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Class IV. has its separate and peculiar functions, a system of nuIII. Intellectual
tritive action or relation, and a system of vital. To principles which is added, by way of appendix, another system,
comprising the functions of generation * Here, however, the brain is not only the seat but the organized substance of the mental powers: so that, we are expressly told, a man must be as he is made in his brain, and that education, and even logic itself, is of no use to him. “ There are,” says M. Magendie,“ justly celebrated persons who have thought differently; but they have hereby fallen into grave errors.” A Deity however is allowed to exist, because, adds the writer, it is comfortable to think that he exists, and on this account the physiologist cannot doubt of his being. “ L'intelligence de l'homme,” says he, “ se compose de phénomênes tellement différens de tout ce que présente d'ailleurs la nature, qu'on les rapporte à un être particuliere qu'on regarde comme une emanation de la Divinité. Il est trop consolant de croire à cet être, pour que le physiologiste métte en doute son existence; mais la séverité de language ou de logique que comporte maintenant la physiologie exige que l'on traite de l'intelligence humaine comme si elle était la résultat de l'action d'un organe. En s'écartant de cette marche, des hommes justement célèbres sont tombés dans des graves erreurs; en la suivant, on a, d'ailleurs, le grand avantage de conserver la même méthode d'étude, et de rendre trésfaciles des choses qui sont envisagées généralement comme presqu'au-dessus de l'esprit humain.”—“Il existe une science dont le but est d'apprendre à raisonner justement c'est la logique, mais le jugement erroné ou l'esprit faux (for judgement, genius, and imagination, and therefore false reasoning, all depend on organization) tiennent à l'organization. Il est impossible de se changer à cet
egard ; nous restons tels que la nature nous à faits t. Hypothesis Dr. Spurzheim has generally been considered, from the
concurrent tenour of his doctrines, as belonging to the class heim.
* Précis Elementaire de Physiologie. 2 Tom. 8vo. Paris, 1816, 1817. + Précis Elementaire, &c. ut supra, passim.
of materialists; but this is to mistake his own positive Class IV.
III, Intelassertion upon the subject, or to conclude in opposition lectual to it. He speaks, indeed, upon this topic with a singular principle. hesitation and reserve, more so, perhaps, than upon any other point whatever ; but as far as he chooses to express himself on so abstruse a subject, he regards the soul as a distinct being from the body, and at least intimates that it may be nearer akin to the Deity. Man is with him also possessed of two lives, an AUTOMATIC and an ANIMAL: the first produced by organization alone, and destitute of consciousness; the second possessed of consciousness dependent on the soul, and merely manifesting itself by organization. “We do not,” says he, “attempt to explain how the body and soul are joined together and exercise a mutual influence. We do not examine what the soul can do without the body. Souls, so far as we know, may be united to bodies at the moment of conception or afterwards; they may be different in all individuals, or of the same kind in every one; they may be emanations from God, or something essentially different "* The mind of this celebrated craniologist seems to be wonderfully sceptical and bewildered upon the subject, and studiously avoids the important question of the capacity of the soul for an independent, and future existence : but with the above declarations he cannot well be arranged in the class of materialists.
The hypothesis which has lately been started by Mr. Hypothesis Lawrence f is altogether of a different kind, and though simpler, but undoubtedly much simpler than any of the preceding, its basis not does not seem to be built on a more stable foundation. According to his view of the subject, organized differs from inorganized matter merely by the addition of certain PROPERTIES which are called vital, as sensibility and irritability. Masses of matter endowed with these new PROPERTIES become organs and systems of organs, constitute an animal frame, and execute distinct sets of
• Physiognomical System, &c. p. 253. 8vo. Lond. 1815.
Class IV. PURPOSES or FUNCTIONS, for functions and purposes car
ried into execution are here synonymous. “Life is the principle. assemblage of all the functions (or purposes) and the
general result of their exercise “Y* Regards life Life, therefore, upon this hypothesis, instead of being as a mere property of
of a two-fold or three-fold reality, running in a combined matter, oc- stream, or in parallel lines, has no reality whatever. It and acci- has no Esse or independent existence. It is a mere as
semblage of PURPOSES, and accidental or temporary PROwithout any real essence: PERTIES: a series of phænomenat, as Mr. Lawrence has a mere as-, himself correctly expressed it;—a name without a thing. semblage of ow. purposes,
“We know not,” says he, “the nature of the link that or series of unites these phænomena, though we are sensible that a phænomena.
