THE last few years have seen a remarkable concentration of British naval power in home waters; and no one possessed of the slightest knowledge of the general international situation and the avowed ambitions of Germany would attempt to deny the absolute necessity for this concentration, in view of our deplorable and well-known military weakness. It is in fact frankly acknowledged by all parties in the State that our fleet is at present not only our first line of defence, but our sole defence against invasion. Yet it is scarcely possible to believe that the so-called mistress of the seas, and proud possessor of the greatest empire the world has ever seen, can continue to hold her place in the world under the humiliating conditions of not daring to move half-or anything like half of her available battleships more than three days' sail from the east coast of England. Britannia's navy tied to Britannia's apron strings! How long is she likely to rule the waves under these conditions? And if she ceases to rule the waves, how long is her empire likely to last?

It is in no jingo spirit that we speak of ruling the waves. It is an essential condition of our existence as an independent Power. It is absolutely vital to us; for our mercantile marine, which our navy protects, is to us both our lungs and our stomach.

On the day that any foreign Power is able to challenge us upon the ocean, down comes our Empire like a house of cards, and this island will be starved into capitulation.

Already we hear bitter complaints from our consuls and our merchants in all parts of the world at the absence of the white ensign from coasts and harbours where formerly it was a familiar object, and where it was universally regarded-not alone by our own merchants and traders, but also by those of all the weaker sea Powers— with a confidence and trust similar to that with which peaceful citizens regard the homely policeman.

The "meteor flag of England" has been replaced by those of other Powers, amongst which the German eagle and the stars and stripes figure conspicuously.

We are frequently asked to believe that so long as the world is at peace there is no particular virtue to be attached to the visible presence of the white ensign of our warships either in foreign commercial harbours or around the coasts of our own colonies, where foreigners trade.

Having had fifty years' experience whilst cruising in every ocean, and visiting some scores of harbours and commercial ports of various degrees of importance, the present writer is strongly of opinion

The exact meaning of the word "prestige" is difficult to define, but whatever way we look at it, there can be no doubt that there is "money in it." Stormonth's Standard Dictionary describes "prestige" as "the moral influence derived from past successes and achievements, on which a confident belief is founded of future triumphs; weight or influence from former deeds or character." And the moral influence of our past success has undoubtedly been one of the most potent factors in the creation of a mercantile marine which in steam tonnage is nearly equal to that of the whole of the rest of the world put together.

A time when our commercial interests in all parts of the world are being subjected to the keenest competition by several of our rivals would appear to be singularly ill suited for the withdrawal in large measure of the moral support and prestige which British consuls and merchants attach to the visible presence of our varships in the harbours and on the coasts where our mercantile interests lie.

Our readers will no doubt remember that a few years ago great credit was taken to themselves by the Admiralty

This sounded most plausible, . and pæans of praise went up from almost the whole press at such a wise and astute "reform" of our naval strategy. The disastrous consequences to our mercantile interests were not foreseen, or, if they were, they were ignored. The true reason for this move was not given. It was a very portentous one, and the responsible authorities were afraid to give it. It was dictated entirely by the fear of invasion.

In view of the rapidly growing strength of the German navy, of the fact that there are four million trained soldiers in Germany, and of our own military weakness-one might almost say impotence, it was felt that the temptation to invade rich and undefended England might prove to be too strong for even our friendly and loving cousins to resist, unless we concentrated fourfifths of our battleships in home waters, and relegated them to the somewhat undignified rôle of coast defence. This was the real reason, and the men in the small and semi

obsolete cruisers were wanted to man the battleships; and the portentous part of it lies in the fact that this arrangement will have to continue for all time, unless this country makes up its mind to keep always ready such an armed force as shall cause invasion to be hopeless by any such number of troops (with their impedimenta) as could be rapidly transported across the North Sea.

The country has not yet realised, and probably will not realise until war breaks out, what this tying of our fleet to our own shores really means. It means that the next time we are involved in war with any of our neighbours (and the man must be an insane optimist who imagines we shall never again be at war)-it means that we should still have to keep our fleet within three days' sail of the North Sea for fear of Germany, even though she might not at first be our enemy.

But with our fleet manacled to the shores of these islands, what is to become of our scattered possessions in all parts of the world? What a temptation to any ambitious Power to lay violent hands upon them, if they knew we dare not send our ships to defend them! History is full of the records of rich and militarily weak nations which succumbed to the envy of poorer and more warlike neighbours. Yet we fail to take warning, and appear to think that we are to be the exception.

A few years ago we began to realise in this country that the rapid expansion of the

VOL. CLXXXV.—NO. MCXIX,

German navy might possibly be regarded as a menace to ourselves, so we asked our neighbours politely if they would be kind enough to limit their naval armaments, or at any rate to come to some agreement with us upon this subject, such as would ensure that for all future time we might be able to keep up a fleet at least double that of theirs, without undue expense to ourselves, as we were anxious to economise! What did they do? They simply laughed in our faces, and told us that they intended to have whatever fleet they pleased, without regard to our wish for economy.

