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man to be born of the same woman Sempronia; and so have as clear a notion of brothers, as of births, and perhaps clearer. For if I believed that Sempronia dug Titus out of the parsley-bed (as they used to tell children) and thereby became his mother; and that afterwards, in the same manner, she dug Caius out of the parsley-bed; I had as clear a notion of the relation of brothers between them, as if I had all the skill of a inidwife : the notion that the same woman contributed, ás mother, equally to their births, (though I were igno: rant or mistaken in the manner of it), being that on which I grounded the relation, and that they agreed in that circumstance of birth, let it be what it will. The comparing them then in their descent from the same person, without knowing the particular circumstances of that descent, is enough to found my notion of their having or not having the relation of brothers. But though the ideas of particular relations are capable of being as clear and distinct in the minds of those, who will duly consider them, as those of mixed modes, and more determinate than those of substances; yet the names belonging to relation are often of as doubtful and uncertain signification, as those of substances or inixed modes, and much more than those of simple ideas: because relative words being the marks of this comparison, which is made only by men's thoughts, and is an idea only in men's minds, men frequently apply them to different comparisons of things, according to their own imaginations, which do not always correspond with those of others using the same name. The notion : p. 20. Thirdly, That in these I call mo. of the rela. ral relations, I have a true notion of relation is the tion, by comparing the action with the rule, same, whe. whether the rulé be true or false. For if I ther the rulo
measure any thing by a yard, I know wheany action is compared to ther the thing I measure be longer or shorter be true or · than that supposed yard, though perhaps false. :. the yard I measure by be not exactly the standard; which indeed is another inquiry. For though the rule be erroneous, and I mistaken in it'; yet the agreement or disagreement observable in that which I
· compare with, makes me perceive the relation. Though measuring by a wrong rule, I shall thereby be brought to judge amiss of its moral rectitude, because I have tried it by that which is not the true rule ; yet I am not mistaken in the relation which that action bears to that rule I compare it to, which is agreement or disagreement.
CH A P. XXIX.
$. 1. L AVING shown the original of 1
11 our ideas, and taken a view of clear and their several sorts; considered the differ- distinct, . ence between the simple and the complex, and observed how the complex ones are di- S
confused, vided into those of modes, substances, and ed nisi relations; all which, I think, is necessary to be done r.ces; fed by any one, who would acquaint himself thoroughly fas de with the progress of the mind in its apprehension and cubic knowledge of things: it will, perhaps, be thought I have me of dwelt long enough upon the examination of ideas. marif I must, nevertheless, crave leave to offer some few en's ta other considerations concerning them. The first is tirement that some are clear, and others obscure; some distinct, ho 2014 and others confused. almeno una $. 2. The perception of the mind being natie most aptly explained by words relating to obscure ex. cielt the sight, we shall best understand what is plained by ntion the meant by clear and obscure in our ideas, sight. with her by reflecting on what we call clear and obscure in the
objects of sight. Light being that which discovers to Thonet us visible objects, we give the name of obscure to create that which is not placed in a light sufficient to disco
ver minutely to us the figure and colours, which are aut observable in it, and which, in a better light, would
be discernible. In like manner our simple ideas are clear, when they are such as the objects themselves,
from whence they were taken, did or might, in a wellordered sensation or perception, present them. - Whilst the memory retains them thus, and can produce them to the mind, whenever it has occasion to consider them, they are clear ideas. So far as they either want any thing of the original exactness, or have lost any of their first freshness, and are, as it were, faded or tarnished by time; so far are they obscure. Complex ideas, as they are made up of simple ones, so they are clear when the ideas that go to their composition are clear: and the number and order of those simple ideas, that are the ingredients of any complex one, is determinate and certain.
$. 3. The causes of obscurity in simple Causes of obscurity.
ideas seem to be either dull organs, or very
slight and transient impressions made by the objects, or else a weakness in the memory not able to retain them as received. For, to return again to visible objects, to help us to apprehend this matter : if the organs or faculties of perception, like wax over-hardened with cold, will not receive the impression of the seal, from the usual impulse wont to imprint it; or, like wax of a temper too soft, will not hold it well when well imprinted; or else supposing the way of a temper fit, but the seal not applied with a sufficient force to make a clear impression : in any of these cases, the print left by the seal will be obscure. This, I sup. pose, needs no application to make it plainer. Distinct and $. 4. As a clear idea is that whereof the confused, . mind has such a full and evident percepwhat. tion, as it does receive from an outward ob. ject operating duly on a well-disposed organ; so a distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference:from all other;, and a confused idea is such a one, as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different. Objection.
§. 5. If no idea be confused, but such
as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it should be different; it will be hardy. may any one say, to find any where a confused
idea. For let any idea be as it will, it can be no other but such as the mind perceives it to be ; and that very perception sufficiently distinguishes it from all other idcas, which cannot be other, i. e. different, without being perceived to be so. No idea therefore can be undistinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different, unless you would have it different from itself: for fiom all other it is evidently different.
9. 6. To remove this difficulty, and to confir help us to conceive aright what it is that ideas is in re makes the confusion ideas are at any time ference to chargeable with, we must consider, that their names., things ranked under distinct names are supposed different enough to be distinguished, and so each sort by its peculiar name may be marked, and discoursed of a-part upon any occasion : and there is nothing more evident, than that the greatest part of different names are supposed to stand for different things. Now every
idea a man has being visibly what it is, and distinct Tags from all other ideas but itself; that which makes it
confused, is, when it is such, that it may as well be DEBE called by another game, as that which it is expressed erede by: the difference which keeps the things (to be ranked the mil under those two different names) distinct, and makes hat some of them belong rather to the one, and some of of the them to the other of those names, being left out; and
Toss so the distinction, which was intended to be kept up by inet. those different names is quite lost. a .7. The defaults which usually occa- Defauits . sident is sion this confusion, I think, are chietly which continue these following:
confusion, count: $ . First, when any complex idca (for it is First, comprio complex ideas that are inost liable to con plex ideas fusion) is made up of too small a number made up of
100 few sim. another of simple ideas, and such only as are com
ple ones. mon to other things, iphereby the differences ! wood that make it deserve a different name, are left out. Thus bet lie that has an idea made up of barely the simple ones
of a' bcast with spots, bas but a contused idea of a EDO lenne er a leopard; it not being thereby sufficiently distinguished
froin a lynx, and several other sorts of beasts that are • Vol. I."
spotted. So that such an idea, though it hath the pe-
S. 8. Secondly, Another fault which its simple makes our ideas confused, is, when though ones jumbled the particulars that make up any idea are in disorderly . number enough; yet they are so jumbled
mitte together, that it is not easily discernible, whether it more belongs to the name that is given it, than to any other. There is nothing properer to make us conceive this confusion, than a sort of pictures usually shown as surprizing pieces of art, wherein the colours, as they are laid by the pencil on the table itself, mark out very odd and unusual figures, and have no discernible order in their position. This draught, thus made up of parts where:n no symmetry nor order appears, is in itself no more a confused thing, than the picture of a cloudy sky; wherein though there be as little order of colours or figures to be found, yet nobody thinks it a confused picture. What is it then that makes it be thought confused, since the want of symmetry does not? as it is plain it does not; for another draught made, barely in imitation of this, could not be called confuscd. I answer, that which makes it ve thought confused, is, the applying it to sonję name, to which it does no inore discernibly belong, than to some other: v. g. When it is said to be the picture of a man, or Cæsar, then any one with reason counts it confused: because it is not discernible, in that state, to belong more to the name man, or Cæsar, than to the name baboon, or Popey; which are supposed to stand for