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$. 16. This was evidently the case of all Gentilism; . · nor hath even amongst Jews, Christians, and Mahome

tans, who acknowledge but one God, this doctrine, and the care taken in those nations to teach men to have true notions of a God, prevailed so far, as to make inen to have the same, and the true ideas of him. How many, even amongst us, will be found, upon enquiry, to fancy him in the shape of a man sitting in heaven, and to have many other absurd and unfit conceptions of him? Christians, as well as Turks, have had whole sects owning and contending earnestly for it, and that the deity was corporeal, and of human shape ; and though we find few among us who profess themselves Anthropomorphites, (though some I have met with that own it) yet, I believe, he that will make it his business, may find, amongst the ignorant and uninstructed Christians, many of that opinion. Talk but with country people, almost of any age, or young people of almost any condition; and you shall find, that though the name of God be frequently in their mouths, yet the notions they apply this name to are so odd, low and pitiful, that no-body can imagine they were taught by a rational man, much less that they were characters written by the finger of God himself. Nor do I see how it derogates more from the goodness of God, that he has given us minds unfurnished with these ideas of himself, than that he hath sent us into the world with bodies unclothed, and that there is no art or skill born with us : for, being fitted with faculties to attain these, it is want of industry and consideration in us, and not of bounty in him, if we have them not. It is as certain that there is a God, as that the opposite angles, made by the intersection of two straight lines, are equal. There was never any rational creature, that set himself sincerely to examine the truth of these propositions, that could fail to assent to them; thouglı yet it be past doubt that there are many men, who, having not applied thcir thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmost of its extent) universal consent, such an one I casily allow ; but such an

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universal consent as this provi's not the idea of God, any
more than it does the idea of such angles, innate.
If the idea of $. 17. Since then, though the knowledge
God be not of a God be the most natural discovery of
innate, no

human reason, yet the idea of himn is not supposed in. innate, as, I think, is evident from what has nate,

been said ; I imagine there will scarce be any other idea found, that can pretend to it: since if God hath sent any impression, any character on the understanding of men, it is most reasonable to expect it should have been some clear and uniform idea of himself, as far as our wcak capacities were capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an object. But our minds being at first void of that idea, which we are most concerned to have, it is a strong presumption against all other innate characters. I must own, as far as I can observe, I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any other. Idea of sub. $. 18. I confess there is another idea, stance notin. which would be of general use for mankind nate. to hare, as it is of general talk, as if they had it; and that is the idea of substance, which we neither have, nor can have, by sensation or reticction. If nature took care to provide us any ideas, we might well expect they should be such, as by our own faculties we cannot procure to ourselves: but we see, on the contrary, that since by those ways, whereby our ideas are brought into our minds, this is not, we have no such clear idea at all, and therefore signify nothing by the word substance, but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what, i. e. of something whereof we have no particular distinct positive idea, which we take to be the substratuin, or support, of those ideas wc know. No propofi.

f. 19. Whatever then we talk of innate, tions can be either speculative or practical, principles innate, since it may, with as much probability, be said, no ideas are that a man hath 1001. sterling in his pocket, innate, and yet denied, that he hath either penny, shilling, crown, or other coin, out of which the sun is to be made up, as to think that certain propositions

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are innate, when the ideas about which they are can by
no means be supposed to be so. The general reception
and assent that is given doth not at all prove that the
ideas expressed in them are innate : for in many cases,
however the ideas came there, the assent to words ex-
pressing the agreement or disagreement of such ideas,
will necessarily follow. Every one, that hath a true
idea of God and worship, will assent to this proposition,
" that God is to be worshipped,” when expressed in
a language he understands : and every rational man,
that hath not thought on it to-day, may be ready to
assent to this proposition to-morrow; and yet millions
of men may be well supposed to want one or both
those idças to-day. For it we will allow savages and
most country people to have ideas of God and worship,
(which conversation with them will not make one for-
Ward to believe) yet I think few children can be sup-
posed to have those ideas, which therefore they must
begin to have some time or other; and then they will
also begin to assent to that proposition, and make very
little question of it ever after. But such an assent upon
hearing no more proves the ideas to be innate, than
it does that one born blind (with cataracts, which will
be couched to-morrow) had the innate ideas of the
sun, or light, or saffron, or yellow ; because, when his
şight is cleared, he will certainly assent to this propo-
sition, " that the sun is lucid, or that saffron is yellow :"
and therefore, if such an assent upon hearing cannot
prove the ideas innate, it can much less the proposi-
tions made up of those ideas. If they have any innate
ideas, I would be glad to be told what, and how many
they are.

