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$. 99. There are creatures in the world Our abstract that have shapes like ours, but are hairy,
viry ideas are to ,
us the meas and want language and reason. There are sures of spe. naturals amongst us that have perfectiy our cies ; in-'. shape, but want reason, and some of thein stance in that language too. There are creatures, as it is of man. said (“ sit fides penes authorem,” but there appears no contradiction that there should be such) that, with language and reason, and a shape in other things agreeing with ours, have hairy tails; others where the males have no beards, and others where the females have. If it be asked, whether these be all men or no, all of human species ? It is plain, the question refers only to the nominal essence: for those of them to whom the definition of the word man, or the complex idea signified by that name, agrees, are men, and the other not. But if the inquiry be made concerning the supposed real essence, and whether the internal constitution and frame of these several creatures be specifically different, it is wholly impossible for us to answer, no part of that going into our specific idca; only we have reason to think, that where the faculties or outward frame so much differs, the internal constitution is not exactly the same. But what difference in the internal real constitution makes a specific difference, it is in vain to inquire ; whilst our measures of species be, as they are, only our abstract ideas, which we know; and not that internal constitution, which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of hair only on the skin, be a mark of a different internal specific constitution between a changeling and a drill, when they agree in shape, and want of reason and speech? And shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign to us of different real constitutions and species between a changeling and a reasonable man? And so of the rest, if we pretend that distinction of species or sorts is fixedly established by the real frame and secret constitutions of things. : §. 23. Nor let any one say, that the power
er Species not
distinguish. of propagation in animals by the mixture eď by gene. of male and female, and in plants by seeds, ration. Ii 4
keeps keeps the supposed real species distinct and entire. For granting this to be true, it would help us in the distinction of the species of things no farther than the tribes of animals and vegetables. What must we do for the rest ? But in those too it is not sufficient: for if history lye not, women have conceived by drills ; and what real species, by that measure, such a production will be in nature, will be a new question: and we have reason to think this is not impossible, since mules and jumarts, the one from the mixture of an ass and a inare, the other from the mixture of a bull and a mare, are so frequent in the world. I once sav a creature that was the issue of a cat and a rat, and had the plain marks of both about it; wherein nature appeared to have followed the pattern of neither sort alone, but to have jumbled them together. To which, he that shall add the monstrous productions that are so frequently to be met with in nature, will find it hard, even in the race of animals, to determine by the pedigree of what species every animal's issue is; and be at a loss about the real essence, which he thinks certainly conveyed by generation, and has alone a right to the specific name. But farther, if the species of animals and plants are to be distinguished only by propagation, must I go to the Indies to see the sire and dam of the one, and the plant from which the seed was gathered that produced the other, to know whether this be a tyger or that tea ?.. . . . . .
i §. 24. Upon the whole matter, it is Not by sub. evident, that it is their own collections of stantial forms.
sensible qualities, that men make the es
sences of their several sorts of substances; and that their real internal structures are not considered by the greatest part of men, in the sorting them. Much less were any substantial forms ever thought on by any, but those who have in this one part of the world learned the language of the schools : and yet those ignorant men, who pretend not any insight into the real essences, nor trouble themselves about substantial forms, but are content. with knowing ings one froin another by their sensible qualities
are often better acquainted with their differences, can more nicely distinguish them from their uses, and better know what they expect from each, than those learned quicked-sighted men, who look so deep into them, and talk so confidently of something more hidden and essential.
g. 25. But supposing that the real es. The specific sences of substances were discoverable by essences are those that would severely apply themselves
made by the
mind, to that inquiry, yet we could not reasonably think, that the ranking of things under general names was regulated by those internal real constitutions, or any thing else but their obvious appearances : since languages, in all countries, have been established long before sciences. So that they have not been philosophers, or logicians, or such who have troubled themselves about forms and essences, that have made the general names that are in use amongst the several nations of men ; but those more or less comprehensive terms have for the most part, in all languages, received their birth and signification from ignorant and illiterate people, who sorted and denominated things by those sensible qualities they found in them; there· by to signify them, when absent, to others, whether they had an occasion to mention a sort or a particular thing.
