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writ very clearly about them. This, I imagine, has been no small occasion of obscurity and mistake in this matter; and therefore is, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he that shall turn to thoughts inwards upon what passes in his mind when he wills, shall see that the will or power of volition is conversant about nothing, but that particular determination of the mind, whereby barely by a thought the mind endeavours to give rise, continuation, or stop, to any action which it takes to be in its power. This well considered, plainly shows that the will is perfectly distinguished from de sire; which in the very same action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our will sets us upon. A man whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. In this case, it is plain the will and desire run counter. I will the action that tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct contrary way. A man who by a violent fit of the gout in his limbs finds a doziness in his head, or a want of appetite in his stomach removed, desires to be eased too of the pain of his feet or hands (for wherever there is pain, there is a desire to be rid of it) though yet, whilst he apprehends that the reinoval of the pain may translate the noxious humour to a more vital part, his will is never determined to any
pne action that may serve to remove this pain. Whence ! it is evident that desiring and willing are two distinct
acts of the mind; and consequently that the will, which is but the power of volition, is much more distinct from
. 31. To return then to the inquiry, What is it that determines the will in re- determines gard to our actions ? And that, upon second the will. thoughts, I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in view; but some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness a man is at present under, This is that which succes
sively determines the will, and sets us upon those ac1tions we perform. This uneasiness we may call, as it
is, desire ; which is an uneasiness of the mind for want
of some absent' good. All pain of the body, of what sort soever, and disquiet of the mind, is uneasiness : and with this is always joined desire, equal to the pain or uneasiness felt, and is scarce distinguishable from it. For desire being nothing but an uneasiness in the want of an absent good, in reference to any pain felt, ease is that absent good; and till that ease be attained, we may call it desire, no-body feeling pain that he wishes
perfe not to be cased of, with a desire equal to that pain, and
distan inseparable from it. Besides this desire of case from pain, there is another of absent positive good; and here also the desire and uneasiness are equal. As inuch as we desire any absent good, so much are we in pain for it. But here all absent good does not, according to the greatness it has, or is acknowledged to have, cause pain equal to that greatness; as all pain causes desire equal to it itself: because the absence of good is not always a pain, as the presence of pain is. And therefore absent good may be looked on, and considered without desire. But so much as there is any where of desire, so much there is of uneasiness.
$. 32. That desire is a state of uneasiness, pata! Desire is
everyone who reflects on himself will a uneasiness.
quickly find. Who is there, that has not l'aul felt in desire what the wise man says of hope, (which is in not much different from it) “that it being deferred makes the heart sick ?" and that still proportionable to pure the greatness of the desire: which sometimes raises the uneasiness to that pitch, that it makes people cry out, Give me children, give me the thing desired, or I die Life itself, and all its enjoyments, is a burden cannot st! be born under the lasting and unremoved pressure of he such an uneasiness. The uneasi. esc $. 33. Good and evil, present and ab- maine
y. 33. ness of desire sent, it is true, work upon the mind: but I determines that which immediately determines the le the will. will, from time to time, to every voluntary action, is the uneasiness of desire, fixed on some absent good ; either negative, as indolence to one in pain; or positive, as enjoyment of pleasure. That it 02 is this uneasiness that determines the will to the succes 27
sive voluntary actions, whereof the greatest part of our lives is made up, and by which we are conducted through different courses to different ends : I shall endeavour to show, both from experience and the reason of the thing. $. 34. When a man is perfectly content
This is the
T with the state he is in, which is, when he spring of is perfectly without any uneasiness, what action. industry, what action, what will is there left, but to continue in it? of this every man's observation will satisfy him. And thus we see our All-wise Maker, suitably to our constitution and frame, and knowing what it is that determines the will, has put into man the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, and other natural desires, that return at their seasons, to move and determine their wills, for the preservation of themselves, and the continuation of their species. For I think we may conclude, that if the bare contemplation of these good ends, to which we are carried by these several uneasinesses, had been sufficient to determine the will, and set us on work, we should have had none of these natural pains, and perhaps in this world little or no
