ture, but from the very nature of the revealed relations which they stand in to us?” I answer, the religious regards of rever, ence, honour, love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope. In what external manner this inward worship is to be expressed, is a matter of pure revealed command; as perhaps, the external manner in which God the Father is to be worshipped, may be more so than we are ready to think; but the worship, the internal wor. ship itself, to the Son and Holy Ghost, is no farther matter of pure revealed command, than as the relations they stand in to us are matter of pure revelation ; for the relations being known, the obligations to such internal worship are obligations of reason, arising out of those relations themselves. In short, the history of the gospel as immediately shows us the reason of these obligations, as it shows us the meaning of the words, Son and Holy Ghost.

If this account of the Christian religion be just, those persons who can speak lightly of it, as of little consequence, provided natural religion be kept to, plainly forget, that Christianity, even what is peculiarly so called, as distinguished from natural religion, has yet somewhat very important, even of a moral nature. For the office of our Lord being made known, and the relation he stands in to us, the obligation of religious regards to him is plainly moral, as much as charity to man. kind is; since this obligation arises, before external command, immediately out of that his office and relation itself. Those persons appear to forget, that revelation is to be considered as informing us of somewhat new in the state of mankind, and in the government of the world ; as acquainting us with some relations we stand in, which could not otherwise have been known. And these relations being real, (though before reve. lation we could be under no obligations from them, yet upon their being revealed,) there is no reason to think, but that neglect of behaving suitably to them will be attended with the same kind of consequences under God's government, as neglecting to behave suitably to any other relations made known to us by reason. And ignorance, whether unavoidable or voluntary, so far as we can possibly see, will, just as much, and just as little, excuse in one case as in the other; the ignorance being supposed equally unavoidable, or equally voluntary, in

If, therefore, Christ be indeed the Mediator between God and man, i. e. if Christianity be true ; if he be indeed our Lord, our Saviour, and our God, no one can say what may follow, not only the obstinate, but the careless, disregard to him

both cases.

in those high relations. Nay, no one can say what may follow such disregard, even in the way of natural consequence. (Pages 253, 254.) For, as the natural consequences of vice in this life are doubtless to be considered as judicial punishments inflicted by God, so likewise, for ought we know, the judicial punishments of the future life may be, in a like way, or a like sense, the natural consequence of vice, (chap. v.) of men's violating or disregarding the relations which God has placed them in here, and made known to them.

Again, if mankind are corrupted and depraved in their moral character, and so are unfit for that state which Christ is gone to prepare for his disciples ; and if the assistance of God's Spirit be necessary to renew

their nature, in the degree requisite to their being qualified for that state ; all which is implied in the express, though figurative, declaration, Except a man be born of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God, John iii. 5; supposing this, is it possible any serious person can think it a slight matter, whether or no he makes use of the means expressly commanded by God, for obtaining this divine assistance especially since the whole analogy of nature shews, that we are not to expect any benefits, without making use of the appointed means for obtaining or enjoying them. Now reason shews us nothing of the particular immediate means of obtaining either temporal or spiritual benefits. This, therefore, we must learn, either from experience or revelation. And experience the present case does not admit of.

The conclusion from all this evidently is, that Christianity being supposed either true or credible, it is unspeakable irreverence, and really the most presumptuous rashness, to treat it as a light matter. It can never justly be esteemed of little consequence, till it be positively supposed false. Nor do I I know a higher and more important obligation which we are under, than that of examining most seriously into the evidence of it, supposing its credibility, and of embracing it, upon supposition of its truth.

The two following deductions may be proper to be added, in order to illustrate the foregoing observations, and to prevent their being mistaken.

First, Hence we may clearly see, where lies the distinction between what is positive and what is moral in religion. Moral precepts are precepts, the reasons of which we see ; positive precepts are precepts, the reasons of which we do not see.*

• This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts, considered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have somewhat of a moral

Moral duties arise out of the nature of the case itself, prior to external command. Positive duties do not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external command; nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such command received from him, whose creatures and subjects we are. But the manner in which the nature of the case, or the fact of the relation, is made known, this doth not denominate any duty, either po. sitive or moral. That we be baptized in the name of the Fa. ther, is as much a positive duty as that we be baptized in the name of the Son ; because both arise equally from revealed command ; though the relation which we stand in to God the Father, is made known to us by reason ; the relation we stand in to Christ, by revelation only. On the other hand, the dispensation of the gospel admitted, gratitude as immcdiately becomes due to Christ, from his being the voluntary minister of this dispensation, as it is due to God the Father, from his being the fountain of all good; though the first is made known to us by revelation only, the second by reason. Hence also we may see, and, for distinctness sake, it may be worth mentioning, that positive institutions come under a twofold consideration. They are either institutions founded on natural religion, as baptism in the name of the Father; though this has also a particular reference to the gospel dispensation, for it is in the name of God, as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ; or they are external institutions founded on revealed religion, as baptism in the name of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.

