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ture; but capable of seeing that the proof is not lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by these objections. But then a thorough examination into religion, with regard to these objections, which cannot be the business of every man, is a matter of pretty large compass, and from the nature of it, requires some knowledge, as well as time and attention, to see how the evidence comes out, upon balancing one thing with another, and what, upon the whole, is the amount of it. Now, if persons who have picked up these objections from others, and take for granted they are of weight, upon the word of those from whom they received them, or, by often retailing of them, come to see, or fancy they see, them to be of weight, will not prepare themselves for such an examination, with a competent degree of knowledge; or will not give that time and attention to the subject, which, from the nature of it, is necessary for attaining such information : in this case, they must remain in doubtful

ness, ignorance, or error ; in the same way as they must, with : regard to common sciences, and matters of common life, if they neglect the necessary means of being informed in them.

But still, perhaps, it will be objected, that if a prince or common master were to send directions to a servant, he would take care, that they should always bear the certain marks who they came from, and that their sense should be always plain ; so as that there should be no possible doubt, if he could help it, concerning the authority or meaning of them. Now, the proper answer to all this kind of objections is, that, wherever the fallacy lies, it is even certain we cannot argue thus with respect to him who is the Governor of the world: and particularly that he does not afford us such information with respect to our temporal affairs and interests, as experience abundantly shews. However, there is a full answer to this objection, from the very nature of religion. For, the reason why a prince would give his directions in this plain manner, is, that he absolutely desires such an external action should be done, without concerning himself with the motive or principle upon which it is done: i. e. he regards only the external event, or the thing's being done, and not at all, properly speaking, the doing of it, or the action. Whereas the whole of morality and religion consisting merely in action itself, there is no sort of parallel between the cases. But if the prince be supposed to regard only the action ; i. e. only to desire to exercise, or in

any sense prove, the understanding or loyalty of a servant, he would not always give his orders in such a plain manner. It may be proper to add, that the will of God, respecting morality and religion, may

be considered, either as absolute, or as only conditional. If i be absolute, it can only be thus, that we should act virtuousi, in such given circumstances; not that we should be brought to act so, by his changing of our circumstances. And if God will be thus absolute, then it is in our power, in the highes: and strictest sense, to do or to contradict his will, which is a most weighty consideration. Or his will may be considered only as conditional, that if we act so and so, we shall be rewarded ; if otherwise, punished : of which conditional will of the Author of nature, the whole constitution of it affords most certain instances.

Upon the whole: That we are in a state of religion, necessarily implies, that we are in a state of probation : And the credibility of our being at all in such a state being admitted, there seems no peculiar difficulty in supposing our probation to be. just as it is, in those respects which are above objected against There seems no pretence from the reason of the thing, to say, that the trial cannot equitably be any thing, but whether persons will act suitably to certain information, or such as admits nó room for doubt; so as that there can be no danger of miscarriage, but either from their not attending to what they certainly know, or from overbearing passion hurrying them on to act contrary to it. For, since ignorance and doubt afford scope for probation in all senses, as really as intuitive conviction or certainty; and since the two former are to be put to the same account as difficulties in practice ; men's moral probation may also be, whether they will take due care to inform themselves by impartial consideration, and afterwards whether they will act as the case requires, upon the evidence which they have, however doubtful. And this, we find by experience, is frequently our probation, (pages 260, 391, 393,) in our temporal capacity. For the information which we want, with regard to our worldly interests, is by no means always given us of course, without any care of our own. And we are greatly liable to self-deceit from inward secret prejudices, and also to the deceits of others. So that to be able to judge what is the prudent part, often requires much and difficult consideration. Then after we have judged the very best we can, the evidence upon which we must act, if we will live and act at all, is perpetually doubtful to a very high degree. And the constitution and course of the world in fact is such, as that want of impartial consideration what we have to do, and venturing upon extravagant courses, because it is doubtful what will be the consequence, are often naturally, i. e. providentially, altogether as

fatal, as miseonduct occasioned by heedless inattention, to what "we certainly know, or disregarding it from overbearing passion. Several of the observations here made may

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seem strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good men. But if the persons for whose sake they are made, think so; persons who object as above, and throw off 'all regard to religion under pretence of want of evidence; I desire them to consider again whether their thinking so, be owing to any thing unintelligible in these observations, or to their own not having such a sense of religion and serious solicitude about it, as even their state of scepticism does in all reason require ? It ought to be forced upon the reflection of these persons, that our nature and condition necessarily require us, in the daily course of life, to act upon evidence much lower than what is commonly called probable; to guard, not only against what we fully believe will, but also against what we think it supposable may, happen ; and to engage in pursuits when the probability is greatly against success, if it be credible that possibly we may suceeed in them.

