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loose after the enjoyments of this life, take their
turns in the determining their wills; and all that while.
they take not one step, are not one jot inoved towards
the good things of another life, considered as ever so
great.
Because all

$. 38. Were the will determined by the who allow views of good, as it appears in contemthe joys of plation greater or less to the understanding, hcaven pos. which is the state of all absent good, and

les pursue that which in the received opinion the will them not.

is supposed to move to, and to be moved by, I do not see how it could ever get loose from the infinite eternal joys of heaven, once proposed and considered as possible. For all absent good, by which alone, barely proposed, and coining in view, the will is thought to be determined, and so to set us on action, being only possible, but not infallibly certain; it is unavoidable, that the infinitely greater possible good should regularly and constantly determine the will in all the successive actions it directs : and then we should keep constantly and steadily in our course towards heaven, without ever standing still, or directing our actions to any other end. The eternal condition of a future state infinitely outweighing the expectation of riches, or honour, or any other worldly pleasure which we can propose to ourselves, though we should grant these the more probable to be obtained : for nothing future is yet in possession, and so the expectation even of these may deceive us. If it were so, that the greater good in view determines the will, so great a good once pro posed could not but seize the will, and hold it fast to the pursuit of this infinitely greatest good, without his ever letting it go again; for the will having a powered over, and directing the thoughts as well as other actions, would, if it were so, hold the contemplation of the mind fixed to that good.

This would be the state of the mind, and oth uneasiness is regular tendency of the will in all its de never neg. terininations, were it determiued by that appe lected. which is considered, and in view the greater good; but that it is not so, is visible in experience: Role

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the infinitely greatest confessed good being often neglected, to satisfy the successive uneasiness of our desires pursuing trifles. But though the greatest allowed, éven everlasting unspeakable good, which has sometimes moved and affected the mind, does not stedfastly hold the will, yet we see any very great and prevailing uneasiness, having once laid hold on the will, lets it not go; by which we may be convinced, what it is that determines the will. Thus any vehement pain of the body, the ungovernable passion of a man violently in love, or the impatient desire of revenge, keepš the will steady and intent; and the will, thus determined, never lets the understanding lay by the object,

but all the thoughts of the mind and powers of the ther body are uninterruptedly employed that way, by the

determination of the will, influenced by that topping uneasiness as long as it lasts; whereby it seems to me evident, that the will or power of setting us upon one action in preference to all other, is determined in us by uneasiness. And whether this be not so, I desire every one to observe in himself.

§. 39. I have hitherto chiefly instanced Desire ac. of al in the uneasiness of desire, as that which companies Lo determines the will; because that is the all uneasie ab chief and most sensible, and the will sel. Hess

dom orders any action, nor is there any voluntary action Mund to performed without some desire accompanying it; jeg which I think is the reason why the will and desire creators are so often confounded. But yet we are not to look fonci upon the uneasiness which makes up, or at least accomoldies panies most of the other passions, as wholly excluded pod, in the case. Aversion, fear, anger, envy, shame, &c. in OP have each their uneasiness too, and thereby influence tuzo the will. These passions are scarce any of them in life rico al and practice simple and alone, and wholly unmixed

with others : though" usually in discourse and contemJe plation, that carries the name which operates strongest, Tables and appears most in the present state of the mind : nay cena k there is, I think, scarce any of the passions to be found the set without désire joined with it. I am sure, wherever ARDT there is uneasiness, there is desire ; for we constantly

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desire happiness: and whatever we feel of uneasiness, so much it is certain we want of happiness, even in our own opinion, let our state and condition otherwise bę wliat it will. Besides, the present moment not being our eternity, whatever our enjoyment be, we look beyond the present, and desire goes with our foresight, and that still carries the will with it. So that even in joy itself, that which keeps up the action, whereon the enjoyment depends, is the desire to continue it, and fear io lose it: and whenever a greater uneasiness than that takes place in the mind, the will presently is by that determined to some new action, and the present delight neglected.

