et par les phases successives de la négociation qui vient de vous être exposé. La spontanéité de l'offre qui nous a été déférée, la vivacité persistante des souvenirs qu'elle a eu pour effet de réveiller, l'unanime et touchante démonstration qui nous a été adressée de l'autre côté de l'Océan, sont des témoignages auxquels notre patriotisme n'a pu demeurer insensible. Nous avons saisi, non sans quelque émotion, nous devons l'avouer, l'occasion de rattacher à la patrie, dont sur une rive lointaine elle avait gardé si fidèlement le culte, cette petite colonie essentiellement française. Vous aussi, nous en avons l'assurance, vous estimerez le prix de l'acquisition qui nous est proposée, non d'après l'étendue du territoire ou le nombre des sujets, mais d'après la valeur morale de ce pieux attachement pour la France. the successive phases of the negotiation which we have just revealed to you. The spontaneity of the offer which has been tendered to us, the persistent vivacity of the memories that it had the effect of awakening, the unanimous and touching demonstration addressed to us from the other side of the ocean, are testimonies to which our patriotism could not remain insensible. We have seized, not without some emotion, we must confess, the occasion to reattach this little colony, essentially French, to the country whose worship it has so faithfully guarded on a distant shore. You too, we feel assured, will estimate the price of the acquisition which is proposed to us, not according to the extent of territory or the number of subjects, but according to the moral value of this pious attachment for France. THE TACNA-ARICA QUESTION, 1883—. Extracts from the Correspondence Between the Secretary of State of the United States and the United States Minister Plenipotentiary to Chile. June 26, 1882-July 2, 1883 1 1 SIR: MR. FRELINGHUYSEN TO MR. LOGAN Department of State, Washington, June 26, 1882. The war between Peru and Bolivia on the one side and Chili on the other began more than three years ago. In 1880 the substantial success of Chili and its conquest and occupation of all the littoral territory of Bolivia, furnished an opportunity for a pause in operations and for negotiations for peace, which were conducted in the presence of the representatives of the United States. At that time a peace could probably have been secured upon much more favorable terms for the defeated party than are possible now. The allies refused then to concede territory to Chili, and the negotiations failing, the war was continued until Chili became master of the coast and of the capital of Peru. President Pierola fled, and Mr. Calderon was made President and Mr. Montero Vice-President of Peru. This Government was recognized by the United States. The Chilian authorities arrested Mr. Calderon and carried him to Chili, and the United States continued to recognize the same. Government in the person of Mr. Montero. After the arrest of Mr. Calderon the President sent a special mission to both countries in the hope that a way might be found for terminating the war through the exercise of the good offices of the United States. It was hoped that Peru and Bolivia might, through our generous and unselfish counsels, be brought to see that Chili, as a conqueror, had a right to substantial indemnity as the result of victory. On the other hand, it was also hoped that Chili might be found willing to accept a money indemnity sufficient to compensate her for the losses and expenses of war without demanding a sacrifice of territory from the other belligerents. All these hopes proved to be groundless. The mission returned, having effected nothing beyond giving new proof to all parties of the good will of the United States, and of their desire to bring about an equitable and lasting peace. 1 United States, Foreign Relations, 1883, p. 74. Notwithstanding the failure of past efforts, we have reason to think that both parties still wish for peace, and that both still desire to have it effected through the good offices of the United States. It will therefore be the first and most pressing duty of the new missions to Chili and Peru to cooperate for that purpose. As a conquering nation Chili is entitled to the reasonable and natural fruits of victory, chief among which are an indemnity to cover her just losses and a guaranty of future peace and safety. What may be the nature of the indemnity and what that of the guaranty, this Government can not undertake to dictate or to prescribe. A proper indemnity may involve a payment of money or even the cession of territory, and the guaranty, to be effectual, may exact stipulations relating to the control of strategic points or may even assume other forms as they may be found necessary to attain the end desired. We, in common with the other American Republics, are only interested to prevent by our counsels the perpetration of substantial injustice. The President has been disappointed by the failure of the parties to conclude a peace. Without completely subjugating her adversary, Chili has caused the disorganization of the Government of Peru, paralyzed its financial interests, and disastrously affected the pecuniary and other interests of those citizens of neutral states who have gone there to assist in the development and progress of the