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. 5. 4. The comparing them one with ano-
ther, in respect of extent, degrces, time,
place, or any other circumstances, is another operation
of the mind about its ideas, and is that upon which de-
pends all that large tribe of idcas, comprehended under
relations; which of how vast an extent it is, I shall have
occasion to consider hereafter.
. f. 5. How far brutes partake in this fa-

Brutes com culty, is not easy to determine; I imagine

pare but im, they have it not in any great degree : for

9:"0 perfectly. though they probably have several ideas distinct enough, yet it seems to me to be the prerogative of human understanding, when it has sufficiently distinguished any ideas, so as to perceive them to be perfectly different, and so consequently two, to cast about and consider in what circumstances they are capable to be compared : and therefore, I think, beasts compare not their ideas farther than some sensible circumstances annexed to the objects themselves. The other power of comparing, which may be observed in men, belonging to general ideas, and useful only to abstract reasonings, we may probably conjecture beasts have not.

§. 6. The next operation we may observe Compound in the mind about its ideas, is composition; ing. whereby it puts together several of those simple ones it has received from sensation and reflection, and combines them into complex ones. Under this of composition may be reckoned also that of enlarging; wherein though the composition does not so much appear as in more complex ones, yet it is nevertheless a putting several ideas together, though of the same kind. Thus by adding several units together, we make the idea of a dozen ; and, putting together the repeated ideas of several perches, we frame that of a furlong.

$. 7. In this also, I suppose, brutes come Brutes com. far short of men: for though they take in, pound but and retain together several combinations of little. simple ideas, as possibly the shape, smell, and voice of his master make up the complex idea a dog has of him, or rather are so many distinct marks whereby he knows

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him; yet I do not think they do of themselves ever compound them, and make complex ideas. And perhaps even where we think they have complex ideas, it is only one simple one that directs them in the knowledge of several things, which possibly they distinguish less by their sight than we imagine : for I have been credibly informed that a bitch will nurse, play with, and be fond of young foxes, as much as, and in place of, her puppies; if you can but get them once to suck her so long, that her milk may go through them. And those animals, which have a numerous brood of young ones at once, appear not to have any knowledge of their number: for though they are mightily concerned for any of their young that are taken from them whilst they are in sight or hearing; yet if one or two of them be stolen from them in their absence, or without noise, they appear not to miss them, or to have any sense that their number is lessened. Naming.

9. 8. When children have, by repeated

sensations, got ideas fixed in their memories, they begin by degrees to learn the use of signs. And when they have got the skill to apply the organs of speech to the framing of articulate sounds, they begin to make use of words, to signify their ideas to others. These verbal signs they sometimes borrow from others, and sometimes make themselves, as one may observe among the new and unusual names children often give to things in the first use of language. Abstraction. on

9. 9.

§. 9. The use of words then being to

" stand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from particular things, it every particular idea that we take in should have a distinct name, names must be endless. To prevent this, the mind makes the particular ideas, received from particular objects, to become general, which is done by considering them as they are in the mind, such appearances, separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called abstraction, whereby ideas, taken from particular beings, become


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general representatives of all of the same kind, and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas. Such precise naked appearances in the mind, without considering how, whence, or with what others they came there, the understanding lays up (with names commonly annexed to them) as the standard to rạnk real existences into sorts, as they agree with these patterns, and to denominate ihem accordingly. Thus the same colour being observed to-day in chalk or snow, which the mind yesterday received from milk, it considers that appearance alone, makes it a representative of all of that kind; and haying given it the name whiteness, it by that sound signifies the same quality, wheresoever to be imagined pr met with : and thus universals, whether ideas or terms, are made.

$. 10. If it may be doubted, whether beasts compound and enlarge their ideas

Brutes ab

stract not. that way to any degree; this, I think, I may be positive in, that the power of abstracting is not at all in them; and that the having of general ideas, is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and þrutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to. For it is evident we observe no footsteps in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we have reason to imagine, that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words, or any other general signs.

$. 11. Nor can it be imputed to their want of fit organs to frame articulate sounds, that they have no use or knowledge of general words; since many of them, we find, can fashion such sounds, and pronounce words distinctly enough, but never with any such application, And on the other side, men, who through some defect in the organs want words, yet fail not to express their universal ideas by signs, which serve them instead of general words; a faculty which we see beasts come short in. And therefore I think we may suppose, that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated


in them


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from man; and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so vast a distance: for if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them) we cannot deny them to have some reason, It seems as evident to me, that they do some of them in certain instances reason, as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they received them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction.

S. 12. How far idiots are concerned in Idiots and madmen.

the want or weakness of any, or all of the

foregoing faculties, an exact observation of their several ways of faltering would no doubt discover : for those who either perceive but dully, or retain the ideas that come into their minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have little matter to think on. Those who cannot distinguish, compare, and abstract, would hardly be able to understand and make use of language, or judge or reason to any tolerable degree; but only a little and imperfectly about things present, and very familiar to their senses. And indeed any of the forementioned faculties, if wanting, or out of order, produce suitable effects in men's understandings and knowledge.

§. 13. In fine, the defect in naturals seems to proceed from want of quickness, activity, and motion in the intellectual faculties, whereby they are deprived of reason; whereas madmen, on the other side, seem to sufler by the other extreme: for they do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning; but having joined together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for truths, and they err as men do that argue right from wrong principles. For by the violence of their imaginations, having taken their fancies for realities, they make right deductions from them. Thus you shall find a distracted man fancking himself a king, with a right inference require suitable attendance, respect and obedience; others, who have thought themselves made

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of glass, have used the caution necessary to preserve
such brittle bodies. Hence it comes to pass that a
man, who is very sober, and of a right understanding
in all other things, may in one particular be as frantick
as any in Bedlam ; if either by any sudden very strong
impression, or long fixing his fancy upon one sort of
thoughts, incoherent ideas have been cemented together
90 powerfully, as to remain united. But there are de-
grees of madness, as of folly: the disorderly jumbling
ideas together, is in some inore, some less. In short,
herein seems to lie the difference between idiots and
madmen, that madmen put wrong ideas together, and
80 make wrong propositions, but argue and reason right
from them; but idiots make very few or no propositions,
and reason scarce at all.
$. 14. These, I think, are the first facul-

ties and operations of the mind, which it
makes use of in understanding: and though they are
exercised about all its ideas in general, yet the instances
I have hitherto given have been chiefly in simple ideas;
and I haye subjoined the explication of these faculties
of the mind to that of simple ideas, before I come to
what I have to say concerning complex ones, for these
following reasons.

First, Because several of these facoltics being exercised at first principally about simple ideas, we might, by following nature in its ordinary method, trace and discover them in their rise, progress, and gradual improvements.

Secondly, Because observing the faculties of the mind how they operate about simple ideas, which are usually, in most men's minds, much more clear, precise, and distinct than complex ones; we may the better examine and learn how the mind abstracts, denominates, compares, and exercises its other operations about those which are complex, wherein we are much more liable to mistake.

Thirdly, Because these very operations of the mind about ideas, received from sensations, are themselves, when reflected on, another set of ideas, derived from that other source of our knowledge which I call re


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