their estimate of Oczakow, and their con

ng it

Majesty's ministers, to the fortress of Oczakow; | Inconsistency and here I must beg leave to say, of misters in that they have not once attempted to answer the arguments so judiciously duct respect and ably enforced by my honorable friend who made this motion. It was explicitly stated by the gentlemen on the other side, as the only argument for our interference et all, that the balance of Europe was threatened with great danger if Oczakow was suffered to remain in the hands of Russia. Of no less importance did ministers last year state this fortress of Oczakow, than as if it were indeed the talisman on which depended the fate of the whole Ottoman empire. But if this, from their own admission, was true last year, what has happened to alter its value? If it then excited the alarms of his Majesty's ministers for the safety of Europe, what can enable them now to tell us that we are perfectly secure? If it was true that her bare possession of Oczakow would be dangerous, what must be the terror of Europe, when they see our negotiators put Russia into the way of seizing even Constantinople itself? This was the strong argument of my honorable friend [Mr. Whitbread], and which he maintained with such solid reasoning that not the slightest answer has been given to it. To illustrate the value of Oczakow, however, one honorable gentleman [Mr. Grant] went back to the reign of Elizabeth, and even to the days of Philip and Demosthenes. He told us that when Demosthenes, urging the Athenians to make war on Philip, reproached them with inattention to a few towns he had taken, the names of which they scarcely knew, telling them that those towns were the keys by which he would in time invade and overcome Greece, he gave them a salutary warning of the danger that impended. But if the opponents of that great orator had prevailed, if they had succeeded in inducing their Countrymen to acquiesce in the surrender not only of those towns, but of considerably more, as in the present instance, with what face would he afterward have declared to his countrymen, "True it was that these sorry and nameless towns were the keys to the Acropolis itself; but you have surrendered them, and what is the consequence? You are now in a state of the most perfect security. You have now nothing .0 fear.

You have now the prospect of sixteen years of peace before you!" I ask, sir, what would have been the reception even of Demosthenes himself, if he had undertaken to support such an inconsistency?

Let us try this, however, the other way. In order to show that his Majesty's ministers merit the censure which is proposed, I will admit that the preservation of the Turks is necessary for the security of a balance of power. I trust, at the same time, that this admission, which I make merely for the argument, will not be disingenCously quoted upon me, as hypothetical statements too commonly are. for admissions of fact. What will the right honorable gentleman gain by it? The Turks, by his arrangement, are left

in a worse situation than he found them; for, previous to his interference, if Russia had gone to Constantinople, he would have been unfettered by the stipulations which bind him now, and he and hir ally might have interfered to save the Porte from total destruction. But at present the possible and total extirpation of the Ottoman pow. er is made to depend on a point so precarious as their accepting the proposal which the right honorable gentleman thought fir to agree to for them within the space of four months. And what is this proposal? Why, that the Turks should give up, not only the war they had begun, but this very Oczakow, which of itself was sufficient, in the hands of Russia, to overturn the balance. If, therefore, it was so im- Dilemma for portant to recover Oczakow, it is not ministers. recovered, and ministers ought to be censured. If unimportant, they ought never to have demanded it. If so unimportant, they ought to be censured for arming; but if so important as they have stated it, they ought to be censured for disarming without having gotten it. Either way, therefore, the argument comes to the same point, and I care not on which side the gentlemen choose to take it up; for whether Oczakow be, as they told us last year, the key to Constantinople, on the preservation of which to Turkey the balance of Europe depended, or, as they must tell us now, of no comparative importance, their con duct is equally to be condemned for disarming and pusillanimously yielding up the object, in the first instance; for committing the dignity of their Sovereign, and hazarding the peace of their country, in the second.

No escape

dilemma.

But they tell us it is unfair to involve them in this dilemma. There was a middle course to be adopted. Oczakow was from this certainly of much importance; but this importance was to be determined upon by circumstances. Sir, we are become nice, indeed, in our political arithmetic. In this calculating age we ascertain to a scruple what an object is really worth. Thus it seems that Oczakow was worth an armament, but not worth a war; it was worth a threat, but not worth carrying that threat into execution! Sir, I can conceive nothing so degrading and dishonorable as such an argument. To hold out a menace without ever seriously meaning to enforce it, constitutes, in common language, the true description of a bully. Applied to the transactions of a nation, the disgrace is deeper, and the consequences fatal to its honor. Yet such is the precise conduct the King's ministers have made the nation hold in the eyes of Europe, and which they defend by an argument that, if urged in private life, would stamp a man with the character of a coward and a bully, and sink him to the deepest abyss of infamy and degradation. Sure I am that this distinction never suggested itself to the reflection of a noble Duke [the Duke of Leeds], whose

5 Mr. Pitt, as already stated, when he gave up Oczakow, agreed that Turkey should accele tc these terms with four months, or be abandoned to her fate.

