this subject, in our two last numbers, we conceive to be more rational than this theory of our author and others, and better calculated to explain the phenomena of sensation in animals; and it is highly probable, that by a modus operandus of the same nature, the mind is affected through the instrumentality | of the sentient extremities of the nerves. But this effect, so far as it regards mind, must furnish it only with a certain class of ideas; these, however, being admitted, they will serve as materials on which the mind can now exercise itself in all that variety of abstract ratiocination of which it is capable.

We are not certain how far the mind, by means of some of the senses, while deprived of the use of others, may be able to penetrate, in the way of speculation, into subjects, a knowledge of the elements of which properly belongs to other senses, of which they are deprived; as, for example, a blind person may expatiate on colours, or on the motions and phenomena of the heavenly bodies, though he had never possessed any other means of acquiring the knowledge he has attained on these subjects, excepting the sense of hearing. And thus we perceive how one sense may supply, in a measure, the want of another, at least in the way of speculation, by furnishing the mind, yet possessed of all its faculties, with materials on which to exercise itself.

And it is very possible, that the person who thus acquires his knowledge of these subjects, may, by the dint of application, come to know a great deal more of them in a speculative sense, than many others who enjoy the exercise of those organs of which he is deprived; and hence he may be puffed up with high and mighty conceptions of his own acquirements, while, in reality, his knowledge is only a mere semblance; for when examined more narrowly respecting the very first principles of colours, or of the motions and real phenomena of the heavenly bodies, he is found to be in an egregious mistake, and really more ignorant than the child who knows nothing more of them, than that he can say, I have seen them.

And, humiliating as it is to the pride of the philosopher and the mere disputer of this world, thus it is in spiritual matters. In consequence of

the perversion of his nature, man has been deprived of some, or rather we should say, of all his spiritual senses of discernment; so that now it is a truth, The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can ke know them, in his present state of spiritual darkness, because they are spiritually discerned." 1 Cor. ii. 14.

Nor does this subject apply less aptly to others of the human race, who have assumed a profession of Christianity, and who value themselves much on account of their clear and speculative notions of its doctrines and facts, but are strangers to any spiritual change having been produced upon their character, through the cordial reception and belief of the gospel of truth. Such may speculate, it is true, about every fact contained in the word of God; they may bring forth the evidence on which its high authority rests, in a manner so forcible, that it cannot be overturned; they may even demonstrate the great and wonderful things of God's law, to the astonishment and wonder of their hearers; and yet be all the while working in the dark, and in the very state of the blind speculator on colours. and on other phenomena which require for obtaining proper ideas, even of their very first principles, the exercise of an organ he wants. But the mind that has been spiritually illuminated, though a babe in knowledge in other respects, knows more of real, substantial, enduring, and soul-reviving truths, than either the philosopher or merely speculative Christian, who as yet wants that spiritual discernment which the other has obtained, and by means of which he can say, I have seen them.

But without dwelling longer on generals, let us descend to particulars.

"The first act of the faculty of abstraction," or the act of separating ideas, as our author judiciously remarks, "is to analyze those combinations which the animal faculties present in a concrete state to the understanding. Objects of thought being thus in a manner dissected, and stript of their coverings, accidents, properties, and qualities, &c. we can attend to the naked abstract truth, perceiving, at one glance of the intellect, the necessary conditions by which things are

circumscribed. This we accomplish by means of language or symbols, expressed or understood, for language or speech is a process of abstraction, which is the instrument made use of by the intellect.

“Abstractionis, therefore, the faculty which distinguishes the man from the brute. By means of it, the most stupid savage, when two objects of sense are before him-the piece of gold, for example, which he wears as an ornament, and the glittering bawble exhibited by the stranger, will abstract or separate what is common to both, (viz. the pleasure of beholding it,) and perceiving the quantum of the one to exceed, as he thinks, the quantum of the other, he will barter or exchange that which belongs to himself, for that which belongs to the stranger."

But, has the principle of novelty no concern in this transaction? If the stupid savage be like the inexperienced youngsters among ourselves, I should suppose it must be concerned, and that this, as well as the quantum, disposes him to make the exchange. For a child, without any regard to value, or any thing else, for the old, will let it go without concern, for something new.

