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weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts: and if he were demanded, what is it that solidity and extension adhere in, he would not be in a much better case than the Indian beforementioned, who, saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on; to which his answer was, a great tortoise. But being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied, something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases where
is, of the complex ideas of substances : and the first section of it, which your lordship cites for those words you have set down.
In which words I do not observe any that deny the general idea of substance to be made by abstracting, nor any that say it is made by a complication of many simple ideas together. But speaking in that place of the ideas of distinct substances, such as man, horse, gold, &c. I say they are made up of certain combinations of simple ideas, which combinations are looked upon, each of them, as one simple idea, though they are many; and we call it by one name of substance, though made up of modes, from the custom of supposing a substratum, wherein that combi. nation does subsist. So that in this paragraph I only give an account of the idea of distinct substances, such as oak, elephant, iron, &c. how, though they are made up of distinct complications of modes, yet they are looked on as one idea, called by one name, as making distinct sorts of substance.
But that my notion of substance in general, is quite different from these, and has no such combination of simple ideas in it, is evident froin the immediate following words, where I say, "The idea of pure substance ' in general, is only a supposition of we know not what support of such • qualities as are capable of producing simple ideas in us." And these two I plainly distinguish all along, particularly where I say, 'whatever • therefore be the secret and abstract nature of substance in general, all
the ideas we have of particular distinct substances, are nothing but
several combinations of simple ideas, co-existing in such, though un• known cause of their union, as makes the whole subsist of itself.'
The other thing laid to my charge, is, as if I took the being of substance to be doubtful, or rendered it so by the imperfect and ill-grounded idea I have given of it. To which I beg leave to say, that I ground not the being, but the idea of substancé, on our accustoming ourselves to suppose some substratum; for it is of the idea alone I speak there, and not of the being of substance. And having every where affirmed and built upon it, that a man is a substance, I cannot be supposed to question or doubt of the being of substance, till I can question or doubt of my own being. Farther; I say, + Sensation convinces us, that there are
* B. 2. C. 23. 5 2.
+ Ib. § 29.
we use words without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children; who being questioned what such a thing is, which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, that it is something; which in truth signifies no more, when so used either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is what they have no distinct idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea then we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, “ sine re substante,” without something to support
• solid, extended substances ; and reflection, that there are thinking
ones.' So that, I think, the being of substance is not shaken by what I have said : and if the idea of it should be, yet (the being of things depending not on our ideas) the being of substance would not be at all shaken by my saying, we had but an obscure imperfect idea of it, and that that idea came from our accustoming ourselves to suppose some sub. stratum; or indeed, if I should say, we had no idea of substance at all. For a great many things may be, and are granted to have a being, and be in nacare, of which we have no ideas. For example : it cannot be doubted but there are distinct species of separate spirits, of which yes we have no distinct ideas at all; it cannot be questioned but spirits have ways of communicating their thoughts, and yet we have no idea of it at all.
The being then of substance being safe and secure, notwithstanding any thing I have said, let us see whether the idea of it be not so too. Your lordship asks, with concern, and is this all, indeed, that is to be said for the being (if your lordship please, let it be the idea) of substance, that we accustom ourselves to suppose a substratum ? Is that customi grounded upon true reason or no ? I have said that it is grounded upon this, ** That we cannot conceive how simple ideas of sensible qualities
should subsist alone ; and therefore we suppose them to exist in, and to • be supported by some common subject; which support we denote by the
name substance.' Which, I think, is a true reason, because it is the same your lordship grounds the supposition of a substratum on, in this very page; even on the repugnancy to our conceptions, that modes and accidents should subsist by themselves. So that I have the good luck to agree here with your lordship; and consequently conclude, I have your approbation in this, that the substratum to modes or accidents, which is our idea of substance in general, is founded in this,' that we cannot
conceive how modes or accidents can subsist by themselves.'
* B. 2. C. 23. $. 4.
them, them, we call that support substantia ; which, according to the true import of the word, is in plain English, standing under or upholding (1).
§. $. An obscure and relative idea of subOf the sorts
stance in general being thus made, we come of substance.
to have the ideas of particular sorts of substances, by collecting such combinations of simple ideas, as are by experience and observation of men's senses taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution,
(1) From this paragraph, there hath been raised an objection by the bishop of Worcester, as if our author's doctrine here concerning ideas, had almost discarded substance out of the world : his words in this paragraph, being brought to prove, that he is one of the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, that have almost discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world. To which our author replies : * This, my lord, is an accusation, which your lordship will pardon me, if I do not readily know what to plead to, because I do not under. stand what it is almost to discard substance out of the reasonable part of the world. If your lordship means by it, that I deny, or doubt, that there is in the world any such thing as substance, that
your lordship will acquit me of, when your lordship looks again into this 2 3d chapter of the second book, which you have cited more than once; where you will find these words, $. 4. When we talk or think of any particular sort of
corporeal substances, as horse, stone, &c. though the idea we have of either of them, be but the complication or collection of those several
simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we use to find united in the • thing called horse or stone ; yet, because we cannot conceive how they
should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, • and supported by some common subject, which support we denote by • the name substance ; though it is certain, we have no clear or distinct • idea of that thing we suppose a support.' And again, 5. 5. The * same happens conceming the operations of the mind, viz. thinking,
reasoning, fearing, &c. which we considering not to subsist of them. • selves, nor apprehending how they can beleng to body, or be produced
by it, we are apt to think these the actions of some other substance, • which we call spirit; whereby yet it is evident, that having to other • idea of notion of matter, but something wherein those many sensible
qualities, which affect our senses, do subsist, by supposing a substance,
wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. s do subsist, we have as clear a notion of the nature or substance of
spirit, as we have of body ; the one being supposed to be without I knowing what it is) the substratum to those simple ideas we have from * In his first letter to that bishop.
