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such as come into the mind only by one sense : and so
The names of simple modes differ little from those of simple ideas.
of the Names of mired Modes and Relations.
They stand §. 1. TIE names of mixed modes befor abstract
i ng general, they stand, as has ideas, as
been shown, for sorts or species of things, other general
each of which has its peculiar essence. The names.
essences of these species also, as has been showed, are nothing but the abstract ideas in the mind, to which the name is annexed. Thus far the names and essences of mixed modes have nothing but what is common to them with other ideas : but if we take & little nearer survey of them, we shall find that they have something peculiar, which perhaps may deserve our attention,
$. 2. The first particularity I shall ob
1. The ideas serve in them, is, that the abstract ideas, they stand or, if you please, the essences of the several for are made species of mixed modes are made by the by the underunderstanding, wherein they differ from standing. those of simple ideas : in which sort the mind has no power to make any one, but only receives such as are presented to it, by the real existence of things, operating upon it.
. 3. In the next place, these essences of 2. Made arthe species of mixed modes are not only bitrarily, made by the mind, but made very arbitra- an
and without rily, 'made without patterns, or reference P to any real existence. Wherein they differ from those of substances, which carry with them the supposition of some real being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But in its complex ideas of mixed modes, the mind takes a liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly. It unites and retains certain collections, as so many distinct specific ideas, whilst others, that as often occur in nature, and are as plainly suggested by outward things, pass neglected, without particular names or specifications. Nor does the mind, in these of mixed modes, as in the complex idea of substances, examine them by the real existence of things; or verify them by patterns, containing such peculiar compositions in nature. To know whether his idea of adultery or incest be right, will a man seek it any where amongst things existing? Or is it true, because any one has been witness to such an action? No: but it suffices here, that men have put together such a collection into one complex idea, that makes the archetype and specific idea, whether ever any suci action were committed in rerum natura or no.
0.4. To understand this right, we must con- . :.. sider wherein this making of these complex done. ideas consists; and that is not in the making any new idea, but putting together those which the mind had before. Wherein the mind does these three things : first, it chooses a certain number : secondly, it gives them comexion, and makes them into one idea:
thirdly, it ties them together by a name. If we examine liow the mind proceeds in these, and what liberty it takes in thein, we shall easily observe how these essences of the species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the mind; and consequently, that the species themselves are of men's making.
. 5. No-body can doubt, but that these arbitrare in ideas of mixed inodes are made by a vothat the idea luntary collection of ideas put together in is often be the mind, independent from any original fore the ex
patterns in nature, who will but reflect istence.
that this sort of complex ideas may be made, abstracted, and have names given them, and so a species be constituted, before any one individual of that species ever existed. Who can doubt but the ideas of sacrilege or adultery might be framed in the minds of men, and have names given them; and so these species of mixed modes be constituted, before either of them was ever committed ; and might be as well discoursed of and reasoned about, and as certain truths discovered of them, whilst yet they had no being but in the understanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently a real existence? Whereby it is plain, how much the sorts of mixed modes are the creatures of the understanding, where they have a being as subservient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge, as when they really exist: and we cannot doubt but lawmakers have often made laws about species of actions, which were only the creatures of their own understandings; beings that had no other existence but in their own minds. And I think no-body can deny, but that the resurrection was a species of mixed modes in the mind, before it really existed. Instances; §. 6. To see how arbitrarily these esmurder, in. sences of mixed modes are made by the cest, siab mind, we need but take a view of almost
• any of them. A little looking into them will satisfy us, that it is the mind that combines several scattered independent ideas into one complex one, and, by the common name it gives thein, makes them the essence of a certain specics, without regulating itself by
any connexion they have in nature. For what greater connexion in nature has the idea of a man, than the idea of a sheep, with killing; that this is made a parti
cular species of action, signified by the word murder, Die
and the other not? Or what union is there in nature between the idea of the relation of a father with killing, than that of a son, or neighbour ; that those are combined into one complex idea, and thereby made the essence of the distinct species parricide, whilst the other make no distinct species at all ? But though they have made killing a man's father, or mother, a distinct species from killing his son, or daughter; yet, in some other cases, son and daughter are taken in two, as well as father and mother : and they are all equally comprehended in the same species, as in that of incest. Thus the mind in mixed modes arbitrarily unites into complex ideas such as it finds convenient; whilst others that have altogether as much union in nature, are left loose, and never combined into one idea, because they have no need of one name. It is evident then, that the mind by its free choice gives a connexion to a certain number of ideas, which in nature have no more union
with one another, than others that it leaves out: why podes else is the part of the weapon, the beginning of the ey banki wound is made with, taken notice of to make the dis
tinct species called stabbing, and the figure and matter
of the weapon left out? I do not say, this is done H2 without reason, as we shall see more by and by; but
this I say, that it is done by the free choice of the okies mind, pursuing its own ends; and that therefore these
species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the understanding: and there is nothing more evident, than
that, for the most part, in the framing these ideas the radi * mind searches not its patterns in nature, nor refers the
ideas it makes to the real existence of things; but puts such together, as may best serve its own purposes, without tying itself to a precise imitation of any thing that really exists.
§. 7. But though these complex ideas, But still suba or essences of mixed modes, depend on the servient to
the end of mind, and are made by it with great liber
language. ty; yet they are not made at random, and VOL. I. Hh
jumbled together without any reason at all. Though these complex ideas be not always copied from nature, yet they are always suited to the end for which abstract ideas are made : and though they be combinations made of ideas that are loose enough, and have as little union in themselves, as several other to which the mind never gives a connexion that combines them into one idea; yet they are always made for the convenience of communication, which is the chief end of language. The use of language is by short sounds to signify with ease and dispatch general conceptions : wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contained, but also a great variety of independent ideas collected into one coinplex one. In the making therefore of the species of mixed modes, men have had regard only to such combinations as they had occasion to mention one to another. Those they have combined into distinct complex ideas, and given names to; whilst others, that in nature have as near an union, are left loose and unregarded. For to go no farther than human actions themselves, if they would make distinct abstract ideas of all the varieties might be observed in them, the number must be infinite, and the memory confounded with the plenty, as well as overcharged to little purpose. It suflices, that men make and name so many complex ideas of these mixed modes, as they find they have occasion to have names for, in the ordinary occurrence of their affairs. If they join to the idea of kill. ing the idea of father, or mother, and so wake a distinct species from killing a man's son or neighbour, it is because of the different heinousness of the crime, and the distinct punishinent is due to the murdering a inan's father and mother; different from what ought to be inflicted on the murder of a son or neighbour; and therefore they find it necessary to mention it by a distinct name, which is the end of making that distinct coinbination. But though the ideas of mother and daughter are so differently treated, in reference to the idea of killing, that the one is joined with it, to inake a distinct abstract idea with a name, and so a distinct species, and the other not:
et in respect of carnal