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one jot more solid than water. For though the two flat sides of two pieces of marble will more easily approach each other, between which there is nothing but water or air, than if there be a diamond between them: yet it is not that the parts of the diamond are more solid than those of water, or resist more; but because, the parts of water being more easily separable from each other, they will, by a side motion, be more easily removed, and give way to the approach of the two pieces of marble. But if they could be kept from making place by that side-motion, they would eternally hinder the approach of these two pieces of marble as much as the diamond; and it would be as impossible by any force to surmount their resistance, as to surmount the resistance of the parts of a diamond. The softest body in the world will as invincibly resist the coming together of any other two bodies, if it be not put out of the way, but remain between them, as the hardest that can be found or imagined. He that shall fill a yielding soft body well with air or water, will quickly find its resistance; and he that thinks that nothing but bodies that are hard can keep his hands from approaching one another, may be pleased to make a trial with the air inclosed in a foot-ball. The experiment, I have been told, was made at Florence, with a hollow globe of gold filled with water and exactly closed, which farther shows the solidity of so soft a body as water. For the golden globe thus filled being put into a press which was driven by the extreme force of skrews, the water made itself way through the pores of that very close metal; and, finding no room for a nearer approach of its particles within, got to the outside, where it rose like a dew, and so fell in drops, before the sides of the globe could be made to yield to the violent compression of the engine that squeezed it.

. 5. 5. By this idea of solidity, is the depend im extension of body distinguished from the expulse, resist- tension of space : the extension of body beance, and ing nothing but the cohesion or continuity protrusion

of solid, separable, moveable parts; and

of the extension of space, the continuity of unsolid, inse

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parable, and immoveable parts. Upon the solidity of
bodies also depend their mutual impulse, resistance,
and protrusion. Of pure space then, and solidity, there
are several (amongst which I confess myself one) who
persuade themselves they have clear and distinct ideas;
and that they can think on space, without any thing in
it that resists or is protruded by body. This is the idea
of pure space, which they think they have as clear, as
any idea they can have of the extension of body; the
idea of the distance between the opposite parts of a
concave superficies being equally as clear without as
with the idea of any solid parts between: and on the
other side they persuade themselves, that they have,
distinct from that of pure space, the idea of something
thạt fills space, that can be protruded by the impulse
of other bodies, or resist their motion. - If there be
others that have not these two ideas distinct, but con-
found them, and make but one of them; I know not
how men, who have the same idea under different
names, or different ideas under the same name, can in
that case talk with one another; any more than a man,
who, not being blind or dcaf, has distinct ideas of the
colour of scarlet, and the sound of a trumpet, could
discourse concerning scarlet colour with the blind man
I mention in another place, who fancied that the idea
of scarlet was like the sound of a trumpet.

5. 6. If any one ask me, what this so-
lidity is? I send him to his senses to in-
form him: let him put a fint or a foot-bali between
his hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will
know. If he thinks this not a sufficient explication of
solidity, what it is, and wherein it consists; Ipro-
mise to tell him what it is, and wherein it consists,
when he tells me what thinking is, or wherein it con-
sists; or explains to me what extension or motion is,
which perhaps seems much easier. The siinple ideas we
have are such as experience teaches them us, but if,
beyond that, we endeavour by words to niake them
clearer in the mind, we shall succeed no better, than if
we went about to clear up the darkness of a blind man's
H 4.

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mind by talking; and to discourse into hin the ideas of light and colours. The reason of this I shall show in another place.

CH A P. V.
Of Simple Ideas of divers Senses.

THE ideas we get by more than one sense are of

1 space, or extension, figure, rest and motion; for these make perceivable impressions, both on the eyes and touch: and we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extension, figure, motion, and rest of bodies, both by seeing and feeling. But having occasion to speak more at large of these in another place, I here only enumerate them.

C H A P. VI:

Of Simple Ideas of Reflection.

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Simple ideas 9. 1. THE mind, receiving the ideas, are the ope,

1 mentioned in the foregoing rations of the chapters, from without, when it turns its mind about view inward upon itself, and observes its its other

own actions about those ideas it has, takes ideas.

from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation as any of those it received from foreign things. The idea of 5. 2. The two great and principal actions perception of the mind, which are most frequently conand idea of sidered, and which are so frequent, that willing, we every one that pleases may take notice of have from re.

them in himself, are these two: Perception flection. or Thinking; and Volition, or Willing.

The

he is

The power of thinking is called the understanding, and the power of volition is called the will; and these two powers or abilities in the mind are denominated faculties. Of some of the modes of these simple ideas of reflection, such as are Remembrance, Discerning, Reasoning, Judging, Knowledge, Faith, &c., I shall have occasion to speak bereafter.

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CHA P. VII.
Of Simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection.

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die it! forces turns

$. 1. THERE be other simple ideas
1 which convey themselves into

Pleasure and

pain. the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection, viz. Pleasure or Delight, and its opposite; Pain or Uneasiness, Power, Existence, Unity. ..

. 2. Delight or uneasiness, one or other of them; join themselves to almost all our ideas, both of sensation and reflection; and there is scarce any afiection of our senses from without, any retired thought of our mind within, which is not able to produce in us plcasure or pain. By pleasure and pain I would be understood to signify whatsoever delights or molests us most; whether it arises from the thoughts of our minds, or any thing operating on our bodies. For whether we call it satisfaction, delight, pleasure, happiness, &c. on the one side; or uneasiness, trouble, pain, torment, anguish, misery, &c. on the other; they are still but different degrees of the same thing, and belong to the ideas of pleasure and pain, delight or uneasiness : which are the names I shall most commonly use for those two sorts of ideas.

$. 3. The infinitely wise author of our being having given us the power over several parts of our bodies, to move or keep them at rest as we think fit; and also, by the motion of them, to move ourselves and other contiguous bodies, in which consist all the actions of our

body;

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body; having also given a power to our minds in feveral instances, to choose, amongst its ideas, which it will think on, and to pursue thre inquiry of this or that subject with consideration and attention, to excite us to these actions of thinking and motion that we are capable of; has been pleased to join to several thoughts, and several sensations, a perception of delight. If this were wholly separated from all our outward sensations and inward thoughts, we should have no reason to prefer one thought or action to another; negligence to attention; or motion to rest. And so we should neither stir our bodies nor employ our minds, but let our thoughts (if I may so call it) run a-drift, without any direction or design; and suffer the ideas of our minds, like unregarded shadows, to make their appearances there, as it happened, without attending to them. In li which state man, however furnished with the faculties in of understanding and will, would be a very idle Anactive creature, and pass his time only in a lazy, lethargick dream. It has therefore pleased our wise Creator to annex to several objects, and the ideas which we receive from them, as also to several of our thoughts, a concomitant pleasure, and that in several objects, to several degrees; that those faculties which he had endowed us with might not remain wholly idle and unemployed by us.

$. 4. Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work that pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoid that, as to pursue this: only this is worth our consideration, that pain is often produced by the same objects and ideas that produce pleasure is

Plectia us. This their near conjunction, which makes is often feel pain in the sensations where we expected pleasure, gives us new occasion of adıniring the wisdom and goodness of our Maker: who, designing the preservation of our being, has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies, to warn us of the harm that they will do, and as advices to withdraw from them. But he not designing our preservation barely, but the preservation of every part and organ in its perfection, hath, in many cases, annexed pain to those very ideas which

delight

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