Imágenes de página
PDF
ePub

ther on this unpleasing subject than to express | Parliament pays no regard but to the interests my hope, that we shall no longer suffer ourselves of Great Britain. to be deceived and oppressed: that we shall at length perform our duty as representatives of the people. and, by refusing to ratify this contract, show, that however the interests of Hanover have been preferred by the ministers, the

The motion was carried by a considerable majority; but Mr. Pitt's popularity was greatly increased throughout the country by his resist ance of this obnoxious measure.

SPEECH

OF LORD CHATHAM ON A MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS OF THANKS AFTER THE BATTLE OF DET. TINGEN, DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, DECEMBER 1, 1743.

INTRODUCTION.

THE battle of Dettingen was the last in which any English monarch has appeared personally in the field. It was fought near a village of this name in Germany, on the banks of the Mayn, between Mayence and Frankfort, on the 27th of June, 1743. The allied army, consisting of about thirty-seven thousand English and Hanoverian troops, was commanded, at the time of this engagement, by George II. Previous to his taking the command, it had been brought by mismanagement into a perilous condition, being hemmed in between the River Mayn on the one side and a range of precipitous hills on the other, and there reduced to great extremities for want of provisions. The French, who occupied the opposite side of the Mayn in superior force, seized the opportunity, and threw a force of twenty-three thousand men across the river to cut off the advance of the allies through the defile of Dettingen, and shortly after sent twelve thousand more into their rear, to preclude the possibility of retreat. The position of the French in front was impregnable, and, if they had only retained it, the capture of the entire allied army would have been inevitable. But the eagerness of Grammont, who commanded the French in that quarter, drew him off from his vantage ground, and induced him to give battle to the allies on more equal terms. When the engagement commenced, George II., dismounting from his horse, put himself at the head of his infantry. and led his troops on foot to the charge. "The conduct of the King in this conflict," says Lord Mahon, "deserves the highest praise; and it was undoubtedly through him and through his son [the Duke of Cumberland], far more than through any of his generals, that the day was won." The British and Hano verian infantry vied with each other under such guidance, and swept the French forces before them with an impetuosity which soon decided the battle, and produced a complete rout of the French army. The exhausted condition of the allies, however, and especially their want of provisions, rendered it impossible fir them to pursue the French, who left the field with the loss of six thousand men.

The King, on his return to England, opened the session of Parliament in person; and in reply to his speech, an Address of Thanks was moved, “acknowledging the goodness of Divine Providence to this nation in protecting your Majesty's sacred person amid imminent dangers, in defense of the common cause and liberties of Europe." In opposition to this address, Mr. Pitt made the following speech. In the former part of it, either from erroneous information or prejudice, he seems unwilling to do justice to the King's intrepidity on that occasion. But the main part of the speech is occupied with an examination,

I. Of Sir Robert Walpole's policy (which was that of the King) in respect to the Queen of Hungary and the balance of power.

II. Of the conduct of the existing ministry (that of Lord Carteret) in relation to these subjects.
III. Of the manner in which the war in Germany had been carried on; and,

IV. Of the consequences to be anticipated from the character and conduct of the ministry. The speech will be interesting to those who have sufficient acquaintance with the history of the times to enter fully into the questions discussed. It is characterized by comprehensive views and profound retion on the leading question of that day, the balance of power, and by a high sense of national honor. It has a continuous line of argument running throughout it; and shows the error of those who imagine that "Lord Chatham never reasoned.'

SPEECH, &c.

From the proposition before the House, sir, ister [Walpole] betrayed the interests of his we may perceive, that whatever alteration has country by his pusillanimity; our present minbeen, or may be produced with respect to for- ister [Carteret] would sacrifice them by his eign measures, by the late change in administra- Quixotism. Our former minister was for nego tion, we can expect none with regard to our do- tiating with all the world; our present minister mestic affairs. In foreign measures, indeed, a is for fighting against all the world. Our formost extraordinary change has taken place. mer minister was for agreeing to every treaty, From one extreme, our administration have run though never so dishonorable; our present min to the very verge of another. Our former minister will give ear to none, though never so res

sonable. Thus, while both appear to be extravagant, this difference results from their opposite conduct that the wild system of the one must subject the nation to a much heavier expenditure than was ever incurred by the pusillanimity

