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possible to show an example of any one, who has no
other way to get the idea of motion, but barely by the
definition of that name. Those who tell us, that light
is a great number of little globules, striking briskly on
the bottom of the eye, speak more intelligibly than the
schools; but yet these words ever so well understood
would make the idea the word light stands for no more
known to a man that understands it not before, than if
one should tell him, that light was nothing but a com-
pany of little tennis-balls, which fairies all day long
struck with rackets against some men's foreheads, whilst
they passed by others. For granting this explication of
the thing to be true; yet the idea of the cause of light;
if we had it ever so exact, would no more give us the
idea of light itself, as it is such a particular perception
in us, than the idea of the figure and motion of a sharp
piece of steel would give us the idea of that pain which
it is able to cause in us. For the cause of any sensa-
tion, and the sensation itself, in all the simple ideas of
one sense, are two ideas; and two ideas so different and
distant one from another, that no two can be more so.
And therefore should Des Cartes's globules strike ever
so long on the retina of a man, who was blind by a
gutta serena, he would thereby never have any idea of
light, or any thing approaching it, though he under-
stood what little globules were, and what striking on
another body was, ever so well. And therefore the
Cartesians very well distinguish between that light which
is the cause of that sensation in us, and the idea which
is produced in us by it, and is that which is properly
: $. 11. Simple ideas, as has been shown, Simple ideas,
are only to be got by those impressions ob-

impressions oh why undefi.

nable, far. jects themselves make on our minds, by the proper inlets appointed to each sort. If plained. they are not received this way, all the words in the world, made use of to explain or define any of their names, will never be able to produce in us the idea it stands for. For words being sounds can produce in us no other simple ideas, than of those very sounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary


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connexiori which is known to be between them and those simple ideas, which common use has made them signs of. He that thinks otherwise, let him try if any words can give him the taste of a pine-apple, and make him have the true idea of the relish of that celebrated delicious fruit. So far as he is told it has a resemblance with any tastes, whereof he has the ideas already in his meinory, imprinted there by sensible objects not strangers to his palate, so far may he approach that resemblance in his mind. But this is not giving us that idea by a definition, but exciting in us other simple ideas by their known names; which will be still very different from the true taste of that fruit itself. In light and colours, and all other simple ideas, it is the same thing; for the signification of sounds is not natural, but only imposed and arbitrary. And no definition of light, or redness, is inore fitted, or able to produce either of those ideas in us, than the sound light or red by itself. For to hope to produce an idea of light, or colour, by a sound, however formed, is to expect that sounds should be visible, or colours audible, and to make the ear's do the office of all the other senses. Which is all one as to say, that we might taste, smell, and see by the ears; a sort of philosophy worthy only of Sancho Panca, who had the faculty to see Dulcinea ly hearsay. And therefore he that has not betore received into his mind, by the proper inlet, tachy the simple idea which any word stands for, can never come to know the signification of that word by any other words or sounds whatsoever, put together according to any rules of definition. The only way is by applying to his senses the proper object, and so producing that idea in lim, for which he has learned the name already. A studious blind man, who had mightily beat his head about visible objects, and made use of the explication of his books and friends, to understand those names of light and colours, which often came in his way, bragged one day, that he now understood what scarlet significd. Upon which his friend demanding, what scarlet was? the blind man answered, It was like the sound of a trumpet. Just such an under

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standing of the name of any other simple idea will he have, who hopes to get it only from a definition, or other words made use of to explain it.

