formally banished them. Another decade was to pass before unity could

be achieved.

THE ITALIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES OF 1859

However permanent the Powers may have considered the restoration of the petty princes to their Italian thrones in 1849, it was obvious that the inhabitants of the duchies regarded the arrangement as purely temporary. By 1859, there was but one party in Northern Italy, that for union with Sardinia. Republican prestige had greatly increased after the defeat of Sardinia in 1849, only to fall again through the subsequent ill-conceived revolutionary attempts in Genoa, Milan and Leghorn. It was, too, becoming increasingly evident that union could come only by the aid of France and the complacency of Europe and that neither France nor Europe looked with favor on the proposal of a republic in the Italian peninsula. Thinking union more important than form, many of the republican leaders, among them Manin, and thousands of their followers, had gone over to the Sardinian party. La Farina, Manin and Pallavicino, three former republicans, founded the Società nazionale with the motto "Unity, Independence and Victor Emanuel," which made great headway, especially in the provinces under Austria. The party for federation under the Pope, the plan so eloquently urged by Gioberti, had long since been abandoned by its leader and was of small importance in Italy, though, having found a lodgment in the brain of Napoleon, it was to cause endless difficulty. The Sardinian party had no rivals save in Tuscany, where there was a party for autonomy, of uncertain strength, and in Rome and Naples where the liberals still wished for constitutional government rather than for union.

Napoleon's aid against Austria had been promised to Cavour at Plombières in 1858. By the bargain made there, the Austrians were to be expelled, from the Alps to the Adriatic, Venetia and Lombardy were to be annexed to Sardinia, Central Italy was to form a separate kingdom under a Bonapartist prince, Naples was to be a third under Lucien Murat, and the whole was to form an Italian confederation under the presidency of the Pope. In return for this, Savoy and Nice, which had formed part of France after the plebiscites in 1792,1 and had been returned to Sardinia in 1815, were to be given back to France.

The war which had been planned at Plombières by Cavour and Napoleon broke out on April 29, 1859. The petty princes ruling over Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, and their dependencies, were completely under Austrian domination. When the invitation of Sardinia to join in the war of liberation was 1 Cf. ante, pp. 41, 43.

received, each in turn refused. The refusal was followed by a bloodless and orderly revolution in each duchy; the liberals rose, assumed power, and established a provisional government, which, in each province, announced the deposition of the reigning house.1 Tuscany and the Romagna,2 to which the union of 1848 had not extended, joined in the general revolt, proclaimed Victor Emanuel dictator, and sent envoys to Sardinia to offer allegiance. Lombardy, Parma and Modena, which had voted union in 1848, at once proclaimed the union to be again effective. Fearful of awakening the apprehension of the Powers at this early date, Cavour, the King and the Emperor thought it impolitic to accept these offers. Yet, as unity of action was essential for military success, a royal commissioner was appointed to each province to represent the King and the cause of Italian liberation, it being carefully stated that this was in no way to prejudice the question of union, a question which both Napoleon and Victor Emanuel had promised should be settled by a vote of the people themselves. 3

The events of the war need not be given here, nor the many explanations of the unexpected peace concluded between Napoleon and Francis Joseph at Villafranca. By the agreement there drawn up Venetia was to remain with Austria, while Lombardy was ceded to Napoleon, to be in turn ceded by him to Victor Emanuel. It is said that Napoleon made every effort to write into this article a stipulation of a vote of the Lombard people before the final cession. Francis Joseph utterly refused to give recognition to such a revolutionary doctrine. The only vote in 1859 in Lombardy was that of the municipal congregation of Milan renewing the compact of 1848, a vote ratified in turn by the communal council.5

The cession of Lombardy was the sole concession made at Villafranca to Italian national aspiration. Venetia was to be retained by Austria, the dukes were to be restored to Tuscany and Modena, and the papal legates to Romagna. Parma alone was left unmentioned.