The answer was a decided snub for our Liberal and peaceloving statesmen, as there can be no doubt whatever that the Germans have a perfect right to possess any fleet they choose to pay for; and we also have a perfect right, or let us rather say an imperative duty, to take due notice of Germany's rapid naval expansion, and, without foolishly asking her to limit her armaments, to ask ourselves what an extremly powerful German navy can be intended for. Having done so, if we come to the conclusion that such a navy as Germany is now building, backed by four million trained soldiers, will become in the near future (if it has not already done so) a serious menace to our own safety, the self-respecting and dignified course to pursue is to take due and ample steps to ensure that safety, so far as human foresight can do so, and not to go about the world

K

whining and lamenting over "the crushing burden of armaments": a course which is as futile as lamenting about the state of the weather, over which we have no more power than we have over the warlike preparations of our neighbours. And seeing that they all assure us their armaments are intended for defence and not for attack, we may believe that while they say so they are absolutely sincere, for the immediate present; but we must also remember that they cannot answer for the near future: nor can the present statesmen and rulers of Europe answer for those who will succeed them. So that it surely behoves us to look a little bit ahead, and try to forecast what the consequences will be of depending entirely upon our navy for defence against a sudden and deadly blow at the heart of our empire.

Öne significant consequence which has already caused a considerable amount of disappointment, is an order from the Admiralty to curtail the usual Christmas leave of the officers and seamen of our Channel Fleet. The reason given is that "the authorities require that the fleet shall not be unduly weakened, and that a certain portion of the ships shall be kept fully manned.

Now, no one can for one moment believe that these "fully manned" ships of the Channel Fleet are intended to protect Servia against Austria, or Bulgaria against Turkey; and we can only come to the conclusion that unless this Admiralty order is to be considered

as a needless and irritating interference with the hopes of some thousands of our seamen

to spend a happy Christmas with their families, it is a humiliating acknowledgment

that our military impotence is so well known abroad, we dare not put before Germany the temptation of making a sudden and unprovoked attack upon us whilst our sailors are enjoying their Christmas leave.

Nothing which has occurred lately has been more significant of our present insecurity, and of the alarming fact that we dare not-literally dare notrun the risk of being unable to concentrate in the North Sea, within twenty-four hours, a fleet of fully manned ships superior to the whole German navy, which is always concentrated there. The conditions will not get better, but worse and worse, year by year, as the German navy approaches more nearly in strength to our own; and when the Germans have fifteen Dreadnoughts as they will have in 1914-the position will be very serious indeed, and we may well ask ourselves how long this kind of "touch - and - go business can go on, without leading to an irretrievable disaster.

The arbitrary curtailment of our sailors' Christmas holiday ought to bring home to the minds of all thinking men the indubitable fact that no matter how strong our navy may be, we can never again feel safe, or free ourselves from constant discreditable and undignified panics concerning invasion, until we possess a truly national army for home defence, founded

upon the reasonable and absolutely just propositions of Lord Roberts and the National Service League-viz., that it is the duty of every able-bodied man in this country to prepare himself to defend his home. In other words, that service in the Territorials should be a duty, and not, as now, an option.

Those who oppose anything in the shape of compulsion, even for home defence, make use of the argument that obligatory training would give us a great many more men than we want, and that the cost would be prohibitive. One newspaper spoke of an army of four million men, and an addition to our regular army budget of twenty millions sterling. As to getting more men than we want, that is simply ridiculous, as we need not take more than we want; but we should get the pick, the very cream of the manhood of the nation, the best men physically and morally, discarding all the undersized weaklings, so many of whom we now see both in the ranks of our regular army and in those of our Territorials.

It has been proved, and is not denied, that a short course of military training has a strikingly beneficial effect, both morally and physically, upon the young men in those countries which have actually tried it, and this alone ought to be a very strong argument in favour of introducing it in England. If all our young men were trained at about the age of eighteen, we should soon have sufficient raw material to form a home defence army of such numbers as those competent to

judge considered adequate for our national safety, in view of the ever varying vicissitudes of international relations and foreign ambitions. And as to the expense, there seems to be no reason why the cost of a home defence army, founded on the bed-rock of universal training, should be much greater than the cost of Mr Haldane's Territorials, founded on slippery soil of the individual whim and fancy of our young men as to whether they will or will not do their duty, as well as claiming their rights and privileges as citizens of a free country.

We hear boast about British love of justice and fairplay, but it is all cant and brag so long as we put up with the glaring injustice and unfairness of allowing nine-tenths of our young men to shirk their duty, whilst we call upon the small patriotic minority to undertake the whole burden of national defence, and to protect, amongst others, that ninety per cent of selfish young shirkers who prefer their own amusements (and what they are pleased to boast of as their freedom), instead of taking their fair share of an obviously national duty.

much talk and

As to cost, the officials of the National Service League have already drawn up a tentative scheme for universal training, which shows that for an additional cost of less than 2 millions we could have a really efficient force of 520,000 men properly trained, instead of Mr Haldane's 300,000 insufficiently trainedonly about two-thirds of which we have actually got.