of the Germanic Confederation.

The Danish nationalists in Denmark, who were hoping to incorporate the whole of Schleswig, if not Holstein also, into the kingdom, were opposed by the revolutionary provisional government of the duchies, which wished both duchies to enter the Germanic Confederation. The provisional government, in its first manifesto, promised to the people of Northern Schleswig an opportunity to register their choice between the Confederation and Denmark. Relying on the aid of Prussia, however, this same government almost immediately repudiated the promise, but the political value of the doctrine was at once recognized by the Prussian Foreign Minister, von Arnim, as providing, if accepted by Denmark and the neutral Powers, a basis which would ipso facto give to Germany a valid claim to the German part of the duchies, as well as offering a hope that the people of North Schleswig might vote against separation from the rest of the duchy. On his suggestion the Confederation formally endorsed the proposal for a vote of the people of North Schleswig; and Bunsen, the Prussian Minister at London, urged it strongly on Lord Palmerston as one of the bases of mediation. Palmerston accepted the proposal of a division, but suggested that the line be drawn "with reference to known or ascertainable facts," to which Bunsen replied "Germany can not give up the principle declared on all occasions, that no separation of any part of Schleswig can ever be thought of, unless the population in the northern districts themselves declare, by an open and unbiased manifestation of their intention to that effect, that they will be separated from the rest of the duchy." 1 The Prussian proposal was not accepted, however, and no further mention of the doctrine is found until the Crimean War precipitated discussion of the Eastern Question.

We now come to the period when the method of popular consultation enjoyed its greatest prestige. From 1855 to 1866 scarcely a year passed without some endorsement of the method. No matter what the attitude towards popular sovereignty at home, there was no one of the great Powers, not even Austria or Russia, which did not participate during those years in some form of appeal to national self-determination to settle the numerous European territorial questions.

Considering how definite was the Russian opposition to all suggestions of popular sovereignty, it is strange to find Russia the first Power to propose the method for solving the question of the Danubian Principalities. Her purpose was to enable the Principalities to unite and so to form a bulwark against Turkey and Austria. Knowing that this was also the desire of the people of the two Principalities, in March, 1855, Gortchakoff proposed that in the memorandum drawn up at Vienna to serve as the preliminary basis for 1 Bunsen to Palmerston, June 24, 1848, British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 40, p. 1321. Documents, post, p. 878.

peace, there be inserted a clause providing for consulting the wishes of the Danubian Principalities themselves as to their reorganization. Napoleon was not only favorable to the union as in line with his own policy, but, having made popular appeal the basis of his own throne, was disposed to favor the introduction of the principle as a European custom. The Russian proposal was adopted, and in the ensuing Congress of Paris the details of this plan were elaborated by the French plenipotentiary, Bourqueney, were agreed to by Clarendon, Cowley, Cavour, Brunnow and their colleagues, by the Austrian Representatives and by Aali Pacha for Turkey, and were incorporated in the Treaty of Paris which was signed March 30, 1856. The treaty provided that the settlement of the question of organization of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia should be arrived at by means of an assembly or "divan ad hoc " elected in each principality under the joint supervision of the Porte and a European Commission. In this manner, by the initiation of Russia and the support of France, and without a dissenting voice in the Congress, international sanction was given to the method of direct consultation concerning a question of internal order which, it was well known, would involve primarily the question of union of the two Principalities.

The history of the deliberations of the European Commission and the forcing of a second vote in Moldavia by the concerted action of some of its members is of exceeding interest. Lack of harmony due to the conflicting policies of the various European courts towards the question of union somewhat hampered its efficiency, yet in the end the work was well done and the popular will as clearly ascertained as was possible in view of the limited. suffrage and the intricate method of indirect election which gave little indication of the will of any but the landed proprietors. So strong, however, was the national feeling of the two Principalities that there appears to have been no disaffection regarding the result.