pain at all. “It is better to marry than to burn," says in St. Paul ; where we may see what it is that chiefly drives that 3 men into the enjoyments of a conjugal life. A little per burning felt pushes us more powerfully, than greater einges pleasures in prospect draw or allure. portio. §. 35. It seems so established and settled The greate Mes Tes a maxim by the general consent of all man- positive xople & kind, that good, the greater good, deter
good deter- good deter
mines not the red, rimines the will, that I do not at all wonder,
will, butun. burdes that when I first published my thoughts on
easiness. ved print this subject, I took it for granted ; and I
imagine that by a great many I shall be thought more opgent excusable, for having then done so, than that now I the ne have ventured to recede from so received an opinion. Pterminare But yet upon á stricter inquiry, I am forced to consereys clude, that good, the greater good, thongh apprehended
fired it and acknowledged to be so, does not determine the will, connell until our desire, raised proportionably to it, makes us Leyte yocasy in the want of it. Convince a-man ever so
that plenty has an advantage over poverty; make hiin see and own, that the handsome conveniencies of life are better than nasty penury : yet as long as he is content with the latter, and finds no uneasiness in it, he moves not ; his will never is determined to any action that shall bring him out of it. Let a man be ever so well persuaded of the advantages of virtue, that it is as necessary to a man who has any great aims in this world, or hopes in the next, as food to life : yet, till he hungers or thirsts after righteousness, till he feels an uneasiness in the want of it, his will will not be de. termined to any action in pursuit of this confessed grcater good; but any other uneasiness he feels in him. self shall take place, and carry his will to other actions. On the other side, let a drunkard see that his health decays, his estate wastes; discredit and diseases, and the want of all things, even of his beloved drink, attends him in the course he follows; yet the returns of uneasiness to miss his companions, the habitual thirst after his clips, at the usual time, drives him to the tavern, though he has in his view the loss of health and plenty, and perhaps of the joys of another lite : the least of which is no inconsiderable good, but such as he coi. fesses is far greater than the tickling of his palate with à glass of wine, or the idle chat of a soaking club. It is not want of viewing the greater good; for he sees and acknowledges it, and, in the intervals of his drinking hours, will take resolution to pursue the greater good; but when the uneasiness to miss his accustomed delight returns, the greater acknowledged good loses its hold, and the present uneasiness determines the will to the accustomed action : which thereby gets stronger footing to prcvail against the next occasion, though lie at the saine tine makes secret promises to himself, that he will do so no more; this is the last time he will act against the attainment of those greater goods. And thus he is from time to time in the state of that unhappy complainer, video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor: which sentence, allowed for true, and made good by constant experience, may this, and possibly no other way, be easily inade intelligible.
. iono . 6. 36.
"$. 36. If we inquire into the reason of Because the what experience makes so evident in fact, removal of and examine why it is uneasiness alone ope
the first step rates on the will, and determines it in its choice; we shall find that we being capable but of one determination of the will to one action at once, the present uneasiness that we are under does naturally determine the will, in order to that happiness which we all aim at in all our actions; forasmuch as whilst we are under any uneasiness, we cannot apprehend ourselves happy, or in the way to it. Pain and uneasiness being, by every one, concluded and felt to be inconsistent with happiness, spoiling the relish even of those good things which we have; a little pain serving to mar all the pleasure we rejoiced in. And therefore that which of course determines the choice of our will to the next action, will always be the removing of pain, as long as we have any left, as the first and necessary step towards happiness.
§. 37. Another reason why it is uncasi. Because unness alone determines the will, may be this; casinessalone because that alone is present, and it is is present. against the nature of things, that what is absent should operate where it is not. It may be said, that absent good may by contemplation be brought home to the mind, and made present. The idea of it indced may be in the mind, and viewed as present there; but nothing will be in the mind as a present good, able to counter-balance the removal of any u11casiness which we are under, till it raises our desire; and the uneasiness of that has the prevalency in determining the will. Till then, the idea in the mind of
whatever good, is there only, like other ideas, the obre "ject of bare unactive speculation, but operates not on be the will, nor sets us on work; the reason whereof I Docs shall show by and by. How many are to be found, des that have had lively representations set before their 012. minds of the unspeakable joys of heaven, which they de acknowledge both possible and probable too, who yet li 20; would be content to take up with their happiness here)
And so the prevailing uneasinesses of their desires, let