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56 vous? It answered, De Marinnan. The prince, A " qui estes vous? The parrot, A un Portugais. Prince, “Que fais tu la ? Parrot, Je garde les poulles. The “ prince lauglied, and said, Vous gardez les poulles ? «The parrot answered, Oui, moi; et je sçai bien faire; • and made the chuck four or five times that people “ use to make to chickens when they call them. I set “ down the words of this worthy dialogue in French, * just as prince Maurice said them to me. I asked « him in what language the parrot spoke, and he said, “ in Brasilian; I asked whether he understood Brasi“Jian; he said, no, but he had taken care to have two “interpreters by him, the one a Dutelman that spoke “ Brasilian, and the other a Brasilian that spoke “ Dutch; that he asked them separately and privately, 66 and both of them agreed in telling him just the same s thing that the parrot had said. I could not but tell 6 this odd story, because it is so much out of the way, k and from the first hand, and what may pass for a good cone; for I dare say this prince at least believed him« self in ail he told me, having ever passed for a very “ honest and pious man. I leave it to naturalists to “reason, and to other men to believe, as they please s upon it: however, it is not, perhaps, amiss to relieve

or enliven a busy scene sometimes with such digres“sions, whether to the purpose or no.”

I have taken care that the reader should Sanre man.

have the story at large in the author's own words, because he seems to me not to have thought it incredible; for it cannot be imagined that so able a man as he, who had sufficiency enough to warrant all the testimonies he gives of himself, should take so much pains, in a place where it had nothing to do, to pin so close not only on a inan whom he mentions as his friend, but on a prince in whom he acknowledges very great honesty and piety, a story, which if he himself thonght incredible, he could not but also think ridiculous. The prince, it is plain, who youches this story, and our author, who relates it from him, both of them call this talker a parrot: and I ask any one else, who thinks such a story, fit to be told, whether it

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this parrot, and all of its kind, had always talked, as
we have a prince's word for it this one did, whether,
I say, they would not have passed for a race of rational
animals : but yet whether for all that they would have
been allowed to be men, and not parrots ? For I pre-
sume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being
alone that makes the idea of a man in most people's
sense, but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to it:
and if that be the idea of a man, the same successive
body not shifted all at once, must, as well as the same
immaterial spirit, go to the making of the same man.
. 9. This being premised, to find wherein

1 Personal personal identity consists, we must consider identity what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions: and by this every one is to hinself that which he calls self; it not being cousidered in this case whether the same self be continued in the same or divers substances. For since consciousness always accoinpanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone consists personal identity, i. e. the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same seif now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done. §. 10. But it is farther inquired, whe

Conscious. : ther it be the same identical substance. Dess makes This few would think they had reason to personal . doubt of, if these perceptions, with their identity'a',


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consciousness, always remained present in the mind, whereby the same thinking thing would be always consciously present, and, as would be thought, evidently the same to itself. But that which seems to make the difficulty is this, that this consciousness being interrupted always by forgetfulness, there being no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our past actions before our eyes in one view, but even the best memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are viewing another; and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of our lives, not reflecting on our past selves, being intent on our present thoughts, and in sound sleep having no thoughts at all, or at least none with that consciousness which remarks our waking thoughts : I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the sight of our past selves, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, i. e. the same substance or no. Which, however reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not personal identity at all: the question being, what makes the same person, and not whether it be the same identical substance, which always thinks in the same person ; which in this case matters not at all: different substances, by the same consciousness (where they do partake in it), being united into one person, as well as different bodies by the saine life are united into one animal, whose iden. tity is preserved, in that change of substances, by the unity of one continued life. For it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed solely to one individual substance; or can be continued in a succession of several substances. For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had.of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same personal self. For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions, that it is self to itself now, and so will be the same 'self, as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past -or to come; and would be by distance of time, or change of substance, no more two

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persons, ihan a man be two men by wearing other clothes to-day than he did yesterday, with a long or a short sleep between: the same consciousness uniting those distant actions into the same person, whatever substances contributed to their production.

$. 11. That this is so, we have some Personal kind of evidence in our very bodies, all identity in whose particles, whilst vitally united to this change of same thinking conscious self, so that we substar feel when they are touched, and are affected by, and conscious of good or harm that happens to them, are

a part of ourselves; i. e. of our thinking conscious dine

self. Thus the limbs of his body are to every one a part of himself; he sympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off an hand, and thereby separate it from that consciousness he had of its heat, cold, and other affections, and it is then no longer a part of that which is himself, any inore than the remotest part of matter. Thus we see the substance, whereof personal self consisted at one time, may be varied at another, without the change of personal identity; there being no question about the same person, though the limbs which

but now were a part of it, be cut off. estancia

§. 12. But the question is, “ whether if the same

"substance which thinks, be changed, it can be the erent

"same person; or, remaining the same, it can be dif-
"ferent persons ?”

And to this I answer, first, This can be Whether in no question at all to those who place the change of thought in a purely naterial animal con- thinking

stitution, void of an immaterial substance. substances. , Orlor whether their supposition bé true or no, it is plain

they conceive personal identity preserved in something

else than identity of substance; as animal identity is it has preserved in identity of life, and not of substance. haif And therefore those who place thinking in an immaal selle terial substance only, before they can come to deal with

these men, must show why personal identity cannot be and his preserved in the change of immaterial substances, or jourselona variety of particular inmaterial substances, as well as road animal identity is preserved in the change of material

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mal spirit is: unless there

es, as it

substances, or variety of particular bodies : unless they will say, it is one iinmaterial spirit that makes the same life in brutes, as it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same person in men; which the Cartesians at least will not admit, for fear of making brutes thinking things too.

. 13. But next, as to the first part of the question, " whether if the same thinking substance (supposing “immaterial substances only to think) be changed, it “ can be the same person?" I answer, that cannot be resolved, but by those who know what kind of substances they are that do think, and whether the consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one thinking substance to another. I grant, were the saine consciousness the same individual action, it could not : but it being a present representation of a past action, why it may not be possible, that that may be represented to the mind to have been, which really never was, will remain to be shown. And therefore how far the consciousness of past actions is annexed to any individual agent, so that another cannot possibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of action it is that cannot be done without a reflex act of perception accompanying it, and how performed by thinking substances, who cannot think without being conscious of it. But that which we call the same consciousness, not being the same individual act, why one intellectual substance may not have represented to it, as done by itself, what it never did, and was perhaps done by some other agent; why, I say, such a representation may not possibly be without reality of matter of fact, as well as several representations in dreams are, which yet whilst dreaming we take for true, will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things. And that it never is so, will by us, till we have clearer views of the nature of thinking substances, be best resolved into the good. ness of God, who as far as the happines or misery of any of his sensible creatures is concerned in it, will not by a fatal error of theirs transfer from one to another that consciousness which draws reward or punishment with it. How far this may be an argument


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