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apply them to our uses, and several ways to accom-
the same to him, and others; the visible ideas of every thing would be different. So that I doubt, whether he and the rest of men could discourse concerning the objects of sight, or have any communication about colours, their appearances being so wholly different.
Ind perhaps such a quickpėss and tenderness of sight could not endure bright sun-sline, or so much as open day-light; nor take in but a very small part of any object at once, and that too only at a very near distanee. And if, by the help of such inicroscopical eres (if I may so call them), a man could penetrate farther than ordinary into the secret composition and radical texture of bodies, he would not make any great advantage by the change, if such an acute sighit would not serve to conduct him to the market and exchange; if he could not see things he was to avoid, at a coue. nient distance; nor distinguish things he had to do with, by those sensible qualities others do. lle that ?? was sharp-sighted enough to see the configuration of the minute particles of the spring of a clock, and observe upon what peculiar structure and impulse its elastic motion depends, would no doubt discover some thing very admirable : but if eves so framed could not view at once the hand, and the characters of the hours plate, and thereby at a distance see what o'clock it was, their owner could not be much benefited by that acutemess; which, whilst it discovered the secret contrivance of the parts of the maclrinc, made him lose its use.
te . 13. And here give me leave to proabout spirits. pose all extravacant conjectore of mine. Trejt
viz. that since we have some reason (if therr be any credit to be given to the report of things, that are our philosophy cannot account for) to imagine, that spirits can assume to themselves bodies of different bulk figure, and conformation of parts; whether one great advantage some of them have over us, may not lie in this, that they can so frame and shape to themselves durch organs of sensation or perception, as to suit them to their present design, and the circumstances of the ob- niktor ject they would consider. For how much would that 1.114 man èxceed all others in knowledge, who had but the end
faculty so to alter the structure of his eyes, that one sense, as to make it capable of all the several degrees of vision, which the assistance of glasses (casually at first lighted on) has taught us to conceive? What wonders would he discover, who could so fit his eyes to all sorts of objects, as to see, when he pleased, the figure and motion of the minute particles in the blood, and other juices of aniinals, as distinctly as he does, at other times, the shape and motion of the animals themselves. But to us, in our present state, unalterable organs so contrived, as to discover the figure and motion of the minute parts of bodies, whereon depend those sensible qualities we now observe in them, would perhaps be of no advantage. God has, no doubt, made thein so, as is best for us in our present condition. He hath fitted us for the neighbourhood of the bodies that surround us, and we have to do with: and though we cannot, by the faculties we have, attain to a perfect knowledge of things, yet they will serve us well enough for those ends above-mentioned, which are our great concernment. I beg iny reader's pardon for laying before him so wild a fancy, concerning the ways of perception in beings above us; but how extravagant soever it be, I doubt whether we can imagine any thing about the knowledge of angels, but after this manner, some way or other in proportion to what we find and observe in ourselves. And though, we cannot but allow that the infinite power and wisdoin of God may frame creatures with a thousand other faculties and ways of perceiving things without them, than what we have: yet our thoughts can go no farther than our own : so impossible it is for us to enlarge our very guesses beyond the ideas received from our own sensation and retection. The supposition at least, that angels do sometimes assume bodies, needs not startle us; since somo of the most antient and most learned fathers of the church seemed to believe, that they had bodies : and this is certain, that their state and way of existence is unknown to us.
. 14. But to return to the matter in Complex hand, the ideas we have of substances, and ideas of sub. the ways we come by them; I say, our spe- stances.
cifick ideas of substànces are nothing else but a collection of a certain number of simple ideas, considered as united in one thing. These ideas of substances, though they are commonly simple apprehensions, and the names of them simple terms; yet in effect are complex and compounded. Thus the idea which an Englishman sig. nifies by the name Swan, is white colour, long neck, red beak, black legs, and whole feet, and all these of a certain size, with a power of swimming in the water, and making a certain kind of noise : and perhaps, to a man who has long observed this kind of birds, some other properties which all terminate in sensible simple ideas, all united in one common subject. Idea of spi.
$. 15. Besides the complex idcas we have rieval sub of inaterial sensible substances, of which ! stances as have last spoken, by the simple ideas we clear as of have taken from those operations of our bodily sub,
own minds, which we experiment daily in stances.
ourselves, as thinking, understanding, willing, knowing, and power of beginning motion, &c. co-existing in some substance; we are able to frame the complex idea of an immaterial spirit. And thus, by putting together the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty, and power of moving themselves, and other things, we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances, as we have of material. For putting together the ideas of thinking and willing, or the power of moving or quieting corporeal motion, joined to substance of which we have no distinct idea, we have the idea of an immaterial spirit; and by putting together the ideas of coherent solid parts, and a power of being moved, joined with substance, of which likewise we have no positive idea, we have the idea of matter. The one is as clear and distinct an idea as the other : the idea of thinking, and moving a body, being as clear and distinct ideas, as the ideas of extension, :solidity, and being moved. For our idea of substance is equally obscure, or none at all in both: it is but a supposed I know not what, to support those ideas we call accidents. It is for want of reflection that we are apt to think, that our senses show us nothing but
material things. Every act of sensation, when duly considered, gives us an equal view of both parts of nature, the corporeal and spiritual. For whilst I know, by seeing or hearing, &c. that there is some corporeal being without me, the object of that sensation; I do more certainly know, that there is some spiritual being within me that sees and hears. This, I must be convinced, cannot be the action of bare insensible matter; nor ever could be, without an immaterial thinking being.
$. 16. By the complex idea of extended, No idea of figured, coloured, and all other sensible abstract sub: qualities, which is all that we know of it, stance. we are as far from the idea of the substance of body, as if we knew nothing at all: nor after all the acquaintance and familiarity, which we imagine we have with matter, and the many qualities men assure themselves they perceive and know in bodies, will it perhaps upon examination be found, that they have any more, or clearer, primary ideas belonging to body, than they have belonging to immaterial spirit.
$. 17. The primary ideas we have pecu- 7 liar to body, as contradistinguished to spi- of solid parts rit, are the cohesion of solid, and conse- 'and impulse quently separable, parts, and a power of the primary
rese communicating motion by impulse.
ideas of I think, are the original ideas proper and peculiar to body; for figure is but the consequence of finite extension.
Ø. 18. The ideas we have belonging, and peculiar to spirit, are thinking and will, or and motivity a power of putting body into motion by the primary thought, and which is consequent to it, ideas of spi. liberty. For as body cannot but commu- " nicate its motion by impulse to another body, which it mcets with at rest; so the mind can put bodies into motion, or forbear to do so, as it pleases. The ideas of existence, duration, and mobility, are common to them both.
§. 19. There is no reason why it should Spirits capa be thought strange, that I make mobi- bie of mom lity belong to spirit: for having no other* tiou.