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nification.

Of the degrees of our knowledge.
SECT.

1 Intuitive.

2 Demonftrative.

Of the extent of human knowledge.
SECT.

1 First, No farther than we have ideas.
2 Secondly, No farther than we can

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CHAP. XI.

Of the knowledge of the existence of other
things.
SECT.

1 Is to be had only by fenfation.
2 Inftance-Whitenefs of this paper.
3 This, though not fo certain as de-
monstration, yet may be called
knowledge, and proves the exist-
ence of things without us.

4 First, Because we cannot have them
but by the inlet of the fenfes.

5 Secondly, Because an idea from ac-

tual fenfation, and another from

memory, are very distinct percep-

tions.

6 Thirdly, Pleasure or pain, which
accompanies actual fenfation, ac-
companies not the returning of
thofe ideas without the external ob-
jects.

7 Fourthly, Our fenfes affift one an-
other's teftimony of the existence
of outward things.

8 This certainty is as great as our

condition needs.

9 But reaches no farther than actual
fenfation.

10 Folly to expect demonstration in
every thing.

11 Past existence is known by memo-
ry.

12 The existence of spirits not know-

able.

13 Particular propofitions concerning
existence are knowable.

14 And general propofitions concern-
ing abstract ideas.

CHAP. XII.

Of the improvement of our knowledge.

SECT.

1 Knowledge not from maxims,
2 The occafion of that opinion.

3 But from the comparing clear and

diftinct ideas.

4 Dangerous to build upon precari-

eus principles.

5 This no certain way to truth.

6 But to compare clear complete i-
deas under steady names.

7 The true method of advancing

knowledge, is by confidering our

abstract ideas.

8 By which morality alfo may be

made clearer.

9 But knowledge of bodies is to be

improved only by experience

10 This may procure us convenience,
not science.

11 We are fitted for moral knowledge
and natural improvements.

12 But muft beware of hypothefes and
wrong principles.

13 The true ufe of hypotheses.
14 Clear and diftinct ideas with fet-

tled names, and the finding of those
which fhow their agreement or
disagreement, are the ways to en-
large our knowledge.

15 Mathematics an instance of it.

CHAP. XIII.

Some other confiderations concerning our knowl-

edge.

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4 The grounds of probability are
two; conformity with our own ex-
perience, or the teftimony of oth-
er's experience.

5 In this all the agreements, pro and
con, ought to be examined, before
we come to a judgement.

6 They being capable of great vari-
ety.

SECT.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the degrees of affent.

1 Our affent ought to be regulated
by the grounds of probability.
2 These cannot always be all actual-
ly in view, and then we muft con- ·
tent ourselves with the remem-
brance that we once faw ground
for fuch a degree of affent.

8 The ill confequence of this, if our
former judgement were not rightly
made.

4 The right use of it is mutual char-
ity and forbearance.

5 Probability is either of matter of
fact or fpeculation.

6 The concurrent experience of all
other men with ours, produces af-
furance approaching to knowledge.
7 Unquestionable teftimony and ex-
perience for the most part produce
confidence.

8 Fair teftimony, and the nature of
the thing indifferent, produces allo
confident belief.

5 Helps little in demonftration, lefs
in probability.

6 Serves not to increase our knowl-
edge, but fence with it.

7 Other helps fhould be fought.
8 We reafon about particulars.

9 Firft, Reason fails us for want of
ideas.

10 Secondly, Because of obfcure and
imperfect ideas.

11 Thirdly, For want of intermediate
ideas.

12 Fourthly, Because of wrong princi-
ples.

13 Fifthly, Because of doubtful terms.
14 Our highest degree of knowledge
is intuitive without reafoning.
15 The next is demonstration by rea-
foning.

16 To supply the narrowness of this,
we have nothing but judgement
upon probable reasoning.

17 Intuition, demonstration, judge-

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inces.

9 Experience and teftimonies clash Of faith and reason, and their distinct prov-
ing, infinitely vary the degrees of
probability.

10 Traditional teftimonies, the far-
ther removed, the less their proof.
11 Yet history is of great use.
12 In things which fenfe cannot dif-
cover, analogy is the great rule of
probability.

13 One case where contrary experi-
ence leffens not the teftimony.
14 The bare teftimony of revelation
is the highest certainty.

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SECT.

1 Neceffary to know their bounda-
ries.

2 Faith and reafon what, as contra-
distinguished.

3 No new fimple idea can be convey.
ed by traditional revelation.
4 Traditional revelation may make
us know propofitions knowable al-
fo by reafon, but not with the
fame certainty that reafon doth.
5 Revelation cannot be admitted a-
gainst the clear evidence of reason,
6 Traditional revelation much lefs.
7 Things above reason,

8 Or not contrary to reafon, if re-
vealed, are matter of faith.

9 Revelation, in matters where rea-
fon cannot judge, or but probably,
ought to be hearkened to.

10 In matters where reafon can afford

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