The declaration for union made by the "divans" was at first disregarded by the Congress at Paris, the diplomatic situation having changed, and a very qualified union was accorded. This arrangement was defeated by the strategem of the two "divans" which proceeded to elect one and the same man as Hospodar or ruler in both Principalities. The Powers thereupon granted a temporary union for the lifetime of the new Hospodar. Russia had been justified in her foresight. Although the losing Power in the Crimean War, she was enabled through appeal to the doctrine of self-determination to outwit not only Turkey and Austria, but Great Britain as well, an outcome doubtless aided by the Sepoy Rebellion and the British Liberals.

The union of the Principalities was effected, for practical purposes, in 1859. In that same year the method of popular appeal in questions of sovereignty was again resorted to in Italy. The first suggestion of the method came

from Napoleon. The Emperor, himself a carbonaro in his youth, was heir both to the revolutionary principles of 1848 and to the Napoleonic legend, which, so artfully fabricated at St. Helena, had by now convinced the nephew that the uncle had held nationality in special veneration. Spurred on by this idealism as well as by the historic French antagonism to Austrian control of the Italian Peninsula, Napoleon in 1859 had gone to the aid of the Italian patriots.

By the Preliminaries of Villafranca, signed July 11, 1859, the war with Austria came to an untimely end with the freedom of Lombardy as the only fruit of the struggle. By the Preliminaries Austria ceded Lombardy to France with the understanding that it be handed over to Sardinia. Napoleon endeavored to write into the agreement the phrase "according to the votes of the population." Francis Joseph, with characteristic fidelity to the Hapsburg theory of the State and, with the subtle instinct of a despotic sovereign, fully understanding the significance of the phrase, refused, saying that "he was unable to attach any importance to the will of the people," and Napoleon consented to renounce the proposed formula.2

1

Napoleon's devotion to Italian unity had been weakened by fear of opposition at home, not only from the clericals but from those upholding the traditional French policy of a weak Germany and a weak Italy. The Preliminaries of Villafranca liberated Lombardy, but the Emperor had consented to abandon the other Italian peoples once more to their alien dukes, though without providing for the method of forcing their return on their unwilling subjects. The Italians were determined to thwart the provisions of Villafranca. Napoleon's support having been lost to them, the British Cabinet now came forward as their champion. With the support of Palmerston as Prime Minister and Russell as Foreign Secretary, the Italians of the duchies and of Romagna made a second attempt to overthrow the recurring principle of legitimacy and to settle the Italian question by popular consultation, this time through assemblies especially elected and by a limited franchise. Russell, seeing in the method the only hope of a solution of the problem which was threatening the peace of Europe, insisted on no disposal of the duchies before their unbiased opinion had been given. To this proposal the response of the Powers varied. Austria replied that while England looked to populations, Austria looked to governments and could not recognize in established monarchies the principle of popular elections,3 a disapproval in

1 Whether this was intended to refer to the vote of 1848 or to a future vote is obscure. The latter interpretation is the one generally given.

2 Le Assemblee del risorgimento, vol. 1, p. cxxxvi; Guido Fusinato, Le mutazioni territoriali, p. 99.

3 British Parliamentary Papers, Affairs of Italy [2636], pp. 19 and 34.

which Prussia sincerely concurred.1 Napoleon, however, unable to deny the force of a title based on popular vote, chose to hold the method and circumstances of the vote indecisive and to base on that argument his continued opposition to a union. To meet this opposition, Russell proposed to Cavour that fresh assemblies be elected. Napoleon, helpless before this continued appeal to the principle on which his own throne rested, was forced to agree, but with the stipulation that the vote should be by plebiscite. To this Cavour and the Governors of Tuscany and Emilia eagerly assented, as making the result more incontestable, and Russell agreed on the ground that it was a question for each country to regulate for itself. Plebiscites were accordingly taken in Tuscany and Emilia. The importance attached by Cavour to the plebiscites and his confidence in the method may be gathered from a letter written by him on the day of the voting: "If, as I hope, this last proof is decisive," he wrote, "we shall have written a marvelous page in the history of Italy. Prussia and Russia, while disputing the juridical value of universal suffrage, can not cast a doubt upon the immense value of the fact this day accomplished. The dukes, the archdukes, the grand dukes, will be found buried under the pile of ballots deposited in the electoral urns of Tuscany and Emilia." 2 From this time on Cavour made the plebiscitary method the cornerstone of his policy, and the plebiscites of Sicily and Naples, Umbria and 'the Marches, followed swiftly and decisively. Cavour's choice of method has been justified. The political effectiveness of a title based on popular will, and its superiority over any based on treaty rights or inheritance, can never be more clearly shown than in the case of Italy.