CHAP. VII.

OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY.

The presumptions against revelation, and objections against the general scheme of Christianity, and particular things relating to it, being removed, there remains to be considered, what positive evidence we have for the truth of it; chiefly in order to see, what the analogy of nature suggests with regard to that evidence, and the objections against it; or to see what is, and is allowed to be, the plain natural rule of judgment and of action, in our temporal concerns, in cases where we have the same kind of evidence, and the same kind of objections against it, that we have in the case before us.

Now, in the evidence of Christianity, there seem to be several things of great weight, not reducible to the head, either of miracles, or the completion of prophecy, in the common acceptation of the words. But these two are its direct and fundamental proofs; and those other things, however considerable they are, yet ought never to be urged apart from its direct proofs, but always to be joined with them. Thus the evidence of Christianity will be a long series of things, reaching, as it seems, from the beginning of the world to the present time, of great variety and compass, taking in both the direct, and also the collatera proofs, and making up, all of them together, one argument ; the conviction arising from which kind of proof may be compared to what they call the effect in architecture or other works of art ; a result from a great number of things so and so disposed, and taken into one view. I shall therefore, first, make some observations relating to miracles, and the appearing corpletions of prophecy; and consider what analogy suggests, in answer to the objections brought against this evidence. And, secondly, I shall endeavour to give some account of the general argument now mentioned, consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence, considered as making up one argument: this being the kind of proof, upon which we determine most questions of difficulty concerning common facts, alleged to have happened, or seeming likely to happen ; especially questions relating to conduct.

First, I shall make some observations upon the direct proof of Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and upon the objections alleged against it.

I. Now, the following observations, relating to the historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, appear to be of great weight.

1. The Old Testament affords us the same historical evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets, as of the common civil history of Moses and the kings of Israel ; or, as of the affairs of the Jewish nation. And the Gospels and the Acts afford us the same historical evidence of the miracles of Christ and the apostles, as of the common matters related in them. This, indeed, could not have been affirmed by any reasonable man, if the authors of these books, like many other historians, had appeared to make an entertaining manner of writing their aim ; though they had interspersed miracles in their works, at proper distances, and upon proper occasions. These might have animated a dull relation, amused the reader, and engaged his attention. And the same account would naturally have been given of them, as of the speeches and descriptions of such authors; the same account, in a manner, as is to be given, why the poets make use of wonders and prodigies. But the facts

, both miraculous and natural, in Scripture, are related in plain unadorned narratives; and both of them appear, in all respects, to stand

the same foot of historical evidence. Farther ; some parts of Scripture containing an account of miracles fully sufficient to prove the truth of Christianity, are quoted as ge

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nuine, from the age in which they are said to be written, down to the present; and no other parts of them, material in the present question, are omitted to be quoted in such manner, as to afford any sort of proof of their not being genuine. And, as common history, when called in question in any instance, may often be greatly confirmed by contemporary or subsequent events more known and acknowledged ; and as the common Scripture history, like many others, is thus confirmed; so likewise is the miraculous history of it, not only in particular instances, but in general. For, the establishment of the Jewish and Christian religions, which were events contemporary with the miracles related to be wrought in attestation of both, or subsequent to them, these events are just what we should have expected, upon supposition such miracles were really wrought to attest the truth of those religions. These miracles are a satisfactory account of those events; of which no other satisfactory account can be given, nor any account at all, but what is imaginary merely and invented. It is to be added, that the most obvious, the most easy and direct account of this history, how it came to be written and to be received in the world as a true history, is, that it really is so; nor can any other account of it be easy and direct. Now, though an account, not at all obvious, but very far-fetched and indirect, may indeed be, and often is, the true account of a matter; yet it cannot be admitted on the authority of its being asserted. Mere guess, supposition, and possibility, when opposed to historical evidence, prove nothing, but that historical evidence is not demonstrative.

Now, the just consequence from all this, I think, is, that the Scripture history, in general, is to be admitted as an authentic genuine history, till somewhat positive be alleged sufficient to invalidate it.' But no man will deny the consequence to be, that it cannot be rejected, or thrown by as of no authority, till it can be proved to be of none; even though the evidence now mentioned for its authority were doubtful. This evidence may be confr

be confronted by historical evidence on the other side, if there be any; or general incredibility in the things related, or inconsistence in the general turn of the history, would prove it to be of no authority. But since, upon the face of the matter, upon a first and general view, the appearance is, that it is an authentic history, it cannot be determined to be fictitious without some proof that it is so. And the following observations, in support of these and coincident with them, will greatly confirm the historical evidence for the truth of Christianity.