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the metal he hears called gold, but the bright shining yellow colour, he applies the word gold only to his own idea of that colour, and nothing else; and therefore calls the same colour in a peacock's tail gold. Another that hath better observed, adds to shining yellow great weight: and then the sound gold, when he uses it, stands for a complex idea of a shining yellow and very weighty substance. Another adds to those qualities fusibility: and then the word gold signifies to him a body, bright, yellow, fusible, and very heavy. Another adds malleability. Each of these uses equally the word gold, when they have 'occasion to express the idea which they have applied it to: but it is evident, that each can apply it only to his own idea; nor can he make it stand as a sign of such a complex idea as he has not. Words often §. 4. But though words, as they are used
: by men, can properly and immediately sigferred, Girst to the ideas in nify nothing but the ideas that are in the other men's mind of the speaker; yet they in their minds. thoughts give them a secret reference to two other things.
First, They suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of other men, with whom they communicate : for else they should talk in vain, and could not be understood, if the sounds they applied to one idca were such as by the hearer were applied to another; which is to speak two languages. But in this, men stand not usually to examine, whether the idea they and those they discourse with have in their minds, be the same: but think it enough that they use the word, as they imagine, in the common acceptation of that language; in which they suppose, that the idea they make it a sign of is precisely the same, to which the understanding men of that country apply that name. Secondly, to §. 5. Secondly, Because men would not the reality of be thought to talk barely of their own things. imaginations, but of things as really they are ; therefore they often suppose the words to stand also for the reality of things. But this relating more
particularly to substances, and their names, as perhaps
Words by to be considered : first, that they being im
use readily mediately the signs of men's ideas, and by excite ideas. that means the instruments whereby men cominunicate their conceptions, and express to one another those thoughts and imaginations they have within their own breasts ; there comes by constant use to be such a connexion between certain sounds and the ideas they stand for, that the names heard, almost as readily excite certain ideas, as if the objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the senses. Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible qualities; and in all substances, that frequently and fainiliarly occur to us.
5. 7. Secondly, That though the proper and immediate signification of words are
used without Kleas in the inind of the speaker, yet because signification. by familiar use from our cradles we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly, and have them readily on our tongues, and always at hand in our memories, but yet are not always careful to examine, or setile their significations perfectly; it often happens that men, even when they would apply themselves to
an attentive consideration, do set their thoughts more je samo on words than things. Nay, because words are many
of them learned before the ideas are known for which they stand; therefore some, not only children, but men,
speak several words no otherwise than parrots do, only blir et because they have learned them, and have been aca
customed to those sounds. But so far as words are of SHOES use and signification, so far is there a constant conhis VOL. I.
nexion between the sound and the idea, and a designation that the one stands for the other; without which application of them, they are nothing but so much insignificant noise. Their signi. «. 8. Words by long and familiar use, as fication per has been said, come to excite in men certain fectly arbi. ideas so constantly and readily, that they
are apt to suppose a natural connection be. tween them. But that they signify only men's peculiar ideas, and that by a perfect arbitrary imposition, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same language) the same ideas we take them to be the sigus of: and every man has so inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases, that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds that he has, when they use the same words that he does. And therefore the great Augustus himself, in the possession of that power which ruled the world, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word: which was as much as to say, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what idea any sound should be a sign of, in the mouths and common language of his subjects. It is true, common use by a tacit consent appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages, which so far limits the signification of that sound, that unless a man applies it to the same idea, he does not speak properly : and let me add, that unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer, which he makes them stand for in speaka ing, he does not speak intelligibly. But whatever be the consequence of any man's using of words differently, either from their general meaning, or the particular sense of the person to whom he addresses them, this is certain, their signification, in his use of them, is limited to his ideas, and they can be signs of nothing else.
СНАР. CH A P. III.
Of General Terms.
§ 1. ALL things that exist being par-
part of words thought reasonable that words, which
general. ought to be conformed to things, should be so too; I mean in their signification: but yet we find the quite contrary. The far greatest part of words, that make all languages, are general terms; which has not been the effect of neglect or chance, but of reason and necessity. . %. 2. First, it is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct pe- particular culiar name. For the signification and use thing to have of words, depending on that connexion a name is which the mind makes between its ideas impossible. and the sounds it uses as signs of them, it is necessary, in the application of names to things that the mind should have distinct ideas of the things, and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea. But it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with : every bird and beast men saw, every tree and plant that affected the senses, could not find a place in the most capacious understanding. If it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious memory, that some generals have been able to call every soldier in their army, by his proper name, we may easily find a reason, why men have never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads; much less to call every leaf of plants, or grain of sand that came in their way, by a peculiar name. $. 3. Secondly, If it were possible, it
And useless. would yet be useless; because it would not serve to the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up names of particular things, that would not Ffg
east Mid not it be that som
serve them to communicate their thoughts. Men learn names, and use them in talk with others, only that they may be understood : which is then only done, when by use or consent the sound I make by the organs of speech, excites in another man's mind, who hears it, the idea I apply it to in mine, when I speak it. This cannot be done by names applied to particular things, whereof I alone having the ideas in my nind, the names of them could not be significant or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all those very particular things which had fallen under my notice.
$.4. Thirdly, But yet granting this also feasible (which I think is not) yet a distinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great use for the improvement of knowledge : which, though founded in particular things, enlarges itself by general views; to which things reduced into sorts under general names, are properly subservient. These, with the names belonging to them, come within some compass, and do not multiply every moment, beyond what either the mind can contain, or use requires : and therefore, in these, men have for the most part stopped; but yet not so as to hinder themselves from distinguishiny particular things, by appropriated names, where convenience demands it. And therefore in their own species, which they have most to do with, and wherein they have often occasion to mention particular persons, they make use of proper names; and there distinct individuals have distinct denominations. What things
9. 5. Besides persons, countries also, cities, bave proper rivers, mountains, and other the like dis
tinctions of place, have usually found pe
culiar names, and that for the same reason; they being such as men have often an occasion to mark particularly, and as it were set before others in their discourses with them. And I doubt not, but if we had reason to mention particular horses, as often as we have to mention particular men, we should have proper names for the one, as fainiliar as for the other; and 1. phalus would be the word as much in use, as