177 X. How far the idea of Beauty may be applied to the XI. How far the idea of Beauty may be applied to virtue 178 I. Of the efficient caufe of the Sublime and Beautiful 197 IX. Why visual objects of great dimenfions are Sublime ibid. 208 XI. The XIII. The effects of fucceffion in vifual objects explained 211 XIV. Locke's opinion concerning Darkness considered XVI. Why Darkness is terrible XVIII. The effects of Blacknefs moderated XIX. The phyfical caufe of Love XX. Why Smoothness is Beautiful XXI. Sweetness, its nature XXII. Sweetness relaxing XXIII. Variation why beautiful XXIV. Concerning Smallness XXV. Of colour 213 215 216 218 220 221 222 223 PART V. I. Of Words II. The common effect of Poetry, not by raising ideas of things III. General words before ideas IV. The effect of Words I PREFACE HAVE endeavoured to make this edition fomething more full and fatisfactory than the first. I have fought with the utmost care, and read with equal attention, every thing which has appeared in public against my opinions; I have taken advantage of the candid liberty of my friends; and if by these means I have been better enabled to difcover the imperfections of the work, the indulgence it has received, imperfect as it was, furnished me with a new motive to fpare no reasonable pains for its improvement. Though I have not found fufficient reafon, or what appeared to me fufficient, for making any material change in my theory, I have found neceffary in many places to explain, illuftrate, and enforce it. I have prefixed an introductory discourse concerning Tafte: it is a matter curious in itself; and it leads naturally enough to the principal enquiry. This with the other explanations has made the work confiderably larger; and by encreasing its bulk has, I am afraid, added to its faults; fo that, notwithstanding all my attention, it may stand in need of a yet greater share of indulgence than it required at its first appearance. They who are accustomed to ftudies of this nature will expect, and they will allow too for many faults. They know that many of the objects of our enquiry are in themfelves obfcure and intricate; and that many others have been rendered fo by affected refinements or falfe learning; VOL. I. they K they know that there are many impediments in the fubject, in the prejudices of others, and even in our own, that render it a matter of no small difficulty to fhew in a clear light the genuine face of nature. They know that whilft the mind is intent on the general scheme of things, fome particular parts must be neglected; that we must often fubmit the style to the matter, and frequently give up the praise of elegance, fatisfied with being clear. The characters of nature are legible, it is true; but they are not plain enough to enable thofe who run, to read them. We must make ufe of a cautious, I had almoft faid, a timorous method of proceeding. We must not attempt to fly, when we can fcárcely pretend to creep. In confidering any complex matter, we ought to examine every distinct ingredient in the compofition, one by one; and reduce every thing to the utmoft fimplicity; fince the condition of our nature binds us to a ftrict law and very narrow limits. We ought afterwards to re-examine the principles by the effect of the compofition, as well as the composition by that of the principles. We ought to compare our fubject with things of a fimilar nature, and even with things of a contrary nature; for discoveries may be and often are made by the contraft, which would escape us on the fingle view. The greater number of the comparisons we make, the more general and the more certain our knowledge is like to prove, as built upon a more extenfive and perfect induction. If an enquiry thus carefully conducted, fhould fail at last of discovering the truth, it may answer an end perhaps as useful, in discovering to us the weakness of our own underftanding. If it does not make us knowing, it may make us modeft. If it does not preferve us from error, it may at leaft from the spirit of error; and may make us cautious of pronouncing pronouncing with pofitivenefs or with hafte, when fo much labour may end in fo much uncertainty. I could wish that in examining this theory, the fame method were purfued which I endeavoured to obferve in forming it. The objections, in my opinion, ought to be propofed, either to the feveral principles as they are diftinctly confidered, or to the juftness of the conclufion which is drawn from them. But it is common to pass over both the premifes and conclufion in filence, and to produce as an objection, fome poetical paffage which does not seem easily accounted for upon the principles I endeavour to establish. This manner of proceeding I should think very improper. The task would be infinite, if we could establish no principle until we had previously unravelled the complex texture of every image or defcription to be found in poets and orators. And though we should never be able to reconcile the effect of such images to our principles, this can never overturn the theory itfelf, whilft it is founded on certain and indisputable facts. A theory founded on experiment, and not affumed, is always good for fo much as it explains. Our inability to push it indefinitely is no argument at all against it. This inability may be owing to our ignorance of fome neceffary mediums; to a want of proper application; to many other caufes befides a defect in the principles we employ. In reality, the fubject requires a much clofer attention, than we dare claim from our manner of treating it. If it should not appear on the face of the work, I must caution the reader against imagining that I intended a full differtation on the Sublime and Beautiful. My enquiry went no farther than to the origin of these ideas. If the qualities which I have ranged under the head of the Sublime be all found confiftent with each other, and all differ |