entailed.

For many years there had been in Avignon a party for annexation to France. The ties had been strengthened by the several annexations to the kingdom under Louis XIV. The silk manufacturers whose output supplied the chief industry of Avignon saw their rivals of Lyons far outstripping them, thanks to the customs barriers. The tobacco growers resented being deprived of the French market.

On the breaking out of the revolution in France a similar one immediately engulfed the city of Avignon and spread from there to the Venaissin. Immediately three parties appeared, the modérés who wished to adopt the French Constitution but to continue under the sovereignty of the Pope, the

1 The Abbé Maury stated the figures for Avignon to be 30,000 and for the Comtat 100,000. Archives parlementaires, series 1, vol. 25, pp. 237 and 545. Menou gave the exact figures as 152,919 in his final report, q. v. Documents, post, p. 232.

In 1789 there were ninety churches, convents or religious establishments in Avignon alone. Soullier, vol. 1, p. 349, note 8.

patriotes who wished both the French Constitution and union with France, and the aristocrates who were against the constitution and for the sovereignty and unchanged administration of the Pope. To the patriotes belonged a large part of the professional class who desired political reform, the majority of the merchants, who wished economic advantages, and the Jacobin element. To the aristocrates were joined the very numerous and powerful clericals. Roughly speaking, of the ninety-eight communes, those of any size appear to have been for France, whereas the small communes of the upper Comtat and the rural districts, where there was great poverty, were for the Pope. The ensuing disturbances and civil wars were not wholly on political lines, however; excessive jealousy between the two chief towns, Avignon and Carpentras, and the complex local and personal rivalries confused the issues. Later a fourth party, for autonomy, developed, but was never of importance save in continuing disorder.

The first proposition made in the French Assembly for the union of the territory with France came on November 12, 1789, from the neighboring French departments. It was based wholly on the claims of France to the territory and on an elaborate indictment of the papal title. No mention was made of the wish of the inhabitants. Although there was no discussion in the Assembly, this proposal of union caused a protest by the parishes of the Comtat to the French Assembly. This protest avowed the greatest admiration for the principles of the Revolution, but emphasized that among them was the principle of self-determination, and stated the undying loyalty of the people of the Comtat to the Pope.2

On June 10, 1790, the aristocrates and patriotes became involved in a hot armed conflict. The "patriotes" defeated their opponents and drove off the papal legate. After several insurrections the liberals of Avignon had secured from the vice-legate a municipal government on the French pattern, and an elective assembly. At the call of the municipal officials the district assemblies now met, declared the Pope deposed and Avignon an independent State, and then voted for union with France. At the same time the States General of the Venaissin, which had just adopted the French Constitution, reiterated its desire for the continuance of papal sovereignty.3

A delegation from Avignon presented the vote and petition for union to the Constituent Assembly at Paris on June 26. This petition and succeeding ones were referred by the Constituent Assembly to a Committee on Avignon to which were added later the Diplomatic Committee and the Committee on the Constitution. The Committee reported on August 27 that the Pope's

1 See Documents, post, p. 173.

2 Documents, post, p. 175.

3 Documents, post, pp. 178, 182.

4 The original committee was composed of Mirabeau (the elder), Barnave, Tronchet,