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delight us. Thus heat, that is very agreeable to us in
§. 5. Beyond all this we may find another reason, why God hath scattered up and down several degrees of pleasure and pain, in all the things that environ and affect us, and blended them together in almost all that our thoughts and senses have to do with ; that we finding imperfection, dissatisfaction, and want of compleat hapo piness, in all the enjoyments which the creatures can afford us, might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of hiin, with whom there is fulness of joy, and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore.
y. 6. Though what I have here said may not perhaps make the ideas of pleasure and ; pain clearer to us than our own experience does, which is the only way that we are capable of having them; yet the consideration of the reason why they are annexed to so many other ideas, serving to give
us due sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of the sovereign disposer of all things, may not be unsuitable to the inain end of these inquiries; the knowledge and veneration of hinn being the chief end of all our thoughts, and the proper business of all understandings.
. 7. Existence and unity are two other Existence
ideas that are suggested to the understandand unity.
ing by every object without, and every idea · within. When ideas are in our minds, we consider them as being actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us; which is, that they exist, or have existence: and whatever we can consider as one thing, whether a real being or idea, suggests to the understand ing the idea of unity. Power.
f. 8. Power also is another of those sim
ple ideas which we receive from sensation and reflection. For observing in ourselves, that we can at pleasure inove several parts of our bodies which were at rest; the effects also, that natural bodies are able to produce in one another, occurring every moment to our senses; we both these ways get the idea of power.
$. I. Besides these there is another idea, Succession.
which, though suggested by our senses, yet is more constantly offered to us by what passes in our minds; and that is the idea of succession. For if we look immediately into ourselves, and retlect on what is observable there, we shall find our ideas always, whilst we are awake, or have any thought, passing in train, one going and another coming, without intermission. Simple ideas . 10. These, if they are not all, are at alle the materials least (as I thivk) thic most considerable of a the of all our those simple ideas which the mind has, and a knowledge. out of which is made all its other knowledge: pofit all which it receives only by the two forementioned ways of sensation and reflection.
Nor let any one think these too narrow bounds for plas ar the capacious mind of man to expatiate in, which pabec takes its fight farther than the stars, and cannot be con 1972 fined by the liinits of the world; that extends its this thoughts often even beyond the utmost expansion of Panda
matter, and makes excursions into that incomprehensiblepity
CHA P. VIII.
Some farther Considerations concerning our Simple
ORT! $. 1. CONCERNING the simple ideas Positive ideas
of sensation it is to be considered from priva. that whatsoever is so constituted in nature as tive causes.
to be able, by affecting our senses, to cause any percepall, * tion in the mind, doth thereby produce in the underiderak standing a simple idea ; which, whatever be the external
cause of it, when it comes to be taken notice of by our discerning faculty, it is by the mind looked on and considered there to be a real positive idea in the understanding as much as any other whatsoever ; though perhaps the cause of it be but a privation of the subject...
$. 2. Thus the idea of heat and cold, light and dark20thness, white and black, motion and rest, are equally exterior clear and positive ideas in the mind; though perhaps
some of the causes which produce them are barely privations in subjects, from whence our senses derive those ideas. These the understanding, in its view of them, considers all as distinct positive ideas, without taking notice of the causes that produce them ; which is an inquiry not belonging to the idea, as it is in the understanding, but to the nature of the things existing without us. These are two very different things, and carefully to be distinguished; it being one thing to perceive and know the idea of white or black, and quite another to examine what kind of particles they must be, and how ranged in the superficies, to make any object appear white or black.
5. 3. A painter or dyer, who never inquired into their causes, hath the ideas of white and black, and other colours, as clearly, perfectly, and distinctly in his understanding, and perhaps more distinctly, than the philosopher, who hath busied himself in considering their natures, and thinks he knows how far either of them is in its cause positive or privative; and the idea of black is no less positive in his mind, than that of white, however the cause of that colour in the external object may be only a privation.
§. 4. If it were the design of my present undertaking to inquire into the natural causes and manner of perception, I should offer this as a reason why a privative cause might, in some cases at least, produce a positive her idea; viz. that all sensation being produced in us only in by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal tus, spirits, variously agitated by external objects, the abatement of any former motion must as necessarily produce a new sensation, as the variation or increase of ! it; and so introduce a new idea, which depends only medi on a different motion of the animal spirits in that organ.
9. 5. But whether this be so or no, I will not here the determine, but appeal to every one's own experience, whether the shadow of a man, though it consists of the nothing but the absence of light (and the more the best absence of light is, the more discernable is the shadow) PM does not, when a man looks on it, cause as clear and we
positive idea in his mind, as a man himself, though covered over with clear sun-shine ? and the picture of a shadow is a positive thing. Indeed we have negative names, which stand not directly for positive ideas, but for their absence, such as insipid, silence, nihil, &c. which words denote positive ideas; v. g. taste, sound, being, with a signification of their absence.
$. 6. And thus one may truly be said to Positive ideas see darkness. For supposing a hole per- from priva. fectly dark, from whence no light is re- tive caules. ) tiected, it is certain one may see the figure of it, or it may be painted : or whether the ink I write with makes any other idea, is a question. The privative causes I have liere assigned of positive ideas are according to the common opinion ; but in truth it will be hard to deterinme, whether there be really any ideas from a privative cause, till it be determined, whether rest be any more a privation than motion.
9. 7. To discover the nature of our ideas Ideas in the better, and to discourse of them intel- mind, quali. ligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish ties in bo. them as they are ideas or perceptions in our dies. ininds, and as they are modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us: that so we may not think (as perhaps usually is done) that they are exactly the images and resemblances of something inhcrent in the subject; most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us, than the names that stand for thein are the likeness of our ideas, which yet upon hearing they are
apt to excite in us. . ari . 8. Whatsoever the inind perceives in itself, or is
the immediate object of perception, thought, or under
standing, that I call idea; and the power to produce s by any idea in our mind I call quality of the subject
wherein that power is. Thus a suow-ball having the . 10. power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and
7 round, the powers to produce those ideas in us, as they corbes, are in the snow-ball, I call qualities, and as thev are sen
Borsations or perceptions in our understandings, I call them PBB Sens : which ideas, if I speak of sometimes, as in the
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