or unknown essence of that substance. Thus we come to have the ideas of a man, horse, gold, water, &c. of which substances, whether any one has any other clear idea, farther than of certain simple ideas co-exittent together, I appeal to every man's own experience. It is the ordinary qualities observable in iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of those substances, which a smith or a jeweller com monly knows better than a philosopher; who, whatever
i without : and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) " to be the substratum to those operations, which we experiment in our
selves within.' And again, . 6. Whatever therefore be the secret
nature of substance in general, all the ideas we have of particular dis. * tinct substances, are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas,
co-existing in such, though unknown cause of their union, as makes the whole subsist of itself.' And I farther say in the same section, that
we suppose these combinations to rest in, and to be adherent to that "unknown common subject, which inheres not in any thing else.' And 1. 3. That our complex ideas of substances, besides all those simple
ideas they are made up of, have always the confused idea of something * to which they belong, and in which they subsist; and therefore, when
we speak of any sort of substànce, we say it is a thing having such * and such qualities; as body is a thing that is extended, figured, and "capable of motion ; spirit, a thing capable of thinking.
These, and the like fashions of speaking, intimate, that the subIstance is supposed always something besides the extension, figure, soli.
dity, motion, thinking, or other observable idea, though we know nói * what át is.'
"Our idea of body, I say, * is an extended, solid substance ; and our * idea of soul, is of a substance that thinks.' So that as long as there is any such thing as body or spirit in the world, I have done nothing towards the discarding substance out of the reasonable part of the world. Nay, as long as there is any simple idea or sensible quality left, according to iny way of arguing, substance cannot be discarded ; because all simple ideas, all sensible qualities, carry with them a supposition of a substratuin to exist in, and of a substance wherein they inhere : and of this that whole chapter is so full, that I challenge any one who reads it, to think I have alinost, or one jot, discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world. And of this, man, horse, sùn, wafer, iroñ, diamond, &c. which I have mentioned of distinct sorts of substances, will be my witnesses, as long as any such things remain in being; of which I say,
"That the id of substances are such combinations of simple ideas às * are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves,
• B. 2. Č. 23. 6. 22
+ B. 2. C. 12. §. 6.
substantial forms he may talk of, has ņo other idea of those substances, than what is framed by a collection of those simple ideas which are to be found in them ; only we inust take notice, that our complex ideas of substances, besides all those simple ideas they are made up of, have always the confused idea of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist. And therefore when we speak of any sort of substance, we say it is a thing having such or such qualities; as
• in which the supposed or confused idea of substance is always the first and chief."
If, by almost discarding substance out of the reasonable part of the world, your lordship means, that I have destroyed, and almost discarded the true idea we have of it, by calling it a substratum, * a supposition of we know not what support of such qualities as are capable of producing simple ideas in us, an obscure and relative idea : + That without knowing what it is, it is that which supports accidents ; so that of substance we have no idea of what it is, but only a confused, obscure one of what it does : I must confess, this and the like I have said of our idea of substance : and should be very glad to be convinced by your lordship, or ang body else, that I have spoken too meanly of it. He that would show me a more clear and distinct idea of substance, would do me a kindness I should thank him for. But this is the best I can hitherto find, either in my own thoughts, or in the books of logicians: for their account or idea of it is, that it is ens, or res per se subsistens, & substans accidentibus ; which in effect is no more, but that substance is a being or thing; or, in short, something, they know not what, or of which they have no clearer idea, than that it is something which supports accidents, or other simple ideas or modes, and is not supported itself, as a mode, or an accident. So that I do not see but Burgersdicius, Sanderson, and the whole tribe of logicians, must be reckoned with the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, who have almost discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world.
But supposing, my lord, that I, or these gentlemen, logicians of note in the school, should own that we have a very imperfect, obscure, inadequate idea of substance, would it not be a little too hard to charge us with discarding substance out of the world ? For what almost discarding, and reasonable part of the world, signifies, I must confess I do not clearly comprehend: but let almost and reasonable part signify here what they will, for I dare say your lordship meant something by them ; would not your lordship think you were a little hardly dealt with, if, for acknow. ledging yourself to have a very imperfect and inadequate idea of God, or of several other things which in this very treatise you confess our under. • B. 2. C. 23. $. 1. . 2. . 3, + B. 2. C. 13. 9. 19.