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have better thought of that matter. I confess myself to have one of those dull souls, that doth not perceive itself always to contemplate ideas; nor can conceive it any more necessary for the soul always to think, than for the body always to move: the perception of ideas being (as I conceive) to the soul, what motion is to the body; not its essence, but one of its operations. And therefore, though thinking be supposed ever so much the proper action of the soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should be always thinking, always in action. That perhaps is the privilege of the infinite author and preserver of things, who never slumbers níor sleeps; but it is not competent to any finite being, at least not to the soul of man. We know certainly by experience that we sometimes think, and thence draw this infallible consequence, that there is something in us that has a power to think; but whetlier that substance perpctually thinks or no, we can be no farther assured than experience informs us. For to sav that actual thinking is essential to the soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg what is in question, and not to prove it by reason; which is necessary to be done, it it be not a self-evident proposition. But whether this, " that the soul always thinks," be a self-evident proposition, that every body assents to at first hearing, I appeal to mankind. It is doubted whether I thouglit at all last night or no; the question being about a matter of fact, it is begging it to bring, as a proof for it, an hypothesis, which is the very thing in dispute: bv which way one may prove any thing; and it is but supposing that all watches, whilst the balance beats, think ; and it is sufficiently proved, and past doubt, that my watch thought all last night. But he that would not deceive himself, ought to build his hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by sensible experience, and not presume on matter of fact, because of his hypothesis ; that is, because he supposes it to be so : which way of proving announts to this, that 'I must necessarily think all last night, because another suppose's I always think, though I myself cannot perceive that I always do so,
But men in love with their opinions may not only suppose what is in question, but allege wrong matter of fact. How else could any one make it an inference of mine, that a thing is not, because we are not sensible of it in our sleep? I do not say there is no soul in a man, because he is not sensible of it in his sleep: but I do say, he cannot think at any time waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. " Our being sensible of it is not necessary to any thing, but to our thoughts; and to them it is, and to them it will always be necessary, till we can think without being conscious of it.
$. 11. I grant that the soul in a waking It is not alman is never without thought, because it is ways consci. the condition of being awake : but whether ous of it. sleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the whole inan, mind as well as body, may be worth a · waking man's consideration; it being hard to conceive,
that any thing should think, and not be conscious of it. If the soul doth think in a sleeping man without being conscious of it, I ask, whether during such thinking it has any pleasure or pain, or be capable of happiness or misery? I am sure the man is not, any more than the bed or earth he lies on. For to be happy or miserable without being conscious of it seems to me utterly inconsistent and impossible. Or if it be possible that the soul can, whilst the body is sleeping, have its thinking, enjoyments and concerns, its pleasure or pain, apart, which the man is not conscious of nor partakes in; it is certain that Socrates asleep and Socrates awake is not the same person : but his soul when he sleeps, and Socrates the man, consisting of body and soul when he is waking, are two persons; since waking Socrates has no knowledge of, or concernment for that happiness or misery of his soul which it enjoys alone by itself whilst he sleeps, without perceiving any thing of it; any more than he has for the happiness or misery of a man in the Indies, whom he knows not. For if we take wholly away all consciousness of our actions and sensations, especially of pleasure and pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place personal identity.