5. 40. But we being in this world beset The most

ing un. with sundry uneasinesses, distracted with diteasiness na- ferent desires, the next inquiry naturally Curally de. will be, which of them has the precedency

the in determining the will to the next action? will.

and to that the answer is, that ordinarils, which is the most pressing of those that are judged capable of being then removed. For the will being the power of directing our operative faculties to some action, for some end, cannot at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time unattainable : that would be to suppose an intelligent being designedly to act for an end, only to lose its labour, for so it is 10 act for what is judged not attainable ; and therefore very great uneasinesses move not the will, when they are judged not capable of a cure: thcy, in that case, put is not upon endeavours. But these set a part, the most important and urgent uncasiness we at that time feel, is that which ordinarily determines the will successivels; in that train of voluniary actions which makes up our lives. The greatest present uneasiness is the spur 10 action, that is constantly felt, and for the most part de termines the will in its choice of the next action. For this we must carry along with us, that the proper and only object of the will is some action of ours, and 10thiño else: for we producing nothing by our willing il. but some action in our power, it is there the will termi. nates, and reaches no farther.

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• $. 41. If it be farther asked, what it is All desire moves desire ? I answer, Llappiness, and happiness.. that alone. Happiness and misery are the names of two extremnes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not; it is what “eye hath not seen, ear not “ heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to “ conceive.” But of some degrees of both we have very lively impressions, made by several instances of delight and joy on the one side, and torment and sor.' row on the other: which for shortness sake I shall comprehend under the names of pleasure and pain, there being pleasure and pain of the mind as well as the body: “ with him is fulness of joy and pleasure for "evermore.” Or, 'to speak truly, they are all of the mind; though some have their rise in the mind from thought, others in the body from certain modifications of motion.

§. 49. Happiness then in its full extent Happiness, is the utmost pleasure we are capable of, what. and misery the utmost pain : and the lowest degree of what can be called happiness is so much ease from all pain, and so much present pleasure, as without which any one cannot be content. Now because pleasure and pain are produced in us by the operation of certain objects, either on our minds or our bodies, and in different degrees; therefore what has an aptness to produce pleasure in us is that we call good, and what is apt to produce pain in us we call evil, for no other reason, but for its aptness to produce pleasure and pain in us, wherein consists onr happiness and misery. Farther, though what is apt to produce any degree of pleasure, be in itself good; and what is apt to produce any degree of pain, be evil; yo it often happens, that we do not call it so, when it comes in competition with a greater of its sort ; because when they come in competition, the degrecs also of pleasure and pain have justly a preference. So that it we will rightly estimate what we call good and evil, we shall find it lies much in comparison : for the cause of every less degree of pain, as well as every greater R3

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degree of pleasure, has the nature of good, and vice versa.

$. 43. Though this be that which is What good is desired;

called good and evil : and all good be the what not. proper object of desire in general; yet all

good, even seen, and confessed to be so, does not necessarily move every particular man's desire, but only that part, or so much of it as is considered and taken to make a necessary part of his happiness., All other good, however great in reality or appearance, excites not, a man's desires, who looks. not on it to make a part of that happiness, wherewith he, in his present thoughts, can satisfy himself. Happiness, un, der this view, every one constantly pursues, and desires. what makes any part of it; other things, acknowledged to be good, he can look upon without desire, pass by, and be content without. There is no-body, I thinking so senseless as to deny, that there is pleasure in knowledge: and for the pleasures of sense, they have tog many followers to let it be questioned, whether men are taken with them or no. Now let one man place, his satisfaction in sensual pleasures, another in the de. light of knowledge : though each of them cannot but confess, there is great pleasure in what the other pur. sues; yet neither of them making the other's delight a part of his happiness, their desires are not moved, but each is satisfied without what the other enjoys, and so his will is not determined to the pursuit of it. But vet, as soon as the studious man's hunger and thirst makes him.uneasy, he, whose will was never determined to any pursuit of good chear, poignant sauces, delicious wine, by the pleasant taste he has found in thein, is, by the uncasiness of hunger and thirst, presently determined to eating and drinking, though possibly with great indifferency, what wholesome food comes in bus way. And on the other side, the epicure buckles to study, when shame, or the desire to recommend himself to his mistress, shall make him uneasy in the want of any sort of knowledge. Thus, how much soever men are in carnest, and constant in pursuit of happiness yet they may have a clear view of good, great and com.

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