However, as our author justly reasons, there is nothing like this to be seen among the brutes; art. 162, &c. The truth is, they have no idea whatever of property, excepting that of their offspring, and sometimes their habitations, and the food they are in the act of devouring;† all which phenomena arise from the instincts of

their nature, variously modified: whereas in man, the idea of property is a very different thing, and has given rise to almost all the feuds and contentions that have existed in the world.

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Brutes being unable to discriminate what is necessary from what is accidental, are, in the strictest sense of the word, "void of reason." They have no choice, but must necessarily act according to the impressions made upon their senses, whether it be towards docility or ferocity. Properly speaking, they are mere creatures of sensation; which sensation excites passion: but in both are they devoid of reason; for the brute is incapable of regret for the actions to which his passions may propel him.

The conscience, or thinking principle in man, therefore, at once marks his superiority to the brute; and forms a basis on which to build a system of human intellectual phenomena.

But it is reasonable to think, that as man is a compound being, and allied, as it respects his body, to the various laws by which the mere animal is governed,--that the phenomena of his intellectual faculties will form a scale analagous to the scale of the animal faculties. This, accordingly, is the great point which our author proposes; though it is evident that, from the difficulty of the subject, his work is laboured to make it out. See art. 167–180.

To render such an abstruse subject, therefore, as perspicuous as possible, we here again, first represent the scale of the animal faculties, and afterwards those of the intellectual, in that order in which they correspond. We wish, however, the original work particularly to be consulted here, as it contains many important observations, at which it is impossible to hint.

As a compound being, the scale of the animal or irrational faculties, as well as of the rational, are applicable to man. As to his animal nature, he is susceptible, in common with the brute, of 4 7

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judgment, ratiocination, humility.

Our definitions of the animal or irrational scale, it will be recollected, were given two numbers ago, which it will be necessary to consult, and comparewith the definitions that follow.

1. Presuming that the reader, therefore, bears in mind the definitions of the scale of the animal faculties, he will perceive that Sentimentality in the rational scale, is analogous to sensation or feeling in the irrational; in as much as, though it be excited by external abstract truths, it gives us no information regarding the formal nature of these truths; but merely that we think of them; which faculty of thinking distinguishes us from the brutes.

2. Taste or Tact, in the rational | scale, corresponds with perception in the irrational, in as much as it conveys, through the medium of sentiment, a distinct knowledge of the necessary or formal natures of those external abstract truths, about which it was excited to think, as above.

3. Fancy, in the rational scale, corresponds with conception in the irrational; but it will be recollected that our definition of this step differed materially from that of our author, on account of our different views respecting cerebral impressions. By turning to the place, it will be seen, that we considered conception as implying only an inferior kind of memory, relating to objects which had been perceived; and that in this sense it corresponds better than our author's definition, with the fifth of the scale, which is memory in a more perfect sense.

For the same reason, we would here eradicate the picture of those abstract ideas which were formerly selected by taste, supposed to be in the intellect; and we would consider

the imagination, to solid practical judgment, must be obvious at first sight.

5. Practical Judgment, in the ra tional scale, corresponds with memory in the irrational, as it is a kind of voluntary memory, whereby we use efforts to recollect whatever abstract truths have been impressed upon the mind, whether by the faculty of sentiment, taste, or fancy; and our success in thus recollecting such abstract truths previously impressed upon our mind, will always be in proportion to the degree of consideration which we bestowed upon them when they actu ally occurred. But the suggestions of practical judgment can have no place where there has been no previous consideration. Without consideration, the truths about which practical judg ment is exercised, must remain in the condition of mere visions of fancy, like its correspondent third step. And, alas! in what a great proportion of the human kind, does truth never get further hold of the intel lect? Unstable, dissipated, and vi sionary, are they, therefore, in all their plans, and advanced but a few removes from the brute. But as we discover by this arrangement, that their error lies in the want of consideration, they ought, by all the means in their power, to cultivate this faculty; without which, we will venture to predict, though no prophets, that all the painful experience it is possible for them to meet with, will never teach them wisdom.

6. Speculation or ratiocination, in the rational scale, corresponds with association of ideas in the irrational and being the sixth of the scale, it harmonizes with taste or tact, which is the second. Speculation ing, therefore, which is the sixth of the scale, consists in a continual train of thought arising from the second, founded on the relations of cause and

or reason

count.