Ethics: Inventing Right and WrongPenguin, 1977 - 249 páginas |
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Página 29
... desire for X is actually present does not alter the fact that the reason for doing Y is contingent upon the desire for X by way of Y's being a means to X. In Kant's own treat- ment , while imperatives of skill relate to desires which an ...
... desire for X is actually present does not alter the fact that the reason for doing Y is contingent upon the desire for X by way of Y's being a means to X. In Kant's own treat- ment , while imperatives of skill relate to desires which an ...
Página 78
... desire which he now has , not even a present desire that his future desires should be fulfilled , but only a desire which he knows he will have later ? We can indeed say that he has such a reason , and that ( other things being equal ) ...
... desire which he now has , not even a present desire that his future desires should be fulfilled , but only a desire which he knows he will have later ? We can indeed say that he has such a reason , and that ( other things being equal ) ...
Página 145
... desires differently between objects ? Or do we allow that one person may have stronger desires all round than another , so that his satisfactions and frustrations contribute more , positively or negatively , to general utility ? If so ...
... desires differently between objects ? Or do we allow that one person may have stronger desires all round than another , so that his satisfactions and frustrations contribute more , positively or negatively , to general utility ? If so ...
Índice
Patterns of objectification | 42 |
Good in moral contexts | 59 |
The meaning of ought | 73 |
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accept action actual agent agreement argued argument believe called causal Chapter choice claim commendation concepts concern consequences considerations course demands descriptive desires determinism discussion dispositions distinction effect equal ethics example fact fairly follow function further give given happiness holds human ideals imperative important individual institution intended interests intrinsic keep kind least leaves less limited logical matter maxims means merely moral moral judgements motives narrow natural notion objective objective values ordinary particular perhaps person point of view positive possible practical prescriptive present principle promising purely question rational reason reference relations requirements responsibility result rules satisfy seems sense similar simply situation social someone sort speaking specific stage standards statements subjective suggested supposed theory thesis things third thought true universalizable universalization utilitarianism utility values virtue wrong