$. 12. The case is quite otherwise in The contra. complex ideas; which consisting of several ry showed in simple ones, it is in the power of words,

er of words complex standing for the several ideas that make that instanc composition, to imprint complex ideas in a statue and the mind, which were never there before, rainbow. and so, make their names be understood. In such collections of ideas, passing under one name, definition, or the teaching the signification of one word by several others, has place, and may make us understand the names of things, which never came within the reach of our senses; and frame ideas suitable to those in other men's minds, when they use those names: provided that none of the terms of the definition stand for any such simple ideas, which he to whom the explication is made has never yet had in this thought. Thus the word statue may be explained to a blind man by other words, when picture cannot; his senses having given him the idea of figure, but not of colours, which therefore words cannot excite in him. This gained the prize to the painter against the statuary : each of which

contending for the excellency of his art, and the statuphe ary bragging that his was to be preferred, because it can be be reached farther, and even those who had lost their eyes opportuno could yet perceive the excellency of it, the painter opvt. agreed to refer himself to the judgment of a blind man;

Brught who being brought where there was a statue, made by Deticis the one, and a picture drawn by the other, he was first mis as led to the statue, in which he traced with his hands all

the lineaments of the face and body, and with great heb admiration applauded the skill of the workman. But 0:22. being led to the picture, and having his hands laid porta a upon it, was told, that now he touched the head, and pries then the forehead, eyes, nose, &c, as his hands moved a til over the parts of the picture on the cloth, without hege finding any the least distinction : whereupon he cried which out, that certainly that must needs be a very admirable * and divine piece of workmanship, which could repres


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sent to them all those parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive any thing.

$. 13. Tle that should use the word rainbow to one who knew all those colours, but yet had never seen that phænomenon, would, by enumerating the figure, largeness, position and order of the colours, so well define that word, that it might be perfectly understood. But vet that definition, how exact and perfect soever, would never make a blind man understand it; because several of the simple ideas that make that conplex one, being such as he never received by sensation and experience, no words are able to excite them in his mind. The same of

. Ş. 14. Simple ideas, as has been showed, complex can only be got by experience, from those ideas when objects, which are proper to produce in us to be made those perceptions. When by this means intelligible

we have our minds stored with them, and by words.

know the names for them, then we are in a condition to define, and by definition to understand the names of complex ideas, that are made up of them. But when any term stands for a simple idea, that a man has never vet had in his mind, it is impossible by any words to make known its meaning to him. When any term stands for an idea a man is acquainted with, but is ignorant that that term is the sign of it; there another name, of the same idea which he has been accustomed to, may inake him understand its meaning. But in no case whatsoever is any name, of any simple idea, capable of a definition. 1. Names of N. 15. Fourthly, But though the names simple ideas of simple ideas, hare not the help of definileast doubt. tion to determine their signification, vet ful.

that hinders not but that they are generally less doubiful and uncertain, than those of mixed modes and substances: because they standing only for one simple perception, men, for the most part, easily and perfectly agree in their signification; and there is little room for mistake and wrangling about their meaning. lle that knows once that whiteness is the name of that colour he has observed in snow or milk, will not be

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apt to misapply that word, as long as he retains that idea; which when he has quite lost, he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he understands it not. There is neither a multiplicity of simple ideas to be put together, which makes the doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes; nor a supposed, but an unknown real essence, with properties depending thereon, the precise number whereof is also unknown, which makes the difficulty in the names of substances. But, on the contrary, in simple ideas the whole signification of the name is known at once, and consists not of parts, whereof more or less being put in, the idea may be varied, and so the signification of name be obscure or uncertain,

$. 16. Fifthly, This farther may be ob- 5. Simple served concerning simple ideas and their ideas have

few ascents names, that they have but few ascents in ; lineâ prædicamentali (as they call it) from dicamentali. the lowest species to the suminum genus. The reason whereof is, that the lowest species being but one simple idea, nothing can be left out of it ; that so the difference being taken away it may agree with some other thing in one idea common to them both; which, having one name, is the genus of the other two: v. g. there is nothing that can be left out of the idea of white and red, to make them agree in one common appearance, and so have one general name; as rationality being left out of the complex idea of man, makes it agree with brute, in the more general idea and name of animal: and therefore when to avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would comprehend both white and red, and several other such simple ideas, under one general name, they have been fain to do it by a word, which denotes only the way they get into the mind. For when white, red, and yellow, are all comprehended under the genus or name colour, it signifies no more but such ideas as are produced in the mind only by the sight, and have entrance only through the eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general term, to comprehend both colours and sounds, and the like simple ideas, they do it by a word that signifies all


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