conduct throughout the whole of this business has evinced the manly character of his mind, unaccustomed to such calculations! From him we learn the fact. He said in his place that his colleagues thought it fit to risk a threat to recover Oczakow, but would not risk a war for it. Such conduct was not for him. It might suit the characters of his colleagues in office; it could not his. But they say it might be worth a war with the public opinion, but worth nothing without it! I can not conceive any case in which a great and wise nation, having committed itself by a menace, can withdraw that menace without disgrace. The converse of the proposition I can easily conceive. That there may be a place, for instance, not fit to be asked at all, but which being asked for, and with a menace, it is fit to insist upon. This undoubtedly goes to make a nation, like an individual, cautious of committing itself, because there is no ground so tender as that of honor. How do ministers think on this subject? Oczakow was every thing by itself; but when they added to Oczakow the honor of England, it became nothing! Oczakow, by itself, threatened the balance of Europe. Oczakow and national honor united weighed nothing in the scale! Honor is, in their political arithmetic, a minus quantity, to be subtracted from the value of Oczakow! Sir, I am ashamed of this reasoning; nor can I reflect on the foul stain it has fixed on the English name, without feeling mortified and humbled indeed! Their late colleague, the noble Duke [of Leeds], urged his sentiments with the feelings that became him --feelings that form a striking contrast to those that actuate the right honorable gentleman. He told his country, that when he had made up his mind to the necessity of demanding Oczakow, it was his opinion that it might have been obtained without a war; but having once demanded it, he felt it his duty not to shrink from the war that might ensue from the rejection of that demand, and preferred the resignation of his office to the retracting that opinion. Far different was the conduct of the right honorable gentleman [Mr. Pitt], though his advice was the same; and small were the scruples he felt in tarnishing the honor of his Sovereign, whose name he pledged to this demand, and afterward obliged him to recede from it.

Public opinion:

to have resign

verse to their

tiona.

III. They tell us, however, and seem to value themselves much upon it, that, in Ministers ought abandoning the object for which they ed if it was ad had armed, they acted in conformity settled convic to public opinion. Sir, I will fairly state my sentiments on this subject. It is right and prudent to consult the public opinion. It is frequently wise to attend even to public prejudices on subjects of such infinite importance, as whether they are to have war or peace. But if, in the capacity of a servant to the Crown, I were to see, or strongly to imagne that I saw any measures going forward that threatened the peace or prosperity of the cour try, and if the emergency were so pressing as to dermand the sudden adoption of a decisive course

to avert the mischief, I should not hesitate one moment to act upon my own responsibility. If, however, the public opinion did not happen to square with mine; if, after pointing out to ther the danger, they did not see it in the same light with me; or if they conceived that another remedy was preferable to mine, I should consider it as due to my King, due to my country, due to my own honor, to retire, that they might pursue the plan which they thought better by a fit instrument-that is, by a man who thought with them. Such would be my conduct on any sub ject where conscientiously I could not surrende. my judgment. If the case was doubtful, or the emergency not so pressing, I should be ready, perhaps, to sacrifice my opinion to that of the public; but one thing is most clear in such an event as this, namely, that I ought to give the public the means of forming an accurate esti

mate.

They ought, own principles have ser forehand.

least, on their

to

tained it be

Do I state this difference fairly? If I do, and if the gentleman over against me will admit that in the instance before us the public sentiment ought to have influenced them, it follows that the public sentiment ought to have been consulted before we were committed in the eyes of Eu rope, and that the country ought to have had the means, and the information necessary to form their judgment upon the true merits of this ques tion. Did the King's ministers act thus? Did they either take the public opinion, or did they give us the means of forming one? Nothing like it. On the 28th of March, 1791, the mes sage was brought down to this House. On the 29th, we passed a vote of approbation, but ne opinion was asked from us, no explanation was given us. So far from it, we were expressly told our advice was not wanted; that we had nothing to do with the prerogative of the Crown to make war; that all our business was to give confidence. So far with regard to this House. I can not help thinking this conduct somewhat hard upon the majority, who certainly might have counted for something in the general opit ion, when the right honorable gentleman wa collecting it, if he meant fairly so to do. I grant. indeed, that there are many ways by which the feeling and temper of the public may be tolera bly well known out of this House as well as in it. I grant that the opinion of a respectable meeting at Manchester, of a meeting at Norwich, of a meeting at Wakefield, of public bodies of men in different parts of England, might give the righ honorable gentleman a correct idea of the public impression. Permit me to say, also, that in the speeches of the minority of this House, he might find the ground of public opinion, both as to what might give it rise, and what might give it coun tenance. But was the majority of this House the only body whose dispositions were not world consulting? Will the minister say, “I traveled to Norwich, to York, to Manchester, to Wake

Public meetings were held in these and in other places, and resolutions passed host..e to the meas

ures of the minister.