of the other

The honorable gentleman who spoke last [Mr. Yorke] was correct in saying, that in the beginning of the session we could know nothing, in a parliamentary way, of the measures that had been pursued. I believe, sir, we shall know as little, in that way, at the end of the session; for our new minister, in this, as in every other step of his domestic conduct, will follow the example of his predecessor, and put a negative upon every motion which may tend toward our acquiring any parliamentary knowledge of our late proceedings. But if we possess no knowledge of these proceedings, it is, surely, as strong an argument for our not approving, as it can be for our not condemning them. Sir, were nothing relating to our late measures proposed to be inserted in our address upon this occasion, those measures would not have been noticed by me. But when an approbation is proposed, I am compelled to employ the knowledge I possess, whether parliamentary or otherwise, in order that I may join or not in the vote of approbation. What though my knowledge of our late measures were derived from foreign and domestic newspapers alone, even of that knowledge I must avail myself, when obliged to express my opinion; and when from that knowledge I apprehend them to be wrong, it is my duty, surely, to withhold my approbation. I am bound to persist in thus withholding it, till the minister be pleased to furnish me with such parliamentary knowledge as may convince me that I have been misinformed. This would be my proper line of conduct when, from the knowledge I possess, instead of approving any late measures, I think it more reasonable to condemn them. But supposing, sir, from the knowledge within my reach, that I consider those measures to be sound, even then I ought not to approve, unless such knowledge can warrant approval. Now, as no sort of knowledge but a parliamentary knowledge can authorize a parliamentary approbation, for this reason alone I ought to refuse it. If, therefore, that which is now proposed contain any sort of approbation, my refusing to agree to it contains no censure, but is a simple declaration that we possess not such knowledge of past measures as affords sufficient grounds for a parliamentary approbation. A parliamentary approbation, sir, extends not only to all that our ministers have advised, but to the acknowledgment of the truth of several facts which inquiry may show to be false; of facts which, at least, have been asserted without authority and proof. Suppose, sir, it should appear that his Majesty was exposed to few or no dangers abroad, but those to which he is daily liable at home, such as the overturning of his coach, or the stumbling e his horse, would not the address proposed, inad of being a compliment, be an affront and

an insult to the sovereiga? Suppose it should appear that our ministers have shown no regard to the advice of Parliament; that they have ex. erted their endeavors, not for the preservation of the house of Austria, but to involve that house in dangers which otherwise it might have avoided, and which it is scarcely possible for v.3 now to avert. Suppose it should appear that a body of Dutch troops, although they marched to the Rhine, have never joined our army. Suppose it should appear that the treaty with Sardinia is not yet ratified by all the parties concerned, or that it is one with whose terms it is impossible they should comply. If these things should ap pear on inquiry, would not the address proposed be most ridiculously absurd? Now, what as. surance have we that all these facts will not turn. out as I have imagined?

I. Upon the death of the late Emperor of Ger many, it was the interest of this nation, I Walpole' grant, that the Queen of Hungary should policy. be established in her father's dominions, and that her husband, the Duke of Lorraine, should be chosen Emperor. This was our interest, because it would have been the best security for the preservation of the balance of power; but we had no other interest, and it was one which we had in common with all the powers of Eu rope, excepting France. We were not, there fore, to take upon us the sole support of this interest. And, therefore, when the King of Prus sia attacked Silesia-when the King of Spain, the King of Poland, and the Duke of Bavaria laid claim to the late Emperor's succession, we might have seen that the establishment of the Queen of Hungary in all her father's dominions was impracticable, especially as the Dutch re fused to interfere, excepting by good offices What, then, ought we to have done? Since we could not preserve the whole, is it not evident that, in order to bring over some of the claimants to our side, we ought to have advised her to yield up part? Upon this we ought to have insisted, and the claimant whom first we should have considered was the King of Prussia, both because he was one of the most neutral, and one of the most powerful allies with whom we could treat. For this reason it was certainly incum bent upon us to advise the Queen of Hungary to accept the terms offered by the King of Prussia when he first invaded Silesia. Nay, not only should we have advised, we should have insisted upon this as the condition upon which we would assist her against the claims of others. To this the court of Vienna must have assented; and, in this case, whatever protestations the other claim. ants might have made, I am persuaded that the Queen of Hungary would to this day have re

Walpole on the Queen of Hungary. He strongly This, it is now known. was the course urged by advised her to give up Silesia rather than involv Europe in a general war. She replied that she

"would sooner give up her under petticoat;" and, as this put an end to the argument, he could do noth ing but give the aid which England had promised -See Coxe's Walpole iii.. 148.

