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$. 21. But to return to our idea of space.
A vacuum If body be not supposed infinite, which I think no one will affirm, I would ask, utmost Whether, if God placed a man at the ex- bounds of tremity of corporeal beings, he could not body. stretch his hand beyond his body? If he could, then he would put his arm where there was before space without body; and if there he spread his fingers, there would still be space between them without body. If he could not stretch out his hand, it must be because of some external hindrance; for we suppose him alive, with such a power of moving the parts of his body that he hath now, which is not in itself impossible, if God so pleased to have it; (or at least it is not impossible for God so to move him :) and then I ask, Whether that which hinders his hand from moving outwards be substance or accident, something or nothing? And when they have resolved that, they will be able to resolve themselves what that is, which is or may be between two bodies at a distance, that is not body, and has no solidity. In the mean time, the argument is at least as. good, that where nothing hinders (as beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies) a body put in motion may move on; as where there is nothing between, there two bodies must necessarily touch; for pure space between, is sufficient to take away the necessity of mutual contact: but bare space in the way, is not sufficient to stop motion. The truth is, these men must either own that. they think body infinite, though they are loth to speak it out, or else affirm that space is not body. For I would fair meet with that thinking man, that can in his thoughts set any bounds to space, more than he can to duration; or by thinking hope to arrive at the end of either: and therefore, if his idea of eternity be infinite, so is his idea of immensity; they are both finite or infinite alike.
g. 22. Farther, those who assert the im- The power of possibility of space existing without matter, annihilation must not only make body infinite, but must proves a Vam also deny a power in God to annihilate any in .. part of matter. No one, I suppose, will deny that God
can put an end to all motion that is in matter, and
$. 23. But not to go so far as beyond proves a va. the utmost bounds of body in the universe, çuum. . nor appeal to God's omnipotency, to find a vacuum, the motion of bodies that are in our view and neighbourhood seems to me plainly to, evince it.
For I desire any one so to divide a solid body, of any dimension he pleases, as to make it possible for the solid parts to move up and down freely every way within the bounds of that superficies, if there be not left in it a void space, as big as the least part into which he has divided the said solid body. And if where the least particle of the body divided is as big as a mustardseed, a void space equal to the bulk of a mustard-seed be requisite to make room for the free motion of the parts of the divided body within the bounds of its superficies, where the particles of matter are 100,000,000 less than a mustard-seed; there must also be a space void of solid matter, as big as 100,000,000 part of a mus, tard-seed; for if it hold in one, it will hold in the other, and so on i infinitum. And let this void space be as little as it will, it destroys the hypothesis of plenitude. For if there can be a space void of body equal to the smallest separate particle of matter now existing in nature, it is still space without body; and makes as great a difference between space and body, as if it were négo xaqua, a distance as wide as any in nature. And therefore, if we suppose not the void space necessary to motion equal to the least parcel of the divided solid matter, but to is or tooo of it; the same consequence will always follow of space without inatter.
. 24. But the question being here, " whether the idea of space or extension be. The ideas of
space and bo. "the same with the idea of body,” it is day not necessary to prove the real existence of a vacuum, but the idea of it; which it is plain men have, when they inquire and dispute, whether there be a vacuum or no. For if they had not the idea of space without body, they could not make a question about its existence : and if their idea of body did not mclude in it something more than the bare idea of space, they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the world i and it would be as absurd to demand, whether there were space without body, as whether there were space without space, or body without body, since these were but different names of the same idea.. . ;
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$. 25. It is true, the idea of extension being inse. joins itself so inseparably with all visible, parable from and most tangible qualities, that it suffers body, proves us to see no one, or feel very few external it not the
objects, without taking in impressions - of same,
extension too. This readiness of extension to make itself be taken notice of so constantly with other ideas, has been the occasion, I guess, that some have made the whole essence of body to consist in ex. tension; which is not much to be wondered at, since some have had their minds, by their eyes and touch (the busiest of all our senses) so filled with the idea of extension, and as it were wholly possessed with it, that they allowed no existence to any thing that had not extension. I shall not now argue with those men, who take the measure and possibility of all being, only from their narrow and gross imaginations : but having here to do only with those who conclude the essence of body to be extension, because they say they cannot imagine any sensible quality of any body without extension; I shall desire them to consider, that had they reflected on their ideas of tastes and smells, as much as on those of sight and touch; nay, had they examined their ideas of hunger and thirst, and several other pains, they would have found, that they included in them no idea of extension at all; which is but an affection of body, as well as the rest, discoverable by our senses, which are scarce acute enough to look into the pure essences of things.
1. 26. If those ideas, which are constantly joined to all others, must therefore be concluded to be the essence of those things which have constantly those ideas joined to them, and are inseparable from them; then unity is without doubt the essence of every thing. For there is not any object of sensation or reflection, which does not carry with it the idea of one: but the weakness of this kind of argument we have already shown sufficiently.
8. 27. To conclude, whatever men shall
this is plain to me, that we have as clear
we have of solidity distinct from vilotion, or motion from space. : We have not any two-inore distinct idcas, and we can as easily, conceive space without solidity, as we can conceive body or space without morion; though it be ever so certain, that neither body nor motion can exist without space. But whether any one will take space to be only a relation resulting from the existence of other beings at a distance, or whether they will think the words of the most kuowing king Solonión; “The "heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain " thee;" :or those more emphatical ones of the inSpired philosopher St. Paul, “In him we live, move, " and have our being;" are to be understood in a literal sense, I leave every one to consider : only our idea of space is, I think, such as I have mentioned, and distinct from that of body. "For whether we consider-in matter itself the distance of its coherent solid parts, and call it, in respect of those solid parts, extension; or whether, considering it as lying between the extremities of any body in its several dimensions, We-call it-length, breadth, and thickness; or else con sidering.it as Iving between any two bodies, or positive beings, without any consideration whether there be any matter or no between, we call it distance; however named or considered, it is always the same uniform simple idea of space, taken from objects about which our senses have been conversaut; whereof having sets tled ideas in our ininds, we can revive, repeat and add
them one to another as often as we will, and consider in the space or distance so imagined, either as filled with for solid parts, so that another body cannot come there,
without displacing and thrusting out the body that was
of equal dimensions to that empty or pure space may droid be placed in it, without the removing or expulsion of o any thing that was there. But, to avoid confusion in
discourses concerning this. matter, it were possibly to van het be wished that the vanie extension were applied only to
natter, or the distance of the extreinities of particular