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If a sleeping
12. “ The soul, during sound sleep, man thinks thinks,” say these men. Whilst it thinks without and perceives, it is capable certainly of knowing it,
those of delight or trouble, as well as any the sleeping and waking
sering other perceptions; and it must necessarily man are two be conscious of its own perceptions. But persons. it has all this apart; the sleeping man, it is plain, is conscious of notlıing of all this. Let us suppose then the soul of Castor, while he is sleeping, retired from his body; which is no impossible supposition for the inen I have here to do with, who so liberally allow life, without a thinking soul, to all other animals. These men cannot then judge it impossible, or a contradiction, that the body should live without the soul; nor that the soul should subsist and think, or have perception, even perception of happiness or misery, without the body. Let us then, as I say, suppose the soul of Castor separated, during his sleep, from his body, to think apart. Let us suppose too, that it chooses for its scene of thinking the body of another man, v, g. Pollux, who is sleeping without a soul: for if Castor's soul can think, whilst Castor is asleep, what Castor is never conscious of, it is no matter what place it chooses to think in. We have here then the bodies of two men with only one soul between them, which we will suppose to sleep and wake by turns; and the soul still thinking in the waking man, whereof the sleeping man is never conscious, has never the least per: ception. I ask then, whether Castor and Pollux, thus, with only one soul between them, which thinks and perceives in one what the other is never conscious of, nor is concerned for, are not two as distinct persons as Castor and llercules, or as Socrates and Plato were? And whether one of them might not be very happy, and the other very miserable? Just by the same reason they make the soul and the man two persons, who make the soul think apart what the man is not conscious of. for I suppose no-body will make identity of persons to consist in the soul's being united to the very same numerical particles of matter; for if that be necessary to identity, it will be iinpossible, in that constant flux of
the particles of our bodies, that any man should be the game person two days, or two moments together.
1. 13. Thus, methinks, every drowsy nod Impossible to shakes their doctrine, who teach, that the convince
those that soul is always thinking.
ng. Those at least,
That men soul thinks even in the soundest sleep, but dream withthe memory retains it not.” That the soul out rememin a sleeping man should be this moment bering it, in busy a thinking, and the next moment in vain urged. a waking man not remember nor be able to recollect one jot of all those thoughts, is very hard to be conceived, and would need some better proof than bare assertion to make it be believed. For who can without any more ado, but being barely told so, imagine, that the greatest part of men do, during all their lives, for several hours every day, think of something, which if they were asked, even in the middle of these thoughts, they could remember nothing at all of? Most men, I think, pass a great part of their sleep without dreaming. I once knew a man that was bred a scholar, and had no bad memory, who told me, he had never dreamed in his life till he had that fever he was then newly recovered of, which was about the five or six and twentieth year of his age. I suppose the world affords more such instances : at least every one's acquaintance will furnish him with examples enough of such, as pass most of their nights without dreaming.
$. 15. To think often, and never to re- Upon this tain it so much as one moment, is a very
hypothesis liseless sort of thinking: and the soul, in
of a sleeping such a state of thinking, does very little, if man ought to at all, excel that of a looking-glass, which be most sa. constantly receives variety of images, ortional, ideas, but retains none; they disappear and vanish, and G3
there remain no footsteps of them; the looking-glass is never the better for such ideas, nor the soul for such, thoughts. Perhaps it will be said, “ that in a waking “ man the materials of the body are employed, and " made use of, in thinking ; and that the memory of “ thoughts is retained by the impressions that are made “ on the brain, and the traces there jeft after such
thinking; but that in the thinking of the soul, which “ is not perceived in a sleeping inan, there the soul " thinks apart, and, making no use of the organs of “ the body, leaves no impressions on it, and conse“ quently no memory of such thoughts." Not to mention again the absurdity of two distinct persons, which follows from this supposition, I answer farther, that whatever ideas the mind can receive and contemplate without the help of the body, it is reasonable to conclude, it can retaip without the help of the body too; or else the soul, or any separate spirit, will have but little advantage by thinking. If it has no memory of its own thoughts; if it cannot lay them up for its own rise, and be able to recall them upon occasion; if it cannot reflect upon what is past, and make use of its former experiences, reasonings, and contemplations; to what purpose does it think? They, who make the soul a thinking thing, at this rate, will not make it a much more noble being, than those do, whom they condemn, for allowing it to be nothing but the subtilest parts of matter. Characters drawn on dust, that the first breath of wind effaces; or impressions made on a heap of atoms, or animal spirits, are altogether as useful, and render the subject as noble, as the thoughts of a soul that perish in thinking; that once out of sight are gone for ever, and leave no memory of themselves behind them. Nature never makes excellent things for mean or no uses; and it is hardly to be conceived, that our infinitely wise creator should make so admirable a faculty as the power of thinking, that faculty which comes nearest the excellency of his own incomprehensible being, to be so idle and uselessly employed, at least a fourth part of its time here, as to think constantly, without remembering any of those thoughts, without doing