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to be so, as wanting that evident mark of relation which is between correlatives, which seem to explain one another, and not to be able to exist, but together. Hence it is, that many of those names which, duly considered, do include evident relations, have been called external denominations. But all names, that are more than empty sounds, must signify some idea, which is either in the thing to which the name is applied ; and then it is positive, and is looked on as united to, and existing in the thing to which the denomination is given : or else it arises from the respect the inind finds in it to something distinct from it, with which it considers it; and then it concludes a relation. §. 3. Another sort of relative terms there
Some seem. is, which are not looked on to be either relative, or so much as external denomina- lute terms tions; which yet, under the form and ap- contain relapearance of signifying something absolute in tions. the subject, do conceal a tacit, though less observable relation. Such are the seemingly positive terms of old, great, imperfect, &c. whereof I shall have occasion to speak more at large in the following chapters.
8. 4. This farther may be observed, that Relation dif. the ideas of relation may be the same in ferent from men, who have far different ideas of the the things re. things that are related, or that are thus lated. . compared ; v. g. those who have far different ideas of a man, may yet agree in the notion of a father : which is a notion superinduced to the substance, or man, and refers only to an act of that thing called man, whereby he contributed to the generation of one of his own kind, let man be what it will.
§. 5. The nature therefore of relation C consists in the referring or comparing two
paring two change of a things one to another; from which com- be without parison, one or both comes to be denomi
any change nated. And if either of those things be ihtne removed or cease to be, the relation ceases, and the denomination consequent to it, though the other receive in itself no alteration at all: v. g. Caius, whom I consider to-day as a father, ceases to be so to-morrow, only
by the death of his son, without any alteration made in himself. Nay, barely by the mind's changing the object to which it compares any thing, the same thing is capable of having contrary denominations at the same time: v. g. Caius, compared to several persons, may truly be said to be older and younger, stronger and weaker, &c.
$. 6. Whatsoever dotlı or can exist, or be Relation only betwixt
considered as one thing, is positive; and two things. so not only simple ideas and substances, but
modes also, are positive beings: though the parts of which they consist are very often relative one to another; but the whole together considered as one thing, and producing in us the complex idea of one thing, which idea is in our minds, as one picture, though an aggregate of divers parts, and under one name, it is a positive or absolute thing, or idea. Thus a triangle, though the parts thereof compared one to another be relative, yet the idea of the whole is a positive absolute idea. The same may be said of a family, a tune, &c. for there can be no relation, but betwixt two things considered as tiro things. There niust always be in relation two ideas, or things, either in themselves really separate, or considered as distinct, and then a ground or occasion for their comparison.
$. 7. Concerning relation in general, these All things
things may be considered. Carabie of relation,
First, that there is no one thing, whe
ther simple idca, substance, mode, or relation, or name of either of them, which is not capable of almost an infinite number of considerations, in retuence to other things; and therefore this makes no small part of men's thoughts and words: v. g. one single man may at once be concerned in, and sustain all these following relations, and many more, viz. father, brother, son, grandfather, grandson, father-in-law, son-inlaw, husband, friend, enemy, subject, general, judge, pairon, client, professor, European, Englishman, islander, servant, mater, possessor, captain, superior, inferior, bigger, less, older, younger, contemporary, like, unlile', &c. lo un alinost infinite number; he being ca
pable of as many relations, as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things, in any manner of agree.. ment, disagreement, or respect whatsoever. For, as I said, relation is a way of comparing or considering two things together, and giving one or both of them some appellation from that comparison; and sometimes giving even the relation itself a name. $. 8. Secondly, this farther may be con
The ideas of sidered concerning relation, that though it relations be not contained in the real existence of clearer often things, but something extraneous and su- than of the perinduced; yet the ideas which relative