$. 20. To which let me add: If there bc No innate any innate ideas, any ideas in the mind, ideas in the which the mind does not actually think on, memory. they must be lodged in the memory, and from thence nust be brought into view by remembrance; i. e. must be known, when they are remembered, to have been perceptions in the mind before, unless remembrance can be without remembrance. For to remember is to perceive any thing with meinory, or with a

consciousness,

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consciousness, that it was known or perceived before: without this, whatever idea comes into the mind is new, and not remembered ; this consciousness of its having been in the mind before being that which distinguishes remembering from all other ways of thinking. Whatever idea was never perceived by the mind, was never in the mind. Whatever idea is in the mind, is either an actual perception; or else, having been an actual perception, is so in the mind, that by the memory it can be made an actual perception again. Whenever there is the actual perception of an idea without memory, the idea appears perfectly new and unknown before to the understanding. Whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view, it is with a consciousness, that it had been there before, and was not wholly a stranger to the mind. Whether this be not so, I appeal to every one's observation : and then I desire an instance of an idea, pretended to be innate, which (before any impression of it by ways hereafter to be mentioned) any one could revive and remember as an idea he had formerly known ; without which consciousness of a former perception there is no remembrance; and whatever idea comes into the mind without that consciousnes is not remembered, or comes not out of the memory, nor can be said to be in the mind before that appearance : for what is not either actually in view, or in the memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one as if he had never been there. Suppose a child had the use of his eyes, till he knows and distinguishes colours; but then cataracts shut the windows, and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark, and in that time perfectly loses all memory of the ideas of colours he once had. This was the case of a blind man I once talked with, who lost his sight by the small-pox when he was a child, and had no more notion of colours than one born blind. I ask, whether any one can say this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind? And I think no-body will say, that either of them had in his inind any idea of colours at all. His cataracts are couched, and then he has the ideas (which he rememþers not) of colours, de novo, by his restored sight

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conveyed to his mind, and that without any conscious-
ness of a former acquaintance: and these now he can
revive, and call to mind in the dark. In this case all
these ideas of colours, which when out of view can be
revived with a consciousness of a former acquaintance,
being thus in the memory, are said to be in the mind.
The use I make of this, is, that whatever idea, being
not actually in view, is in the mind, is there only by
being in the memory; and if it be not in the memory,
it is not in the mind; and if it be in the memory, it
cannot by the memory be brought into actual view,
without a perception that it comes out of the memory;
which is this, that it had been known before, and is
now remembered. If therefore there be any innate
ideas, they must be in the memory, or else no-where
in the mind; and if they be in the memory, they can
be revived without any impression from without; and
whenever they are brought into the mind, they are
remembered, i. c. they bring with them a perception
of their not being wholly new to it. This being a
constant and distinguishing difference between what is,
and what is not in the memory, or in the mind; that
what is not in the memory, whenever it appears
there, appears perfectly new and unknown before; and
what is in the memory, or in the mind, whenever it is
suggested by the memory, appears not to be new, but i
the mind finds it in itself, and knows it was there be-
fore. By this it may be tried, whether there be any
innate ideas in the mind, before impression from sensa-
tion or reflection. I would fain meet with the man,
who when he came to the use of reason, or at any other
time, remembered any one of them; and to whom,
after he was born, they were never new. If any one
will say, there are ideas in the mind, that are not in
the memory: I desire him to explain himself, and make
what he says intelligible.
$. 21. Besides what I have already said,

Principles
there is another reason why I doubt that

not innate,
neither these nor any other principles are because of
innate. I that am fully persuaded, that the little use or
infinitely wise God made all things in per- iitti
fect wisdom, cannot satisfy myself why he ?

should

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