[merged small][ocr errors]

pose an equal resistance to the Queen of Hungary alone, much less so to that Queen when supported by Hanover and the whole power of Great Britain. During this posture of affairs, it was safe for us, I say, it was safe for Hanover, to promise assistance and to concert schemes in support of the Queen of Hungary. But no sooner did France come forward than our schemes were at an end, our promises forgotten. The safety of Hanover was then involved; and England, it seems, is not to be bound by promises, nor engaged in schemes, which, by possibility, may endanger or distress the Electorate! From this time, sir, we thought no more of assisting the Queen of Hungary, excepting by grants which were made by Parliament. These, indeed, our ministers did not oppose, because they contrive to make a job of every parliamentary grant. But from the miserable inactivity in which we allowed the Danish and Hessian troops to remain, notwithstanding that they receive.. our pay; and from the insult tamely submitted to by our squadron in the Mediterranean, we must conclude that our ministers, from the time the French interfered, resolved not to assist the Queen of Hungary by land or sea. Thus, having drawn that princess forward on the ice by our promises, we left her to retreat as she could. Thus it was, sir, that the Duke of Bavaria became Emperor.2 Thus it was that the house of Austria was stripped of great part of its dominions, and was in the utmost danger of being stripped of all, had France been bent on its destruction. Sir, the house of Austria was saved by the policy of France, who wished to reduce,

This salutary measure was not pursued. This appears, sir, not only from the Gazettes, but from our parliamentary knowledge. For, from the papers which have been either accidentally or necessarily laid before Parliament, it appears, that instead of insisting that the court of Vienna should agree to the terms offered by Prussia, we rather encouraged the obstinacy of that court in rejecting them. We did this, sir, not by our memorials alone, but by his Majesty's speech to his Parliament, by the consequent addresses of both houses, and by speeches directed by our courtiers against the King of Prussia. I allude, sir, to his Majesty's speech on the 8th of April, 1711, to the celebrated addresses on that occasion for guaranteeing the dominions of Hanover, and for granting £300,000 to enable his Majesty to support the Queen of Hungary. The speeches made on that occasion by several of our favorites at court, and their reflections on the King of Prussia, must be fresh in the memory of all. All must remember, too, that the Queen of Hungary was not then, nor for some months after, attacked by any one prince in Europe excepting the King of Prussia. She must, therefore, have supposed that both the court and nation of Great Britain were resolved to support her, not only against the King of Prussia, but against all the world. We can not, therefore, be surprised that the court of Vienna evinced an unwillingness to part with so plenteous a country as that claimed by the King of Prussia—the | but not absolutely to destroy it. Had Austria Lordship of Silesia.

been ruined, the power of the Duke of Bavaria, who had been elected Emperor, would have risen higher than was consistent with the interests of France. It was the object of France to foment divisions among the princes of Germany, to reduce them by mutual strife, and then to ren der the houses of Bavaria, Austria, and Saxony nearly equal by partitions.

But, sir, this was not all. Not only had we promised our assistance to the Queen of Hungary, but we had actually commenced a negotiation for a powerful alliance against the King of Prussia, and for dividing his dominions among the allies. We had solicited, not only the Queen of Hungary, but also the Muscovites and the Dutch, to form parts of this alliance. We had taken both Danes and Hessians into our pay, in support of this alliance. Nay, even Hanover had subjected herself to heavy expenses on this occasion, by adding a force of nearly one third to the army she had already on foot. This, sir, was, I believe, the first extraordinary expense which Hanover had incurred since her fortunate conjunction with England; the first, I say, not-istration; and this leads me to consider the ori withstanding the great acquisitions she has made, and the many heavy expenses in which England bas been involved upon her sole account.