su words stand for, are often clearer and more distinct, than of those substances to which they do belong. The notion we have of a father, or brother, is a great deal clearer and more distinct, than that we have of a man; or, if you will, paternity is a thing whereof it is, easier to have a clear idea, than of humanity: and I can much easier conceive what a friend is, than what God. Because the knowledge of one action, or one simple idea, is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a relation : but to the knowing of any substans tial being, an accurate collection of sundry ideas is necessary. A man, if he compares two things together, can hardly be supposed not to know what it is, wherein he compares them: so that when he compares any things together, he cannot but have a very clear idea, of that relation. The ideas then of relations are capable at least of being more perfect and distinct in our minds, than those of substances. Because it is commonly hard to know all the simple ideas which are really in any substance, but for the most part easy enough to know the simple ideas that make up any relation I think on, or have a name for : v. g. comparing two men, in reference to one common parent, it is very easy to frame the ideas of brothers, without having yet the perfect idea of a man. For significant relative words, as well as others, standing only for ideas; and those being all either simple, or made up of simple ones, it suffices, for the knowing the precise idea the relative term stands for, to have a clear conception of
the be don is the
that which is the foundation of the relation: which may be done without having a perfect and clear idea of the thing it is attributed to. Thus having the notion, that one laid the egg out of which the other was hatched, I have a clear idea of the relation of dam and chick, between the two cassiowaries in St. James's park; though perhaps I have but a very obscure and imperfect idea of those birds themselves.
9. 9. Thirdly, though there be a great Relations all
number of considerations, wherein things terminate in simple ideas. may be compared one with another, and
so a multitude of relations; yet they all terminate in, and are concerned about, those simple ideas, either of sensation or reflection : which I think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge. To clear this, I shall show it in the most considerable relations that we have any notion of, and in some that seem to be the most remote from sense or reflection; which yet will appear to have their ideas from thence, and leave it past doubt, that the notions we have of them are but certain simple ideas, and so originally derived from sense or reflection. Terms lead §. 10. Fourthly, that relation being the ing the mind considering of one thing with another, beyond the which is extrinsecal to it, it is evident, that subject deno. all words that necessarily lead the mind to minated, are relative.
any other ideas than are supposed really to
exist in that thing, to which the words are applied, are relative words: v. g. a man black, merry, thoughtful, thirsty, angry, extended; these, and the like, are all absolute, because they neither signify nor intimate any thing, but what does or is supposed really to exist in the man thus denominated: but father, brother, king, husband, blacker, merrier, &c. are words which, together with the thing they denominate, imply also something else separate and exterior to the existence of that thing. Conclusion.
$. 11. Having laid down these premises “ concerning relation in general, I shall now proceed to show, in some instances, how all the ideas we have of relation are made up, as the others are, only of simple ideas; and that they all, how refined or remote from 'sense soever they seem, terminate at last in simple ideas. I shall begin with the most comprehensive relation, wherein all things that do or can exist are concerned, and that is the relation of cause and effect. The idea whereof, how derived from the two fountains of all our knowledge, sensation, and reflection, I shall in the next place consider.
CHA P. XXVI. Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations. 6.1. IN the notice that our senses take Whencetheit
of the constant vicissitude of ideas got. things, we cannot but observe, that several particular, both qualities and substances, begin to exist; and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observation, we get our ideas of cause and effect. That which produces any simple or complex idea we denote by the general name cause; and that which is produced, effect. Thus finding that in that substance which we call wax fluidity, which is a simple idea that was not in it before, is eonstantly produced by the application of a certain degree of heat; we call the simple idea of heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, the cause of it, and fluidity the effect. So also finding that the substance of wood, which is a certain collection of simple ideas, so called, by the application of fire is turned into another substance, called ashes, i. e. another complex idea, consisting of a collection of simple ideas, quite different from that complex idea which we call wood'; we consider fire, in relation to ashes, as cause, and the ashes as effect. So that whatever is considered by us to conduce or operate to the producing any particular simple idea, or collection of simple ideas, whether substance or mode, which did not before exist, hath thereby in our minds the relation of a cause, and so is denominated by us.
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