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constituted; the essence whereof being that abstract
blished relation between them and certain names, which are made use of to signify them; and not in respect of any thing existing, as made by nature. This all ac. 5. 33. This is adjusted to the true end of commodated speech, which is to be the easiest and shortest to the end of way of communicating our notions. For speech. thus he, that would discourse of things as they agreed in the complex ideas of extension and soli. dity, needed but use the word body, to denote all such. He that to these would join others, signified by the words life, sense, and spontaneous motion, needed but use the word animal, to signify all which partook of those ideas : and he that had made a complex idea of a body, with life, sense, and motion, with the faculty of reasoning, and a certain shape joined to it, needed but use the short monosyllable man to express all parti. culars that correspond to that complex idea. This is the proper business of genus and species : and this men do, without any consideration of real essences, or substantial forms, which come not within the reach of our knowledge, when we think of those things; nor within the signification of our words, when we discourse with others.
§. 34. Were I to talk with any one of a Instance in
sort of birds I lately saw in St. James's cassuaries. ·
de Park, about three or four feet high, with a covering of something between feathers and hair, of a dark brown colour, without wings, but in the place thereof two or three little branches coming down like sprigs of Spanish broom, long great legs, with feet only of three claws, and without a tail; I must make this description of it, and so may make others understand me : but when I am told that the name of it is cassuaris, I may then use that word to stand in discourse for all my complex idea mentioned in that description : though by. that word, which is now become a specific name, I know no more of the real essence or constitution of that sort of animals than I did before; and knew probably as much of the nature of that species of birds, before I learned the name, as many Englishmen do of swans, or herons, which are specific names, very well known, of sorts of birds cominon in England.
$. 35. From what has been said, it is Men deter. evident, that men make sorts of things. mine the For it being different essences alone that sorts. make different species, it is plain that they who make those abstract ideas, which are the nominal essences, do thereby make the species, or sort, Should there be a body found, having all the other qualities of gold, except malleableness, it would no doubt be made a question whether it were gold or no, i. e. whether it were of that species. This could be determined only by that abstract idea to which every one annexed the name gold; so that it would be true
gold to him, and belong to that species, who included . not a malleableness in his nominal essence, signified by
the sound gold; and on the other side it would not be true gold, or of that species, to him who included malleableness in his specific idea. And who, I pray, is it that makes these diverse species even under one and the same name, but men that make two different abstract ideas consisting not exactly of the same collec
tion of qualities ? Nor is it a mere supposition to imatu gine that a body may exist, wherein the other obvious
qualities of gold may be without malleableness; since it is certain, that gold itself will be sometimes so eager (as artists call it) that it will as little endure
the hanımer as glass itself. What we have said, of the 1 putting in, or leaving malleableness out of the comhet plex idea the name gold is by any one annexed to,
may be said of its peculiar weight, fixedness, and several want other the like qualities : for whatsoever is left out, or
put in, it is still the complex idea, to which that gname is annexed, that makes the species : and as any
particular parcel of matter answers that idea, so the name of the sort belongs truly to it; and it is of that species. And thus any thing is true gold, perfect Kk a
metal. All which determination of the species, it is plain, depends on the understanding of man, making this or that complex idea.
§. 36. This then, in short, is the case : Nature
nature makes many particular things which makes the similitude. do agree one with another, in many sensi
ble qualities, and probably too in their internal frame and constitution : but it is not this real essence that distinguishes them into species; it is men, who, taking occasion from the qualities they find united in them, and wherein they observe often several individuals to agree, range thein into sorts, in order to their naming, for the convenience of comprehensive signs; under which individuals, according to their conformity to this or that abstract idea, come to be ranked as under ensigns ; so that this is of the blue, that the red regiment; this is a man, that a drill : and in this, I think, consists the whole business of genus and species.
9. 37. I do not deny but nature, in the constant production of particular beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike and of kin one to another: but I think it nevertheless true, that the boundaries of the species whereby men sort them, are made by men; since the essences of the species, distinguished by different names, are, as has been proved, of man's making, and seldom adequate to the internal nature of the things they are taken from. So that we may truly say, such a manner of sorting of things is the workmanship of men.
. §. 38. One thing I doubt not but will Each abstract idea is
: seem very strange in this doctrine; which
is, that from what has been said it will fol.
low, that each abstract idea, with a name to it, makes a distinct species. But who can help it if truth will have it so ? For so it must remain till some body can show us the species of things limited and distinguished by something else; and let us see, that general terms signify not our abstract ideas, but something different from them. I would fain know why &
shock and a hound are not as distinct species as a spaniel and an elephant. We have no other idea of the dif, ferent essence of an elephant and a spaniel, than we have of the different essence of a shock and a hound; all the essential difference, whereby, we know and distinguish them one from another, consisting only in the different collection of simple ideas, to which we have given those different names.
$. 39. How much the making of species Genera and and genera is in order to general names, species are and how much general names are necessary, naming.
in order to
37 if not to the being, yet at least to the completing of a species, and making it pass for such, will appear, besides what has been said above concerning ice and water, in a very familiar example. - A silent and a striking watch are but one species to those who have but one name for them: but he that has the name watch for one, and clock for the other, and distinct complex ideas, to which those names belong, to him they are different species. It will be said perhaps that the inward contrivance and constitution is different between these two, which the watch-maker has a clear idea of. And yet, it is plain, they are but one species to him, when he has but one name for them, For what is sufficient in the inward contrivance to make a new species? There are some watches that are made with four wheels, others with five : is this a spe-, cific difference to the workman ? Some have strings and physies, and others none; some have the balance loose, and others regulated by a spiral spring, and others by hogs bristles: are any or all of these enough, to make a specific difference to the workman, that knows each of these, and several other different contrivances, in the internal constitutions of watches ? It is certain each of these hath a real difference from the rest : but whether it be an essential, a specific difference or no, relates only to the complex idea to which the name watch is given : as long as they all agree in the idea which that name stands for, and that name does not as a generical name comprehend different species ' '. .
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