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under it, they are not essentially nor specifically different. But if any one will make minuter divisions from differences that he knows in the internal frame of watches, and to such precise complex ideas give names that shall prevail : they will then be new species to them who have those ideas with names to them, and can, by those differences, distinguish watches into these several sorts, and then watch will be a generical name. But yet they would be no distinct species to men ignorant of clock-work and the inward contrivances of watches, who had no other idea but the outward shape and bulk, with the marking of the hours by the band. For to them all those other names would be but synonymous terms for the same idea, and signify no more, nor no other thing but a watch. Just thus, I think, it is in natural things. Nobody will doubt that the wheels or springs (if I may so say within, are different in a rational man and a changeling, no more than that there is a difference in the frame between a drill and a changeling. But whether one, or both the differences be essential or specifical, is only to be known to us, by their agreement or disagreement with the complex idea that the name man stands for; for by that alone can it be determined, whether one, or both, or neither of those be a man or no. Species of ar. §. 40. From what has been before said, tificial things we may see the reason why, in the species less confused of artificial things, there is generally less than natural. confusion and uncertainty, than in natural. Because an artificial thing being a production of mang which the artificer designed, and therefore well knows the idea of, the name of it is supposed to stand for no other idea, nor to import any other essence than what is certainly to be known, and easy enough to be appre hended. For the idea or essence of the several sorts of artificial things consisting, for the most part, in nothing but the determinate figure of sensible parts; and sometimes motion depending thereon, which the artificer fashions in matter, such as he finds for his turn; it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to attain a certain idea thereof, and to settle the signification of

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the names, whereby the species of artificial things are distinguished with less doubt, obscurity, and equivocation, than we can in things natural, whose differences and operations depend upon contrivances beyond the reach of our discoveries.

$. 41. I must be excused here if I think artificial things are of distinct species as Artificial well as natural: since I find they are as things of disa plainly and orderly ranked into sorts, by

tinct species. different abstract ideas, with general names annexed to them, as distinct one from another as those of natural substances. For why should we not think a watch and pistol, as distinct species one from another, as a horse and a dog, they being expressed in our minds by distinct ideas, and to others by distinct appellations ?

$. 42. This is farther to be observed Subst concerning substances, that they alone of alone have all our several sorts of ideas have particular proper or proper names, whereby one only par- names. ticular thing is signified. Because in simple ideas, modes, and relations, it seldom happens that men have occasion to mention often this or that particular when it is absent. Besides, the greatest part of mixed modes, being actions which perish in their birth, are not capable of a lasting duration as substances, which are the actors : and wherein the simple ideas that make up the complex ideas designed by the name, have a lasting union.

9. 43. I must beg pardon of my reader, for having dwelt so long upon this subject, creat of and perhaps with some obscurity. But I words. desire it may be considered how difficult it is to lead another by words into the thoughts of things, stripped of those specifical differences we give them: which things, if I name not, I say nothing; and if I do name them, I thereby rank them into some sort or other, and suggest to the mind the usual abstract idea of that species, and so cross my purpose. For to talk of a man, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinary signification of the name man, which is Kk4

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our complex idea usually annexed to it; and bid the reader consider man as he is in himself, and as he is really distinguished from others in his internal constitution, or real essence; that is, by something he knows not what; looks like trifling: and yet thus-one must do who would speak of the supposed real essences and species of things, as thought to be made by nature, if it be but only to make it understood, that there is no such thing signified by the general names, which substances are called by. But because it is difficult by known familiar names to do this, give me leave to endeavour by an example to make the different consideration the mind has of specific names and ideas a little more clear; and to show how the complex ideas of modes are referred sometimes to archetypes in the minds of other intelligent beings; or, which is the same, to the signification annexed by others to their received names; and sometimes to no archetypes at all. Give me leave also to show how the mind always refers its ideas of substances, either to the substances themselves, or to the signification of their names as to the archetypes; and also to make plain the nature of species, or sorting of things, as apprehended, and made use of by us; and of the essences belonging to those species, which is perhaps of more moment, to discover the extent and certainty of our knowledge, than we at first imagine. Instances of $. 44. Let us suppose Adam in the state mixed modes of a grown man, with a good understandin kinneah ing, but in a strange country, with all things and niouph. new and unknown about him; and 00 other faculties, to attain the knowledge of them, but what one of this age has now. He observes Lamech more melancholy than usual, and imagines it to be from a suspicion he has of his wife Adah (whom he most ardently loved), that she had too much kindness for another man. Adam discourses these his thoughts to Eve, and desires her to take care that Adah commit not folly: and in these discourses with Eve he makes use of these two new words, kinneah and piouph. In time