country. This state of affairs should be terminated, and will be if friendly counsels are allowed to prevail. If, upon your arrival in Chili, it seems advisable so to do, you will in a prudent and courteous manner communicate the substance of these views to the Chilian Government at such time and to such extent as you may deem proper, and you will signify your disposition, under instructions of your Government, to render every assistance within your power towards bringing about the much-desired settlement. Owing to the great distance of Chili from the United States and the rapidity of events in such crises, it will be impossible for you to communicate with this Government for instructions upon subjects which may be settled before an answer can reach you; much, therefore, must be left to your own judgment and discretion. It is understood that Chili is in possession of the littoral province of Bolivia and of the Peruvian littoral provinces of Tarapaca, Tacna, and Arica. It is not supposed that any contingency can happen which will bring about the permanent occupation and annexation by Chili of any larger part of Peru than this. Your efforts, therefore, must be directed towards securing for Peru as large a part of these provinces in the treaty of peace as possible, and as large a money indemnity as possible for whatever territory may be retained by Chili. In my instructions to Mr. Trescot, of the 9th of January last, I said: The President wishes in no manner to dictate or make any authoritative utterance to either Peru or Chili as to the merits of the controversy existing between those Republics, or as to what indemnity should be asked or given, as to a change of boundaries or as to the personnel of the Government of Peru. The President recognizes Peru and Chili to be independent Republics, to which he has no right or inclination to dictate. The President adheres to those views and expects that they will be regarded in the conduct of these negotiations. Under cover of this dispatch I inclose the copy of a note addressed by myself to the minister of foreign affairs, covering in a brief and compact form the history of the recent peace negotiations with Señor Garcia Calderon. My previous dispatches to you embrace the same subject in a much more detailed and extended form. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's esteemed note of yesterday, requesting me to furnish you a brief statement of the vari ous attempts to agree upon a basis of terms for a treaty of peace between Chili and Peru. In reply I beg leave to assure you of the pleasure it will afford me to give you a short history of the negotiations referred to. At the interview held with your excellency after the interchange of notes under date of September 9 ultimo, I stated to you that, as my Government could not feel that the terms of the protocol of Viña del Mar were such as it could recommend Peru to accept, I was anxious that some substantial modification of those terms might be made, in order that my Government could be able to use its good offices in bringing about a peace between its friends. After further consultation, you said that the demands of Chili would be reduced practically to three conditions: first, the cession of Tarapaca; second, the right to purchase the district of Tacna and Arica for a nominal sum of money: and, third, the right to control the sale of guano advertised for the 18th of October. You further said that these conditions were absolute and final. I then had a conference with Señor Calderon, to ascertain what his views would be upon these conditions. This Gentleman said that without some authoritative expression from his people he did not feel at liberty to agree to any peace upon the basis of a cession of territory. He desired a truce of three years, during which time the opinions of the Peruvians might be unified and a line of action clearly defined. I presented this request for a truce to your excellency, who immediately declined to entertain the proposition. I then requested permission to allow Señor Calderon to go to Peru for a short time, in order to consult his people upon making a peace upon the terms proposed by your excellency. It was not deemed expedient to grant this request. I then asked that he be permitted to go to Angol, where a number of prominent Peruvians are domiciled, and offered to accompany him in person. This permission was granted, and our voyage to that place was facilitated by your excellency. At Angol we had long consultations with Señor Calderon's friends, and a conclusion was arrived at which rendered me entirely confident that Señor Calderon would be able to comply with the requirements of your excellency's Government. Soon after our return to Santiago, my understanding is, that Señor Calderon received advices directly from his people in Peru, which seemed positively to prohibit his making an agreement to sell the territory of Tacna and Arica, though he felt fully authorized to consent to the cession of Tarapaca. In consequence of these advices Señor Calderon has steadily refused since that time to consent to a direct sale of the territory alluded to. This decided opposition of the parties has given rise to the various efforts at a compromise. These efforts have been made upon the basis of several |