Napoleon, on leaving Italy, had promised that there should be no armed intervention to effect the restoration and that votes legimately expressed

1 The provisional government of Florence was appointed by the municipality on April 27. 2 The Romagna was a part of the papal territory and was administered by papal legates.

3 Napoleon, on June 8, after the battle of Magenta, said, in a proclamation to the Italian people, "I do not come among you with a preconceived system, to dispossess sovereigns or to impose my will; my army will busy itself with only two things, to fight your enemies and to maintain international order; it will oppose no obstacle to the free manifestation of your legitimate desires." Translation. For original text see Luigi Zini, Storia d'Italia dal 1850. al 1866, vol. 2, part 2, document no. 189 B.

4 Cf. ante, p. 13.

5 Documents, post, pp. 496 and 497.

This stipulation is not contained in the Preliminaries. It was the result of subsequent diplomatic exchanges.

should be carefully considered.1 Deprived by Napoleon's defection of the hope of success through force, the Italians were compelled to take the hint dropped by the Emperor and to rely on their own political resources. The problem was no longer one of how to win a majority to the cause of unity, but how to make the will of the majority triumph in the face of foreign opposition. The Powers were soon to gather at Zurich to complete the Preliminaries of Villafranca and the parcelling out of the Italians. To defeat the ancient methods of diplomacy, the Italians determined to resort once more to the doctrine of national self-determination. Cavour resigned from the ministry the better to work for the union, which must be now done unofficially, and, on the insistence of Napoleon, the Sardinian commissioners were recalled.

England and the English Cabinet, with Palmerston as Prime Minister, Lord John Russell as Foreign Secretary and Gladstone as Chancellor of the Exchequer, then took Napoleon's place as guardian of the Italian cause. Whereas Queen Victoria, the Prince Consort, and the Tories were consistently averse to the expulsion of Austria from the Italian peninsula, the Cabinet and the Liberals were the devoted friends of Italian freedom. Russell had indignantly opposed and repulsed the invitation to join in the two Emperors' plans. "We are asked to propose a partition of the peoples of Italy," he exclaimed, as if we had the right to dispose of them." 2 In this attitude, policy harmonized with conviction. The Cabinet was determined on preserving the peace of Europe while Villafranca, by ignoring national aspirations, gave promise of future war. Such a war, moreover, would certainly result either in the end of the liberal movement in Italy or, equally fearful to believers in constitutional monarchy, it would end by setting up an Italian republic. The latter fear was one which Cavour found a most effective weapon.

In support of the policy of the Cabinet Russell made direct appeal to the doctrine of self-determination. The Cabinet, said Russell, was wholly opposed to the restoration of the dukes by force, which would be, in its opinion, unjustifiable; should such restoration be by the consent of the people, Great Britain would not object. The unbiased opinion of the people must, however, be clearly ascertained, and to establish the wishes of Tuscany, Russell supported the holding of a national assembly, elected in a fair and orderly fashion.3

1 Documents, post, p. 444. Cf. also address of Ricasoli to the Tuscan Assembly at the opening session. Le assemblee del risorgimento, vol. 3, p. 660. To Cavour Napoleon had said that he would plead the people's cause before the European Congress and that, meanwhile, they had simply to keep the tyrants from returning. Cavour to La Marmora, July 16, 1859, Chiala, vol. 3, p. 111. To the representatives of Parma who waited on him in Paris after his return he said to tell the people that their armies would not force the issue, but that their votes would. Giacometti, La question italienne, p. 353.

2 Stuart J. Reid, Lord John Russell, p. 304.

3 Russell, on July 19, wrote to Corbett, the British representative at Florence, who was

Encouraged by Russell's support, the Tuscan ministry on July 15, immediately after Villafranca, and in order to attest their wishes before Europe, issued a decree convoking a representative assembly, competent to pass a legitimate vote as to the definitive fate of Tuscany. The decree was signed by both the Sardinian commissioner and the provisional government. Instead of universal manhood suffrage, the decree provided for a qualified suffrage similar to that in Sardinia, based on a fairly low property, educational or professional qualification. In Modena, Parma, Piacenza, and Romagna similar assemblies were convoked on the basis of adult literate male suffrage. The voting was not by signing a register, as in '48, but by secret ballots cast in primary assemblies. The election machinery was in the hands of the provisional governments, the details of registration to be administered by the mayors. The period for compiling the lists and for claims to be entered appears to have been somewhat short,— eight days for lists and three for claims after posting, with appeal from decisions to a higher court.