. 26. Since then it is evident, that we Therefore sort and name substances by their nominal,
and uncer. and not by their real essences; the next thing to be considered is, how and by whom these essences come to be made. As to the latter, it is evident they are made by the mind, and not by nature : for were they nature's workmanship, they could not be so various and different in several men, as experience tells us they are. For if we will examine it, we shall not find the nominal essence of any one species of substances in all men the sanie; no not of that, which of all others we are the most intimately acquainted with. It could not possibly be, that the abstract idea to which the name man is given, should be different in several men, if it were of nature's making
and that to one it should be “animal rationale," and to another, "animal implume bipes latis unguibus.” He that annexes the name man to a complex idca made up of sense and spontaneous motion, joined to a body of such a shape, has thereby one essence of the species man; and he that, upon farther examination, adds rationality, has another essence of the species he calls man: by which means, the same individual will be a true man to the one, which is not so to the other. I think, there is, scarce, any one will allow this upright figure, so well known, to be the essential difference of the species man; and yet how far men determine of the sorts of animals rather by their shape than descent, is very visible : since it has been more than once debated, whether several human fætuses should be preserved or received to baptism or no, only because of the difference of their outward configuration from the ordinary make of children, without knowing whether they were not as capable of reason, as infants cast in another mould: some whereof, though of an approved shape, are never capable of as much appearance of reason all their lives, as is to be found in an ape, or an elephant, and never give any signs of being acted by a rational soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward figure, which only was found wanting, and not the faculty of re&soll, which no-body could know would be wanting in its due season, was made essential to the human species. The learned divine and lawyer must, on such occasions, renounce his sacred definition of “animal rationale," and substitute some other essence of the human species. Nonsieur Menage furnishes us with an example worth the taking notice of on this occasion : “When the 66 abbot of St. Martin (says he was born, he had so “ little of the figure of a man, that it bespake him “ rather a monster. It was for some time under deli* beration, whether he should be baptized or no. 66 However, he was baptized and declared a man pro" visionally [till time should show what he would « proye.] Nature had moulded him so untowardly; « that he was called all his life the Abbot Malotru, « e. ill-shaped. He was of Caen. Menagiaua, ****" This child, we see, was very near being excluded out of the species of man, barely by his shape. lle escaped very narrowly as he was, and it is certain a figure a little more oddly turned had cast him, and he had been executed as a thing not to be allowed to pass for a man. And yet there can be no reason given, why if the lineaments of his face had been a little altered, a rational soul could not have been lodged in him: why a visage somewhat longer, or a nose flatter, or a wider mouth, could not have consisted, as well as the rest of his ill figure, with such a soul, such parts, as made him, disfigured as he was, capable to be a dignitary in the church. ..
$. 27. Therein then, would I gladly know, consist the precise and unmoveable boundaries of that species ? It is plain, if we examine, there is no such thing made by nature, and established by her amongst men. The real essence of that, or any other sort of substances, it is evident we know not; and therefore are so undetermined in our nominal essences, which we inake ourselves, that if several men were to be asked concerning some oddly-shaped fætus, as soon as born, whether it were a man or no, it is past doubt, one should meet with different answers. Which could not happen, if the nominal essences, whereby we limit and distinguish the species of substances, were not made by man, with some liberty ; but were exactly copied from precise boundaries set by nature, whereby it distinguished all substances into certain species. Who would undertake to resolve, what species that monster was of, which is mentioned by Licetus, lib. i. c. 3. with a man's head and hog's body? Or those other, which to the bodies of men had the heads of beasts, as dogs, horses, &c. If any of these creatures had lived, and could have spoke, it would have increased the difficulty. Had the upper part, to the middle, been of human shape, and all below swine; had it been murder to destroy it? Or must the bishop have been consulted, whether it were man enough to be adınitted to the font or no? as, I have been told, it happened in France some years since, in somewhat a like case. So uncertain are the