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3.1. F VEF that he thinks, ahilst thinking, doubt, that
8.1. LVERY man being conscious to him- Idea is the
I self that he thinks, and that which object of his mind is applied about, whilst thinking, thinking. being the ideas that are there, it is past doubt, that men have in their minds several ideas, such as are those expressed by the words, Whiteness, Hardness, Sweetness, Thinking, Motion, Man, Elephant, Army, Drunkenness, and others. It is in the first place then to be inquired, how he comes by them. I know it is a received doctrine, that men have native ideas, and original characters, stamped upon their minds, in their very first being. This opinion I have, at large, examined already; and, I suppose, what I have said, in the foregoing book, will be much more easily admitted, when I have shown, whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has, and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind; for which I shall appeal to every one's own observation and experience.
$. 2. Let us then suppose the mind to All ideas be, as we say, white paper, void of all cha- come from racters, without any ideas; how comes it sensation or to be furnished ? Whence comes it by that reflection. vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knoirledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experi
ence; in all that our knowledge is founded, and from " that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation emI ployed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived' and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our | understandings with all the materials of thinking.
. Book CD These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring. The objects 5. 3. First, Our senses, conversant about of sensation particular sensible objects, do convey into one source of the mind several distinct perceptions of ideas. things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them: and thus we come by those ideas we have, of Yellow, White, Ileat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions." This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION.
$. 4. Secondly, The other fountain, from tions of our which experience furnisheth the understandminds the ing with ideas, is the perception of the other source operations of our own mind within us, as it their of them.
is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without; and such are Perception, Thinking, Doubting Believing, Reasoning, Knowing, Willing, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other sensation, so I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. By reflection then, in fimi the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them; by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. These two, I say, viz. external
material things, as the objects of sensation; and the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of reflection; are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term operations here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.
0.5. The understanding seems to me not All our ideas to have the least glimmering of any ideas, are of the one which it doth not receive from one of or the other these two. External objects furnish the of the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us: and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.
These, when we have taken a full survey of them and their several modes, combinations, and relations, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of ideas; and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and thoroughly search into his understanding; and then let him tell me, whether all the original ideas he has there, are any other than of the objects of his senses, or of the operations of his mind, considered as objects of his reflection : and how great a mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any idea in his mind, but what one of these two bave imprinted; though perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the understanding,' as we shall see hereafter.
g. 6. He that attentively considers the Observable state of a child, at his first coming into in children. the world, will have little reason to think him stored with plenty of ideas, that are to be the matter of his future knowledge: It is by degrees he comes to be furnished with them. And though the ideas of obvious and familiar qualities imprint themselves before the
memory begins to keep a register of time or order, yet
with afford greater or less variety; and
from the operations of their minds within, objects they according as they more or less reflect on converse them. For though he that contemplates with the operations of his mind cannot but have plain and clear ideas of them; vet unless he turns his thoughts that way, and considers them attentively, he will no more have clear and distinct ideas of all the operations of his mind, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular ideas of any landscape, or of the parts and motions of a clock, who will not turn his eyes to it, and with attention heed all the parts of it. The picture or clock may be B so placed, that they may come in his way every day; an but yet he will have but a confused idea of all the parts they are made up of, till he applies hintself with attenttion to consider them cach in particular.
s. 8. And hence we see the reason, why Ideas of reit is pretty late before most children get. flection later, ideas of the operations of their own minds; because they and some have not any very clear or perfect need attenideas of the greatest part of them all their "
lives : because though they pass there continually, yet, f the
like floating visions, they make not deep impressions
ing objects. Thus the first years are usually employed Elve!!and diverted in looking abroad. Men's business in .them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found
without; and so growing up in a constant attention to outward sensations, seldom make any considerable re
flection on what passes within them till they come to be form of riper years; and some scarce ever at all. COMO U . 9. To ask at what time a man has the soul be
COLTE first any ideas, is to ask when he begins to gins to have [;? perceive; baving ideas, and perception, ideas, when
being the same thing. I know it is an it begins to eflect opinion, that the soul always thinks, and perceive. ECU that it has the actual perception of ideas in itself conbuty stantly as long as it exists; and that actual thinking is
ID: as inseparable from the soul, as actual extension is from Welt" the body: which if true, to inquire after the beginning 1929 of a man's ideas is the same as to inquire after the beolen ginning of his soul. For by this account soul and its
je ideas, as body and its extension, will begin to exist both acid at the same time. ito. $. 10. But whether the soul be supposed
The soul poets to exist antecedent to, or coeval with, or
thinks not or some time after the first rudiments of or- always ; for hipei ganization, or the beginnings of life in the this wants he body; I leave to be disputed by those who proofs. Vol. I,