None of thefe pofts could be approached by any other means than by thofe fingle freight roads on the dykes; and they formed a line, which, extending from Muyden on the Zuyder fea, to Amftelveen, and Half Wegen, where that sea, under the name of the Ye, communicates with the lake of Haarlem, they compofed nearly three parts of an irregular circle, from the north-eaft to the fouth-weft, entirely enclofing and covering Amfterdam on the land fide, as it was effectually fecured by the Ye to the north. The whole extent of this line was above feventeen miles, the pofts lying at different diftances from each other, as well as from that city; the neareft being within three miles, and the farthest about fix. They were all fortified under the directions of the moft able French engineers that could be procured; were abundantly supplied with artillery, and with French artillery-men; and those that seemed most liable to attack, were fully garrifoned with the best troops of Holland. They had all likewife an uninterrupted communication with Amfterdam, from which they could derive every kind of fupply, and every degree of fuccour, and to which, in the worst cafe, they could make a secure retreat. At the fame time, to cover the city equally on the fea fide, a number of light armed veffels were ftationed on the Zuyder fea, to guard against any attempt which the Pruffians might make by an embarkation from Naarden.

Such were the unufual and arduous difficulties which the duke of Brunswick had to encounter in his approaches to the city of Amiterdam; difficulties, which, it may be eafily feen, would require all the

united force of an exalted genius, and of the moft confummate military, fkill and ability, to be furmounted.

As the Amfterdammers were more apprehenfive of the Pruffians making an impreffion on the fide of Amttelveen than any other of the pofis, from the approaches not appearing fo entirely impracticable, they ufed their utmost efforts in the fortifications and defences of that place; which were farther fecured by its communication with the very ftrong poft of Ouderkerk, to which it was connected by a cross dyke, that afforded means of mutual fuccour, and in fome fort of a common defence. In thefe circumftances, and under the cover of fuch feemingly impaffable barriers, we are not to confider as the effect of an unfounded and blind fecurity, the confidence with which the city of Amfterdam fet that power at defiance, to which the reft of the province had in fo few days, and with fuch little resistance, submitted. were they without motives upon this occation for running fome confiderable rifque, if the danger had even been greater. For, notwithftanding the grievous difappointment which they had hitherto experienced through the unwillingilacknefs of France, yet they could not be without hopes that a long defence, and confequent protraction of the war, would almofi force that power to fulfil her engagements, and take an active part in their favour. And indeed, the probability was cafily feen, that a long contest might draw on the interference of other powers, and kindle fuch a flame as could terminate in nothing lefs than a general war.

Nor

It can fcarcely pafs unobferved by thofe who know the nature of the [D] 4 country,

country, that Amfterdam upon this occafion paffed over one fource of defence, which would have effectually fecured them from the immediate defigns of their enemy. This was no other than the rendering the inundation perfect; for, by letting the waters of the Ye flow into the Haarlem lake at Half Wegen, the dykesas well as the fields would have been laid under water in fuch a manner, as to render all approach to the city impoffible. But as this was the laft, fo would it have been a most defperate resource, and fuch as could fcarcely be warranted by any thing lefs than the approach of fo barbarous an enemy, that extermination, or mailacre, were the expected confequences of his fuccefs. For a very great part of the province of Holland would not only have been ruined for the prefent by the inundation, but the beggary would be entailed for fome years upon the people, through the length of time, and the very great expence, which a fecond recovery of the land from the dominion of the water would occafion. Such a measure would likewife exasperate all orders of the people in fo great a degree, both in the towns, and in the country, all fuffering feverely under the common calamity, that the republican party could fcarcely hope after to exift among them. From thefe caufes, and from a feemingly wellfounded reliance on the fecurity afforded by their prefent barrier, Amfterdam did not yet refort to this laft and diimal extrémity.

Nothing undoubtedly can more ftrongly thew a quick and accurate perception, than for the affailant of ftrone poft, or rather fyftem of fortifications as this was, to difcover at a glance, all the advantages

a

:

and difadvantages of the fituation, and confequently the weaker or more vulnerable parts of the defence, however few or however concealed they may be. The effect of thefe qualities is heightened, and a luftre reflected on them, by the defect which notfeldom appears on the defenfive fide; where,notwithstanding long poffeffion and full knowledge of the ground, and confequent leifure for due confideration of all its parts, fome points of the defence are immeafurably ftrengthened, while others are overlooked or not fufficiently attended to; as if the aflailant was neceffarily obliged to make his attack in that fpot which

the defender wifhed. This obferva

tion is fully exemplified in the prefent inftance; for, while all the other approaches were fortified and guarded as we have feen, the lake of Haarlem was left open; nor was the obviou danger from that quarter fo much as thought of, until it was

too late to be remedied.

