possibility which they felt of otherwise explaining it. What a pitiable and unsatisfactory resource of unassisted reason ! With it must be rejected the apparently more philosophical, but evidently congenial notion of two first principles opposed the one to the other, the Arimanius and Oromasdes of the east, the figurative “ light” and “ darkness” testified against in the Holy Scriptures ;-and as derived from this, the Manichæan doctrine of the inherent evil of matter with all the reveries of the gnostics, whether prior or posterior to the dogma which afterwards held such a conspicuous place in the system of Manes.

Later attempts have equally failed. The origin of moral evil cannot be traced to the mal-conformation of the body; for supposing a God whose work must be perfect, no such conformation was to be expected without the previous existence of that very species of evil, as the ground of punitive actings. The same remark will hold with regard to any supposed original defect of rectitude, or adaptation to virtue, in the intellectual and active powers. Far less can the influence of example, whatever place it may have in perpetuating moral evil, account for its origin. Bad example necessarily implies the existence of the evil prior to imitation ; and as it could not exist with the Deity, it must be supposed to exhibit itself in some created being.

But neither is the scheme which deduces its origin and permanent existence from physical evil, more satisfactory. It were easy, one would think, to detect here an egregious hysteron proteron ; for how, it might be asked, could physical evil exist under the government of an infinitely just and good Being, except as the punishment of sin in some form or another? In this case the priority of moral evil must still be supposed. To anticipate the objection, however, physical evil has been ingeniously confounded with the necessary imperfection of created beings, and thus the explanation proceeds: “ The universe is a system whose very essence consists in subordination,-a scale of beings descending by insensible degrees from infinite perfection to absolute nothing ; we may expect perfection in the whole, yet it would be the highest absurdity to hope for it in all the parts, because the beauty and happiness of the whole depend on the just inferiority of the parts, that is the compa. rative imperfection of the several beings of which it is composed ; this imperfection again, cannot possibly exist without some inconveniency and suffering, and must be regarded as itself a comparative physical evil; and since the true reason of the fitness of things with the obligations naturally resulting from it, and therefore sanctioned by the Deity, can only be this,—that some actions natively produce happiness and others misery, all moral good and evil are nothing more than the result of physical ;—and thus it appears that the production of good exclusive of evil in either sense, is one of the probable impossibilities, which even infinite power, without performing contradictions, cannot accomplish."*

This scheme of optimism, may be admitted so far as it respects the different orders of being and their comparative physical imperfection, with the very obvious exception, however, that no scale of beings can be conceived “ descending from infinitude to absolute nothing." The highest in any created scale will still be at an infinite distance from infinite perfection, and the lowest as far removed from absolute nothing ; nay, in the range of possibilities, the scale itself will present vast chasms or vacuities which might have given farther scope to infinite power. But passing this, no scheme can be agreeable either to reason or Scripture which shall assert the optimism of moral evil in relation to the Deity, except in regard to final result, that is, providing for a more illustrious demonstration of his perfections than had otherwise been practicable. The scheme detailed evidently leans for support on the calculation of pleasures, or of sources and means of happiness, as the sole standard of morality. On this it not only suspends the fitness of things, but builds also (as on its proper foundation) the interposition of divine authority. It is a scheme that verges in fact to the Manichæan system ; for though it admits a Supreme Being, it ranks among the impossibilities of a Deity the production either of matter or spirit exclusive of physical evil, and by inseparably connecting moral evil with this, it makes the latter as well as the former absolutely necessary on the supposition of creation. The idea of imperfection among the several orders of beings is merely relative, and can only refer to the absence of some good for which the creature is not adapted, or which, though abstractly possible, it could not possess and be what it is. But granting we should deviate from accuracy, and endeavour to qualify the thought by styling this imperfection privative evil, it will by no means follow that the evil of inconveniency and suffering is necessarily attached to it, and the latter only comes under the idea of phy

• BOLINGBROKE, Pope, and other advocates of an Optimism independent of Divine ordinations.

sical evil. A horse feels no pain from its not being a human creature, nor even a child from its not being a man ; the circumstances may expose to inconvenience and suffering, but then the pain is superadded, it is wholly adventitious, not in striet propriety the necessary result of the place held by the creature in the scale of beingFar less is it either intuitively erident or demonstrable that physical evil must necessarily be the parent of that which is moral. No appeal to the present state of things will account for the origin of the latter. We are not one whit advanced to an explanation of the difficulty by being told that “ injuries produce anger, often to excess, and that danger excites fear,” for this is to give a reason for all evil by shewing that one evil produces another. Whence came the disposition to injure one another ? and if fear be an evil, why is there danger ?