In default of any definite information it is probable that the voting was by procedure similar to that established for electoral colleges by the Sardinian electoral law of March 17, 1848. By this law a card of identification was necessary for each voter to enter the voting place. A list of names of those qualified was posted in the hall, another copy was in the hands of the presiding officer. Each elector answering to his name, called from the list, received from the President a printed ballot on which he wrote his vote, or, if illiterate, got another man to write it. He then folded the ballot and gave it to the President who placed it in an urn" or ballot-box.

66

The British Foreign Office kept a close watch over the conditions surrounding the vote. In answer to reports from Corbett, British representative at Florence, that oppressive measures were being used against partisans of the Grand Duke,1 Russell instructed him to inform the provisional government that attempts to repress a free declaration of opinion in a matter of such vital interest to the government of the country would be unjust and illiberal. On July 26 Corbett wrote that almost all who have the right to vote had registered, and that he had been assured by the government of a full and free expression of opinion. By a decree of July 29 the date of the elections was fixed for August 7. On August 1 Boncompagni in order to disarm critiendeavoring to discount the feeling for union in his dispatches to the Foreign Office, "It is much to be desired that a representative assembly should be convoked in Tuscany in order that the wishes of the people in favor of the autonomy of that country may be regularly and freely expressed." Documents, post, p. 449. See also Russell to Cowley (at Turin) July 25, Parliamentary Papers, Affairs of Italy, 1860, vol. 68 [2609], p. 20.

1 Parliamentary Papers [2609], p. 28. Corbett also quotes one of the government as saying that it had been necessary to warn some of the ducal party who had shown a disposition towards disturbance. Ibid., p. 44.

cism, resigned office and retired from Tuscany, an act at which Russell expressed the great satisfaction of the British Government as representing the intention of Sardinia to leave Tuscany wholly unfettered in her future choice.1 Ricasoli, a native of Tuscany, had been appointed by Boncompagni as President of the Council of Ministers. By a decree of August 2, Ricasoli ordered the president of each electoral college to inform the electors that the college was to elect a representative "for the sole purpose of expressing the legitimate vote of the Tuscan people as to the definite fate of the country." 2 The elections were held on August 7. No complete official figures of the result are available, but Corbett in a dispatch of August 10 3 gives the returns as follows:

According to Corbett probably three-fourths of the entire electorate went to the polls in spite of the efforts of the priests, who, though no longer election officials, made full use of their religious power to persuade them to abstain. This was more successful in the country districts than in the towns. The archbishop of Florence had shown his discountenance to the elections, but this attitude was not universally followed, for in other districts four priests were themselves elected. The testimony of both Hudson from Turin, and Corbett from Florence, is to the effect that the elections were carried on throughout the country in the most orderly manner, and that the result was received with such lively enthusiasm as to indicate that the Grand Duke had few friends. The enthusiasm appeared to be from all classes, though, Corbett adds, had the vote been by universal suffrage the result might well have been different as the lower orders had taken little interest in politics, and, in the country places, where there was no dislike of the Grand Duke, the people might have been induced to give their votes for restoration. But, he concluded, such a result would have been wholly at variance with the desires of the upper and middle classes. The Grand Duke's cause had been destroyed for these by his presence with the Austrian forces at the battle of Solferino, and the common danger had awakened a community of feeling with Central Italy, the party of union with Piedmont in each province gaining courage from the strength of similar parties.

Corbett adds that another reason for the apparent unanimity is that many

1 Parliamentary Papers [2609], pp. 33, 36 and 44.

2 Documents, post, p. 453.

3 Parliamentary Papers [2609], p. 54.

4 Ibid.