The negociation being broken off, and the truce expiring on the 30th of September in the evening, the duke of Brunswick, fully fenfible of the great importance of rapid action in military affairs, took his meatures for an attack on the enemies barrier early on the following morning. In order to render the alarm and confternation general and effective, he not only ordered all the pofts to be attacked at the fame inflant, but that each fhould be attacked in every quarter that it was poffible to be approached. For this purpofe, three different attacks were directed against Amftelveen, four against the works of Ouderkerk, one on the Duyvendregter Brug, one on Diemerbrug, one on Muyden, and the last on

Half

Half Wegen. Some of thefe were evidently feints, as the nature of the dykes either rendered them abfolutely impracticable, or the pofts were not of fufficient value to justify the lofs of blood which their acquifition must occafion.

The Pruffian forces were ftationed, previous to the attack, in the villages of Aalfineer, Kuderfteert, Vithorne, Abcoude, and the town of Wefep, forming a femicircle, which enclofed the barrier from the lake of haarlem on the fouth-weft, to Wefep on the fouth-eaft; the latter lying on the Vecht, being fcarcely three miles in a direct line, though much farther by following the windings of the river, fhort of Muyden, which is fituated at its mouth on the Zuyder fea.

The great objects of the duke in these various attacks were two, the firft and principal, to gain poffeffion of Amftelveen, and of the great road that led from it directly to Amfterdam; the fecond, and scarcely of lefs importance, was to gain the ftrong poft of Half Wegen; which we have already feen could not be attacked with any profpect of fuccefs on the weft or Haarlem fide. The diligence and genius of the duke, did not fuffer the means to escape him of evading this difficulty He had accordingly taken care to provide, without notice, a number of flat boats at Aalimeer, in which an able officer, with about feven hundred men, embarked early on the night of the 30th of September, who having made their paffage through the part of the lake intended,landed foon after one in the morning near the village of Slooten, which lies to the fouth-east of Half Wegen: and proceeding with great filence through that, and another

called Ooftdorp, the detachment arrived, before day-light, on the Amfterdam road, in the rear of the garrifon.

Nor was a lefs provident forefight difplayed with refpe&t to Amftelveen, which was fo effectually fecured in front, that any attempt in that part would have been at least as fruitlefs as at Half Wegen, while the difficulty of approach to a vulnerable part was much greater. The Haarlem Meer was likewife to afford the means of obviating this difficulty; but to attain this purpofe it was neceffary to be previoufly well informed of its parts, of the navigation clofe to the coaft in the points where a dangerous experiment was intended, and above all to obtain a perfect knowledge of the fituation and nature of the ground lying at the back of Amstelveen, and in the way to the capital. A British volunteer officer had the honour of nobly undertaking and fuccefsfully executing this very hazardous and important fervice. He explored, in an open boat, every neceffary part of the lake, paffing under feveral of the enemy's batteries, and particularly examined a long narrow branch or bay of it, called the Nieuw Meer, which striking off to the right, terminates at a great bleach-ground called Lelie, about three miles at the back of Amftelveen. Having landed in different places, and marked every peculiarity of fituation and ground, he returned in fafety to the duke, with every degree of information that a general could with for; adding his private opinion, that the enterprize was difficult, but not impracticable.

A fimilar detachment to that defined against Half Wegen, was accordingly embarked in flat boats at

Aalfmeer,

Aalfmeer, and the whole conduct of the embarkation, and direction of the enterprize by water, confided to the officer who made the obfervations; and who juftified the confidence repofed in him fo well, upon this new element, that not a boat was overturned, nor a fingle man drowned by any accident: as foon as the troops were landed his command expired, and he returned to his former ftate of a mere volunteer. This detachment did not arrive at Lelie until near five o'clock, which was the hour of general attack, and were scarcely cleared from the boats when they heard the three guns fired by the duke, and the fame number returned from each of the other pofts, which was the fignal for immediate action, and followed by an univerfal cannonading on all fides. This redoubled the ardour of the detachment, whofe first object being to gain poffeffion of the great road from Amfterdam, had still confiderable difficulties to encounter from the inundations, and the number of deep ditches in their way: but the foldiers were fo impetuous in their exertions that these. were foon furmounted.