Secondly, From the distinction between what is moral and what is positive in religion, appears the ground of that peculiar preference, which the Scripture teaches us to be due to the former.

The reason of positive institutions in general is very obvious, though we should not see the reason why such particular ones are pitched upon, rather than others. Whoever, therefore, instead of cavilling at words, will attend to the thing itself, may clearly see, that positive institutions in general, as distinguished from this or that particular one, have the nature of moral commands ; since the reasons of them appear. Thus, for instance, the external worship of God is a moral duty, though no particular mode of it be so. Care then is to be taken, when a

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comparison is made between positive and moral duties, that they be compared no farther than as they are different; no farther than as the former are positive, or arise out of mere ex. ternal command, the reasons of which we are not acquainted with; and as the latter are moral, or arise out of the apparent reason of the case, without such external command. Unless this caution be observed, we shall run into endless confusion.

Now, this being premised, suppose two standing precepts enjoined by the same authority ; that, in certain conjunctures, it is impossible to obey both; that the former is moral, i. e. a precept of which we see the reasons, and that they hold in the particular case before us; but that the latter is positive, i. e. a precept of which we do not see the reasons ; it is indisputable that our obligations are to obey the former, because there is an apparent reason for this preference, and none against it. Farther, positive institutions, I suppose all those which Christianity enjoins, are means to a moral end; and the end must be acknowledged more excellent than the means. Nor is observance of these institutions any religious obedience at all, or or of any value, otherwise than as it proceeds from a moral principle. This seems to be the strict logical way of stating and determining this matter; but will, perhaps, be found less applicable to practice, than may be thought at first sight.

And therefore, in a more practical, though more lax way of consideration, and taking the words, moral law and positive institutions, in the popular sense; I add, that the whole moral law is as much matter of revealed command, as positive institutions are; for the Scripture enjoins every moral virtue. In this respect, then, they are both upon a level. But the moral law is, moreover, written upon our hearts; interwoven into our very nature.

And this is a plain intimation of the Author of it, which is to be preferred, when they interfere.

But there is not altogether so much necessity for the determination of this question as some persons seem to think. Nor are we left to reason alone to determine it. For, first, Though mankind have, in all ages, been greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites, by way of equivalent for obedience to moral precepts; yet, without making any comparison at all between them, and consequently, without determining which is to have the preference, the nature of the thing abundantly shews all notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of true religion; as they are, moreover, contrary to the whole neral tenor of Scripture, and likewise to the most express particular declarations of it, that nothing can render us accepted

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of God, without moral virtue. Secondly, Upon the occasion of mentioning together positive and moral duties, the Scripture always puts the stress of religion upon the latter, and never upon the former; which, though no sort of allowance to neglect the former, when they do not interfere with the latter, yet is a plain intimation, that when they do, the latter are to be preferred. And, farther, as mankind are for placing the stress of their religion any where, rather than upon virtue, lest both the reason of the thing, and the general spirit of Christianity, appearing in the intimation now mentioned, should be ineffectual against this prevalent folly; our Lord himself, from whose command alone the obligation of positive institutions arises, has taken occasion to make the comparison between them and moral precepts, when the Pharisees censured him for eating with publicans and sinners ; and also when they censured his disciples for plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath-day. Upon this comparison he has determined expressly, and in form, which shall have the preference when they interfere. And by delivering his authoritative determination in a proverbial manner of expression, he has made it general : I will hare mercy, and not sacrifice. (Matt. ix. 13. and xii. 70). The propriety of the word proverbial is not the thing insisted upon, though, I think, the manner of speaking is to be called so. But that the manuer of speaking very remarkably renders the determination general, is surely indisputable. For, had it, in the latter case, been said only, that God preferred mercy to the rigid observance of the Sabbath, even then, by parity of reason, most justly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy, likewise, to the observance of other ritual institutions, and, in general, moral duties to positive ones. And thus the determination would have been general, though its being so were inferred, and not expressed. But as the passage really stands in the gospel, it is much stronger ; for the sense, and the very literal words of our Lord's answer, are as applicable to any other instance of a comparison, between positive and moral duties, as to this upon which they were spoken. And if, in case of competition, mercy is to be preferred to positive institutions, it will scarce be thought, that justice is to give place to them. It is remarkable too, that, as the words are a quotation from the Old Testament, they are introduced, on both the forementioned occasions, with a declaration, that the Pharisees did not understand the meaning of them. This, I say, is very remarkable; for, since it is scarce possible for the most ignorant person not to understand the literal sense of the pas