We now come to the plebiscites which in subsequent discussions of the method have been made the touchstone of its value. Napoleon had exacted the cession of Savoy and Nice as payment for his acquiescence in the annexation of Tuscany and Emilia. Unable to refuse Napoleon's demand, Cavour wished to protect himself from attack by writing into the treaty a clause providing for consultation of the inhabitants. On this he insisted in spite of the reluctance of Napoleon who was becoming cool in his support of the method on account of the bad impression made on the Northern Powers by the events in Italy.3

1 The British representative at the Prussian Court wrote that Baron Schleinitz admitted that the method offered a practical solution in Central Italy but "makes no concealment of his disapproval of the principle of appealing to the people of the Italian duchies . . . and I may add that Prussia would disapprove still more of the course about to be pursued if it were based on universal suffrage." British Parliamentary Papers, Affairs of Italy [2636], p. 36. 2 Documents, post, p. 523.

3 Russia, of all the Powers, presented an attitude of acquiescence to the Savoy cession on condition that, whatever Piedmont did, France must not base her claim on a plebiscite. Cf. William R. Thayer, The Life and Times of Cavour, vol. 2, p. 211, quoting from Ollivier, pp. 399-401.

It would be a courageous person who would venture to assert, considering the reputation of these plebiscites, that they were fair; and it would be a credulous person who could accept the mass of repeated assertions, unsupported by facts, without some scepticism. The primary error of later historians has been to confuse the two plebiscites and to treat them as one. Scanty as are the specific charges of any value against the vote of Nice, they must be considered far more weighty than those regarding the vote of Savoy which was admittedly French in race, in language and, at the time, in political sentiment. It is not necessary to account for the vote by moral pressure or the military force which, on examination, proves not to have been present. The recent events in Italy had caused in Savoy, French in culture, a fear of the predominance of the Italian element in the Sardinian monarchy which had suddenly become an Italian kingdom. To this fear was added dislike of the anti-clerical attitude of Cavour and the Italian liberals who had captured the Sardinian parliament in the recent elections. Further, the intelligent French offers of commercial development, four years shorter military service, and the removal of custom barriers, must have been potent factors. European apprehension of Napoleon who thus regained the Swiss passes, the personal feeling of Garibaldi who never forgave the loss of Nice, his birthplace, and the disregard of Swiss claims to the neutralized portions of Savoy, were probably the cause of the exaggerated charges, and the charges were greatly aided by the amusing but frivolous attacks of Lawrence Oliphant who bestowed on propaganda and exhortation all the condemnation due to fraud and corruption. Although there is no doubt that the head officials used their position to urge union, some scepticism regarding the other points of criticism seems justified by the fact that in spite of an option clause in the treaty there appears to have been only a negligible emigration; that in 1870, when the two territories might have safely revolted from France, they were, on the contrary, devoted in their loyalty; and that as far as can be discovered, there has not been an irredentist party in Savoy, Italy, or Nice.

Although the governments of Austria, Russia, and Prussia were all absolutely opposed to the Italian independence which had just been erected through popular consultation and Great Britain was especially hostile to the cession of Savoy and Nice so accomplished, the principle was so firmly established by 1863 that it was again and even more definitely written into an international protocol signed by these four Powers which, by the Treaty of Paris, had been set up as guarantors of the Ionian Islands. This protocol was signed on August 1, 1863. In it the acquiescence of the protecting Powers is given to the expressed intention of Great Britain to allow the union of the Islands to Greece if the Ionian assembly should choose such union rather than the continuance of the British protectorate. The new assembly, spe