The duke was fo apprehenfive of the event of this enterprize, that, in order partly to fecond it, and partly, in cafe of its failure, that fome diverfion might notwithstanding be made at the back of Amftelveen, he ordered two companies of infantry to make their way, under the cover of the night, along a narrow footway which led clofe by the edge of the lake, until they gained a crofs dyke, by which they might pafs by Karnemelk's Gat round the end of the bay which we have mentioned. This party, after furmounting numberleis difficulties from the inunda

tions and ditches, were likewise at length fuccefsful, and either met or joined the former detachment on the Amfterdam road.

We have already feen that the firft detachment had penetrated to the back, or the Amfterdam fide of Half Wegen. These loft no time, but rufhing directly on the enemy's works where they were open behind, and no attack expected, made the French commander and most of his garrifon prifoners, and in a few minutes had poffeffion of the batteries and fluices of the adjoining villages of Half Wegen and Swannenbourg, without the lofs of a man. This fuccefs alone, if every other attack had failed, would have laid the capital fufficiently open on the weftern fide.

The officer who commanded the detachment in the rear of Amftelveen, divided it in two parts, posting one on the road from Amfterdam, to reprefs any fally made from that city, and advancing himself at the head of the other to attack the enemy's works. Thefe were well fortified in the rear as well as the front; but the impetuofity of the Pruffian troops was fo refiftlefs, that they foon drove the enemy from a ftrong battery and feven traverfes which lay in their way, and being arrived near the end of the village halted at the laft traverse.

The duke had referved to himfelf the conduct of the grand and very dangerous attack upon Amftelveen in front; which the enemy had omitted neither pains or judgment in the preparation, nor valour in the defence, to render impracticable; nor would the attempt have been confiftent with prudence, if it had not been for the reliance which he placed on the co-operation

of

of the detachment in the rear. At one in the morning he advanced, at the head of the battalion of Droft, preceded by 200 difmounted huffars, and 80 chaffeurs, along a narrow dyke, enclosed by very deep ditches full of water; having with him two fix pounders, and four howitzers. The regiment of Waldeck was ordered to follow at a given, but not near time, in order to prevent the disorder and confufion, which the darkness, and the narrownels of the paffage, might otherwife be liable to occafion.

At half after two o'clock the duke arrived at the Noordammer bridge, which the enemy had broken down, but was fpeedily repaired, and covered with firaw, that the foldiers might pafs it without noife. They then marched to the hamlet of Hond van Leyden, which lay about 1200 yards fhort of Amftelveen, and was poffeffed by the enemy; but they were foon diflodged by the brisk attack of the chatfeurs. At this village the duke made his preparations for the attack on Amftelveen, while the grenadiers and light troops were clearing the dyke of the trees which the enemy had laid acrofs it. An entrenchment, which lay about four hundred yards in the front of the village, was now the first object of attack, and though it was furrounded by a ditch full of water, and pallifaded, it was carried at the firft onfet.

Day now beginning to break, the deke perceived that the enemy had a much stronger entrenchment than that he had just taken, in the way to Amftelveen. This work had before it a double ditch full of water, was defended by chevaux de frife, and was fo fkilfully conftructed, that its

artillery bore upon the dyke both to the right and left of the drawbridge. This determined the duke to halt in the entrenchment he had newly acquired, while the chaffeurs and grenadiers were employed, under the cover of fome hay-ftacks, to endeavour to throw a bridge over the ditch of the entrenchment. In the mean time a moft fevere fire was kept up by the enemy, in almoft every direction, from their different batteries, while the duke could only bring one howitzer to bear with effect, from the dyke upon their works. To fupply this defect, as much as it could be done, he ordered a battery to be thrown up at Hond van Leyden, with a view of enfilading the entrenchments of the enemy. In the mean time, the hay-ftacks being foon fet on fire and burnt by the enemy, the light troops and grenadiers were left entirely expofed, and the duke fecing their: perilous fituation, immediately fent orders for their retiring to the hamlet; he continuing himself, with only the battalion of Droft, and a fingle howitzer, to maintain the new poft, and endeavour to annoy the enemy. In this very critical fituation, expofed, with very little cover, to a heavy and most severe fire, and to the fame common danger with the troops he commanded, the duke was destined with his party to ftand inactive, as a mark to be fhot at, for between four and five hours, while every eye was anxioufly directed to Amftelveen, every moment expecting the co-operation of the party in the rear.

Some explanation, fuch as we have been able to obtain (for no enquiry was inftituted or cenfure paffed) becomes neceffary to account for this failure or delay. It

cannot