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Adam's mistake appears, for he finds Lamech's trouble proceeded from having killed a man: but yet the two names kinncah and niouph (the one standing for suspicion, in a husband, of his wife's disloyalty to him, and the other for the act of committing disloyalty) lost not their distinct significations. It is plain then that here were two distinct complex ideas of mixed modes with names to them, two distinct species of actions essentially different; I ask wherein consisted the essences of these two distinct species of actions ? And it is plain it consisted in a precise combination of simple ideas, different in one from the other. I ask, Whether the complex idea in Adam's mind, which he called kinneah, were adequate or no? And it is plain it was; for it being a combination of simple ideas, which he, without any regard to any archetype, without respect to any thing as a pattern, voluntarily put together, abstracted and gave the name kinneah to, to express in short to others, by that one sound, all the simple ideas contained and united in that complex one; it must necessarily follow, that it was an adequate idea. His own choice having made that combination, it had all in it he intended it should, and so could not but be perfect, could not be adequate, it being referred to no other archetype which it was supposed to represent.

. 45. These words, kinneah and niouph, by degrees grew into common use; and then the case was somewhat altered. Adam's children had the same faculties, and thereby the same power that he had to make what complex ideas of mixed modes they pleased in their own minds; to abstract them, and make what sounds they pleased the signs of them: but the use of names being to make our ideas within us known to others, that cannot be done, but when the same sign stands for the same idea in two who would communicate their thoughts and discourse together. Those therefore of Adam's children, that found these two words, kinneah and niouph, in familiar use, could not take them for insignificant sounds; but must needs

conclude, conclude, they stood for something, for certain ideas, abstract ideas, they being general names, which abstract ideas were the essences of the species distinguished by those names. If therefore they would use these words, as names of species already established and agreed on, they were obliged to conform the ideas in their minds, signified by these names, to the ideas that they stood for in other men's minds, as to their patterns and archétypes; and then indeed their ideas of these complex modes were liable to he inadequate, as being very apt (especially those that consisted of combinations of many simple ideas) not to be exactly conformable to the ideas in other men's minds, using the same names; though for this there be usually a remedy at hand, which is to ask the meaning of any word we understand not, of him that uses it: it being as impossible to know certainly what the words jealousy and adultery (which I think answer 78 3p and DIR)) stand for in another man's mind, with whom I would discourse about them, as it was impossible, in the beginning of language, to know what kineah and niouph stood for in another man's mind, without explication, they be. ing voluntary signs in every one. Instance of $. 46. Let us now also consider, after the substances in same manner, the names of substances in zahab. their first application. One of Adam's

children, roving in the mountains, lights on a glittering substance which pleases his eye; home he carries it to Adam, who, opon consideration of it, finds it to be hard, to have a bright yellow colour, and an exceeding great weight. These, perhaps, at first, are all the qualities he takes notice of in it; and abstracting this complex idea, consisting of a substance having that peculiar bright yellowness, and a weight very great in proportion to its bulk, he gives it the name zahab, to denominate and mark all substances that have these sensible qualities in them. It is evi. dent now that, in this case, Adam acts quite differently from what he did before in forming those ideas of mixed modes, to which he gave the names kinpeah

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