connexion must exist; and this conviction is sufficient to induce us to give it a NAME, which the vulgar regard as the sign of a particular principle ; though in fact that name can only indicate the ASSEMBLAGE OF THE PHÆNO
MENA which have occasioned its formation ” I. Hence the
The human frame is, hence, a barrel-organ, possessing frame a a systematic arrangement of parts, played upon by pecu
vorn liar powers, and executing particular pieces or purposes ; life the mu- and life is the music produced by the general assemblage sic it plays, or result of the harmonious action. So long as either the ceasing as the music vital or the mechanical instrument is duly wound up by a
* regular supply of food or of the wince, so long the music chine will will continue : but both are worn out by their own action; no longer
and when the machine will no longer work, the life has the same close as the music; and in the language of Cornelius Gallus, as quoted and appropriated by Leo X.,
-redit in nihilum, quod fuit ante nihil. This hypo
There is, however, nothing new either in this hypothe
sis or in the present explanation of it. It was first started but started
in the days of Aristotle by Aristoxenus, a pupil of his, enus a pupil who was admirably skilled in music, and by profession a of Aristotle, who thus
ceases when the ma
thesis not new :
* Introduction to Comparative Anatomy and Physiology, &c. p. 120.
physician. It was propounded to the world under the name Class IV.
III. Intelof the system of HARMONY, either from the author's fond- ; ness for music, or from his comparing the human frame principle. to a musical instrument, and his regarding life as the illustrated result of all its parts acting in accordance, and producing named it a general and harmonious effect.
of harmony. How far Mr. Lawrence's revised edition of this hypothe
Opposed by sis may prove satisfactory to other classes of materialists all the I cannot tell : but if he should succeed, he will be more other sects fortunate than Aristoxenus who pleased neither the other ists in his materialists nor the immaterialists of his day. From the day: latter, indeed, he could expect no countenance : but even the Epicureans, though they held that the mind was cor- especially
by the Epiruptible as formed of matter, which they had no reason to believe was then or ever would be otherwise than corruptible under any modification whatever, held, at the same time, that it had a substantive existence, distinct from that of the grosser frame of the body, and possessed of other and far higher properties : being formed of the finest, lightest, smoothest, and most moveable material elements, and hence exquisitely etherialized and volatile :
-est animi natura reperta Mobilis egregie, perquam constare necesse est
Corporibus parvis, et lævibus, atque rotundis *. The atomic philosophers, therefore, joined with the who united Platonists and Stoics in opposing the system of harmony, Platonists and that chiefly upon the two following grounds, which and Stoics. will apply with as much force to its present as to its T
grounds of primary form. First, admitting that an assemblage and opposition exercise of all the functions of the machine are neces- applicable
to the same sary to maintain the phænomena of life, we are left as doctrine much in the dark as ever concerning the nature of the
o sent modiprinciple by which this harmonious instrument becomes fication. gradually developed and is kept in perpetual play. And next, that the life or well-being of the animal frame does not depend upon an assemblage and exercise of all its functions or purposes, since the mind may be diseased
Lucret, De Rer. Nat. 11. 204.
Class IV. while the body remains unaffected; or the body may lose III. Intel
some of its own organs, while the mind, or even the general lectual principle. health of the body itself may continue perfect *. General In the darkness, therefore, which continues to hang result and
over the mysterious subject before us, I feel incompetent duty. to enter into the question concerning the actual essence of
the mind, and am perfectly content to take its general nature, powers and destiny, from the only volume which is capable of giving us any decided information upon the subject; to follow it up as far as that volume may guide
us, and to stop where it withdraws its assistance. Another Closely connected with the present question is another subject closely con
con of nearly as much perplexity, and the consideration of nected which has not been attended with much more success,
but which must not be passed by on the present occasion
without being glanced at. By what Whatever be the nature or substance of the mind, means the the brain is the organ in which it holds its seat; and tains an in- whence it maintains an intercourse with the surrounding
world. Now, it must be obvious to every one who has surround attended to the operation of his senses, that there never ing world.
is, nor can be any direct communication between the No direct communi mind, thus stationed in the brain, and the external obcation:
jects the mind perceives; which are usually, indeed, at rarely ever
the some distance even from the sense that gives notice of .
them. Thus, in looking at a tree it is the eye alone ternal that beholds the tree, while the mind only perceives a objects. notice of its presence by some means or other, from the
visual organ. So, in touching this table it is my hand alone that comes in contact with it, and communicates to
my mind a knowledge of its hardness and other qualiWhat then ties. What then is the medium by which such communiis the meof cation is maintained ? which enables the mind to have a
perception of the form, size, colour, smell, and even distance of objects, correspondent with that of the senses which are seated on the surface of the body ? and which
tercourse with the
between t external senses and
com cation ?
* Lucret. De Rer. Nat. Ii, 105-266. Lactant, in Vit. Epicur. Polignac. Anti-Lucret. Lib. v. 923.