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phrase borrowed froin place, signifying only its existence,
communication of motion upon impulse. And if it be a reason to prove, that spirit is different from body, because thinking includes not the idea of extension in it; the same reason will be as valid, I suppose, to prove that space is not body, because it includes not the idea of solidity in it: space and solidity being as distinct ideas, as thinking and extension, and as wholly separa. ble in the mind one from another. Body then and extension, it is evident, are two distinct ideas. For,
§. 12. First, Extension includes no solidity, nor repistance to the motion of body, as body does.
$. 13. Secondly, The parts of pure space are inseparable one from the other; so that the continuity cannot be separated neither really, nor mentally. For I demand of any one to remove any part of it from anothier, with which it is continued, even so much as in thought. To divide and separate actually, is, as I think, by removing the parts one from another, to make two superficies, where before there was a contibuity; and to divide mentally, is to make in the mind two superficies, where before there was a continuity, and consider them as removed one from the other ; which can only be done in things considered by the mind as capable of being separated; and by separation, of acquiring new distinct superficies, which they then have not, but are capable of; but neither of these ways of separation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, come patible to pure space.
It is true, a man may consider so much of such a space, as is answerable or commensurate to a foot, without considering the rest; which is indeed a partial consideration, but not so much as mental separation, or division ; since a man can no more mentally divide, without considering two superficies separate one from the other, than he can actually divide, without making two superficies disjoined one from the other: but a partial consideration is not separating. A man may consider light in the sun; without its heat; or inobility i body, without its extension, without thinking of their separation. One is only a partial consideration,
terininating in one alone;. and the other is a consideration of both, as existing separately. .
6. 14. Thirdly. The parts of pure space are immove. able, which follows from their inseparability: motion being nothing but change of distance between any two things : but this cannot be between parts that are inseparable: which therefore must needs be at perpctual rest one amongst another.
Thus the determined idea of simple space distinguishes it plainly and sufficiently from body; since its parts are inseparable, immoveable, and without resistance to the motion of body. The defini. §. 15. If any one ask me, what this space, tion of exten. I speak of, is? I will tell him, when he sión explains tells me what his extension is. For to say, it not. as is usually done, that extension is to have partes extra partes, is to say only, that extension is extension : for what am I the better informed in the nature of extension, when I am told, that extension is to have parts that are extended, exterior to parts that are extended, i. e. extension consists of extended parts ? As if one asking, what a fibre was? I should answer him, that it was a thing made up of several fibres : would he thereby be enabled to understand what a fibre was better than he did before? Or rather, would lie not have reason to think, that my design was to make sport with him, rather than seriously to instruct him?
c . 16. Those who contend that space beings into and body are the same, bring this dilemma: bodies and either this space is something or nothing; spírits,proves if nothing be between two bodies, they not space and
must necessarily touch: if it be allowed body the same,
' to be something, they ask, whether it be
body or spirit? To which I answer, by another question, who told them that there was, or could be nothing but solid beings, which could not thin', and thinking beings that were not extended ? which is all they mean by the terms body and spirit.
Ô. 17. If it be demanded (as usually it Substance is) whether this space, void of body, be which we substance or accident; I shall readily answer, know not, no I know not; nor shall be ashamed to own proof against, :
space without bimy ignorance, till they that ask show me a
clear distinct idea of substance.
9. 18. I endeavour, as much as I can, to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt 10 put upon ourselves, by taking words for things. It helps not our ignorance, to feign a knowledge where we have none, by making a noise with sounds, without clear and distinct significations. Names made at pleasure neither alter the nature of things, nor make us understand them but as they are signs of and stand for deterinined ideas. And I desire those who lay so much stress on the sound of these two syllables, substance, to consider whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite incomprehensible God, to finite spirit, and to body, it be in the same sense; and whether it stands for the same idea, when each of those three so different beings are called substances. If so, whether it will thence follow; that God, spirits, and body, agreeing in the same common nature of substance, differ not any otherwise, than in a bare different modification of that substance; as a tree and a pebble being in the same sense body, and agreeing in the common nature of body, differ only in a bare modification of that common matter : which will be a very harsh doctrine. If they say, that they apply it to God, finite spirit, and inatter, in three different significations, and that it stands for one idea, when God is said to be a substance; for another, when the soul is called substance; and for a third, when a body is called so; if the name substance stands for three several distinct ideas, thcy would do well to make known those distinct idcas, or at least to give three distinct names to them, to prevent in so important a notion the confusion and errors that will naturally follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term; which is so far from being suspected to have three distinct, that in ordinary use it has scarce one clear distinct signification; and if they can thus
make three distinct ideas of substance, what hinders why
only. . support them. llad the poor Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth also wanted something to bear it up) but thought of this word substance, he needed not to have been at the trouble to tind an elephant to support it, and a tortoise to support liis elephant: the word substance would have done it effectually. And he that inquired, night have taken it for as good an answer from an Indian philosopher, that substance, without knowing what it is, is that which supports the earth; as we take it for a sufficient answer, and good doctrine, from our European philosophers, that substance, without knowing what it is, is that which supports accidents. So that of substance, we have no idea of what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does.
. 20. Whatever a learned man may do here, an intelligent American, who inquired into the nature of things, would scarce take it for a satisfactory account, if desiring to learn our architecture, he should be told, that a pillar was a thing supported by a basis, and a basis something that supported a pillar. Would he not think himself mocked, instead of taught, with such an account as this? And a stranger to them would be very liberally instructed in the nature of books, and the things they contained, if he should be told, that all learned books consisted of paper and letters, and that letters were things inhering in paper, and paper a thing that held forth letters: a notable way of having clear ideas of letters and papers ! But were the Latin words inliærentia and substantia, put into the plain English ones that answer them, and were called sticking on and under-propping, they would better discover to us the very great clearness there is in the doctrine of substance and accidents, and show of what use they are ip deciding of questions in philosopby.