It is much to be regretted that Dr. PALEY's four propositions on the Origin of Evil, in his Natural Theology, are nearly as exceptionable as those which have just been considered. They leave a chasm in the relation between moral and natural evil, and the latter they represent as unavoidable. He states, « 1st, That important advantages accrue to the universe from the establishment of general laws. 2d, That general laws, however well set and constituted, often thwart and cross one another. 3d, From these thwartings frequent particular inconveniences will arise. 4th, That it agrees with our observations to suppose that some degree of these inconveniences takes place in the world of nature.” These propositions may account for the phenomena of the present constitution of things; but the question will still recur, could not the Deity have otherwise settled the laws and adjusted their objects ? If he could, then we must resort to his will, and rest either in provisionary arrangements for some plan peculiarly calculated to manifest his glory, or in the enactment of punitive disorder, which implies the existence of moral evil.

What reason suggests for explaining the origin of moral evil, and reconciling its existence with the grand truth that God cannot be the author of sin, may for the sake of perspicuity be arranged under the following induction of principles.

1. A creature when upheld by a Deity must be upheld in what is essential to its nature ; for otherwise it is not upheld but destroyed in regard to its former physical state.

2. A rational creature, to be capable of moral obligation and thus responsible to the Deity, must not only be rational, but

a free agent. It must therefore be physically upheld as such, or live and move as a free agent by the power of the Deity.

3. All the actions of such a creature are, when abstractly considered, INDIFFERENT ; that is, they may be either good or bad according to circumstances. Speaking, for example, is per se indifferent, the quality depending on what is spoken ; and all words are indifferent, the quality of the speech arising entirely from the manner in which they are put together. Bowing and kneeling are indifferent; if to the true God morally right, if to an idol morally wrong. Taking, will assume the character of stealing only when the person has no right to what he takes. The same may be said of killing ; its moral complexion is determined by the subjects--whether animals or men, and by the necessity of the case, in lawful war or selfdefence, or the execution of criminals ; when neither right nor necessity exists, it will be homicide if accidental, murder if intentional. So on of all other actions.

It will be granted that this remark can be of no practical use to the creature, since from his very condition as a creature he must be under law to the Deity, and all actions as performed by him must bear a relation to that law which will extend even to motives. With the creature therefore no action can be absolutely indifferent ; it must either be lawful or unlawful, although if lawful it may be indifferent so far as not to be matter of positive duty, binding at all times, or in particular circumstances, either by the letter or spirit of any law. The abstract consideration of actions, however, may be of some use in our present discussion, for,

4. The divine Efficiency has place only in physically producing the actions of creatures, and therefore can respect their actions only in that sense in which they are indifferent. The sole concern of the Deity as to efficiency in the actions of free agents, which the necessary dependance of the creature implies, is that which has been described by the terms præcursus and concursus,—the former signifying excitement to action, the latter simultaneous operation, not co-operation as a distinct agent, but simple operation in the activity put forth by the creature. Now this concern of the Deity is in both respects merely physical, upholding the free agent as such ; sustaining that very liberty which is essential to his nature, its relation to motives, the susceptibility of impulse, the vital motions, the muscular action, &c. Although therefore, in the second cause or creature, the moral quality be inseparable from the action performed, yet in regard to the first cause it is clearly separable. And when we consider that the moral quality arises from the relation of the creature to God and a law, it must appear not only separable, but actually detached from the divine efficiency, nowise imputable to God, who is not under the law, and who never can, by any connexion with his creatures, be brought into the circumstances on which the moral quality, whether good or bad, depends. This may be illustrated by facts which the atheist can suppose, and the Christian knows to be true. So far as efficiency was concerned, God could not be said to work Adam's righteousness while he acted properly in his state of primitive integrity and abstained from the forbidden fruit, for then no merit could have attached to the conduct of the first of men, not even by paction ; and, on the other hand, when the robbers of the wilderness fell upon the substance of Job and took it away, though God upheld them in the action, the immorality of it could not be imputed to bim. As he was not under the law he had prescribed to Adam, so neither was he under that which regulates the property of creatures in their relations to one another, and the action of taking, which the efficiency respected only in a physical view, was in that view indifferent,-susceptible accordingly of different moral aspeets,-wrong in the creatures who interfered with what was not their own, right in God, who thereby only took from the patriarch goods which he had bestowed for a season, but his own property in which had never been alienated.

5. If all actions considered as the subjects of divine efficiency be merely physical, and thus indifferent, so that the very good, which is positive, cannot be said to be wrought by God in such sense as would exempt the creature from responsibility, or be inconsistent with that liberty in which as a responsible creature he is upheld in the very time of acting,—then it must be evident that the malilia or immorality of actions, which lies in mere defect, can much less be said to be wrought by the Deity. Language is usually composed of terms, which, when their origin or composition can be traced, will be found to be types

of the natural or common-sense conception of things, and therefore frequently just. With the Christian such terms particularly will have weight as have received the sanction of inspiration. Now the terms descriptive of sin in one of the most copious and happily expressive languages,—the language of a people distinguished by much philosophical speculation, are auagria, and évolsa, both privatives significant of defect, the former supposed to mean aberration from a mark,- the latter