"enemies fhould alfo difcover the impofition.-The "increase in the exports was found to have been "occafioned chiefly by the demands of our own

66

fleets and armies, and, inftead of bringing wealth "to the nation, was to be paid for by oppreffive taxes upon the people of England. While the "British feamen were confuming on board our men of war and privateers, foreign fhips and foreign feamen were employed in the transpor"tation of our merchandize; and the carrying "trade, fo great a fource of wealth and marine,

was entirely engroffed by the neutral nations. The "number of British ships annually arriving in our ports was reduced 1756 fail, containing 92,559

tons, on a medium of the fix years war, com"pared with the fix years of peace preceding it.---"The conqueft of the Havannah had, indeed,

ftopped the remittance of fpecie from Mexico to

Spain; but it had not enabled England to feize "it: on the contrary, our merchants fuffered by "the detention of the galleons, as their correfpon"dents in Spain were difabled from paying them

for their goods fent to America. The loss of "the trade to old Spain was a farther bar to an

influx of fpecie; and the attempt upon Portugal "had not only deprived us of an import of bullion "from thence, but the payment of our troops employed in its defence was a fresh drain opened "for the diminution of our circulating fpecie.-

"The

"The high premiums given for new loans had funk " the price of the old stock near a third of its ori

ginal value, fo that the purchafers had an obli

gation from the state to re-pay them with an " addition of 33 per cent. to their capital.

Every new loan required new taxes to be imposed; new taxes muft add to the price of our manu"factures and leffen their confumption among foreigners. The decay of our trade muft ne

་་

46

ceffarily occafion a decrease of the publick revenue; and a deficiency of our funds muft "either be made up by fresh taxes, which would

only add to the calamity, or our national credit "must be destroyed, by fhewing the publick cre"ditors the inability of the nation to re-pay them "their principal money.-Bounties had already "been given for recruits which exceeded the

year's wages of the plowman and reaper; and as "these were exhausted, and husbandry stood still for want of hands, the manufacturers were next "to be tempted to quit the anvil and the loom

by higher offers.-France, bankrupt France, "had no fuch calamities impending over her; her diftreffes were great, but they were immediate "and temporary; her want of credit preferved "her from a great increase of debt, and the lofs of her ultramarine dominions leffened her expences. Her colonies had, indeed, put themfelves into the hands of the English; but the

66

property of her fubjects had been preferced by capitulations, and a way opened for making her thofe remittances, which the war had before' fufpended, with as much fecurity as in the time of peace. Her armies in Germany had been "hitherto prevented from feizing upon Hanover; "but they continued to encamp on the fame

66

ground on which the first battle was fought; " and, as it muft ever happen from the policy of "that government, the last troops fhe fent into the field were always found to be the beft, and her frequent loffes only ferved to fill her regiments " with better foldiers. The conqueft of Hanover "became therefore every campaign more probable. "It is not to be noted, that the French troops "received fubfiftence only, for the last three years "of the war; and that, although large arrears

were due to them at its conclusion, the charge 66 was the lefs during its continuance *.”

If any one be willing to fee to how much greater lengths the author carries thefe ideas, he will recur to the book. This is fufficient for a fpecimen of his manner of thinking. I believe one reflexion uniformly obtrudes itfelf upon every reader of thefe paragraphs. For what purpofe in any caufe fhall we hereafter contend with France? can we ever flatter ourselves that we shall wage a more

* P. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

fuc

fuccefsful war? If, on our part, in a war the most profperous we ever carried on, by fea and by land, and in every part of the globe, attended with the unparalleled circumftance of an immenfe increase of trade and augmentation of revenue; if a continued feries of difappointments, difgraces, and defeats, followed by publick bankruptcy, on the part of France; if all these still leave her a gainer on the whole balance, will it not be downright phrenzy in us ever to look her in the face again, or to contend with her any, even the most effential points, fince victory and defeat, though by different ways, equally conduct us to our ruin? Subjection to France without a ftruggle will indeed be lefs for our honour, but on every principle of our author it must be more for our advantage. According to his reprefentation of things, the queftion is only concerning the moft eafy fall. France had not difcovered, our ftatefman tells us, at the end of that war, the triumphs of defeat, and the refources which are derived from bankruptcy. For my poor part, I do not wonder at their blindness. But the English minifters faw further. Our author has at length let foreigners alfo into the fecret, and made them altogether as wife as ourfelves. It is their own fault if (vulgato imperii arcano) they are impofed upon any longer. They now are apprifed of the fentiments which the great candidate for the government of this great

C 3

*

empire

empire entertains; and they will act accordingly. They are taught our weakness and their own advantages.

He tells the world*, that if France carries on the war against us in Germany, every lofs fhe fuftains contributes to the atchievement of her conqueft. If her armies are three years unpaid, the is the lefs exhausted by expence. If her credit is destroyed, she is the lefs oppreffed with debt. If her troops are cut to pieces, they will by her policy (and a wonderful policy it is) be improved, and will be fupplied with much better men. If the war is carried on in the colonies, he tells them that the lofs of her ultramarine dominions leffens. her expencest, and enfures her remittances :

Per damna, per cædes, ab ipfo

Ducit opes animumque ferro,

if fo, what is it we can do to hurt her?-it will be all an impofition, all fallacious. Why the refult muft be--Occidit, occidit fpes omnis & fortuna noftri nominis.

The only way which the author's principles leave for our escape, is to reverfe our condition into that of France, and to take her lofing cards into our hands. But though his principles drive him

* P. 9, 10,

† P. 9.

to