If, therefore, the Queen of Hungary was obstinate in regard to the claims of Prussia, her obstinacy must be ascribed to ourselves. To us must be imputed those misfortunes which she subsequently experienced. It was easy to promse her our assistance while the French seemed determined not to interfere with Germany. It was safe to engage in schemes for her support, and for the enlargement of the Hanoverian doninions, because Prussia could certainly not opC

It was this policy which restrained the French from sending so powerful an army into Germany as they might otherwise have sent. And then, through the bad conduct of their generals, and through the skill and bravery of the officers and troops of the Queen of Hungary, a great improvement in her affairs was effected. This occurred about the time of the late changes in our admin.

gin of those measures which are now proceed. ing, and the situation of Europe at that particu lar time, February, 1742. But, before I enter upon that consideration, I must lay this down as a maxim to be ever observed by this nation, that, although it be our own interest to preserve a balance of power in Europe, yet, as we are the most remote from danger, we have the least reason to be jealous as to the adjustment of that bal ance, and should be the last to take alarm on its

2 The Duke of Bavaria was eleted Emperor of the 12th of February, 1742.

account. Now the balance of power may be supported, either by the existence of one single potentate capable of opposing and defeating the ambitious designs of France, or by a well-connected confederacy adequate to the same intent. Of these two methods, the first, when practicable, is the most eligible, because on that method we may most safely rely; but when it can not be resorted to, the whole address of our ministers and plenipotentiaries should tend to establish the second.

The wisdom of the maxim, sir, to which I have adverted, must be acknowledged by all who consider, that when the powers upon the Continent apply to us to join them in a war against France, we may take what share in the war we think fit. When we, on the contrary, apply to them, they will prescribe to us. However some gentlemen may affect to alarm themselves or others by alleging the dependency of all the European powers upon France, of this we may rest assured, that when those powers are really threatened with such dependency, they will unite among themselves, and call upon us also to prevent it. Nay, sir, should even that dependence imperceptibly ensue; so soon as they perceived it, they would unite among themselves, and call us to join the confederacy by which it might be shaken off. Thus we can never be reduced to stand single in support of the balance of power; nor can we be compelled to call upon our continental neighbors for such purpose, unless when our ministers have an interest in pretending and asserting imaginary dangers.

the ambition of France. For France, although she had assisted in depressing the house of Aus tria, had shown no design of increasing her own dominions. On the other hand, the haughty de meanor of the court of Vienna, and the height to which that house had beer: raised, excited a spirit of disgust and jealousy in the princes of Germany. That spirit first manifested itself in the house of Hanover, and at this very time prevailed not only there, but in most of the German sovereignties. Under such circumstances, however weak and erroneous our ministers might be, they could not possibly think of restoring the house of Austria to its former splendor and power. They could not possibly oppose that single house as a rival to France. No power in Europe would have cordially assisted them in that scheme They would have had to cope, not only with France and Spain, but with all the princes of Germany and Italy, to whom Austria had be come obnoxious.

In these circumstances, wha was this nation to do? It was impossible to establish the balance of power in Europe upon the single power of the house of Austria. Surely, then, sir, it was our business to think of restoring the peace of Germany as soon as possible by our good offices, in order to establish a confederacy sufficient to oppose France, should she afterward discover any ambitious intentions. It was now not so much our business to prevent the lessening the power of the house of Austria, as it was to bring about a speedy reconciliation between the princes f Germany; to take care that France should go as little by the treaty of peace as she said she expected by the war. This, I say, should have

tion of the balance of power was now no longer to depend upon the house of Austria, but upon the joint power of a confederacy then to be formed; and till the princes of Germany were reconciled among themselves, there was scarcely a possibility of forming such a confederacy. If we had made this our scheme, the Dutch would have joined heartily in it. The Germanic body would have joined in it; and the peace of Germany might have been restored without putting this nation to any expense, or diverting us from the prosecution of our just and necessary war against Spain, in case our differences with that nation could not have been adjusted by the treaty for restoring the peace of Germany.

The posture of Europe since the time of the Romans is wonderfully changed. In those times each country was divided into many sovereign-been our chief concern; because the preserva ties. It was then impossible for the people of any one country to unite among themselves, and much more impossible for two or three large countries to combine in a general confederacy against the enormous power of Rome. But such confederacy is very practicable now, and may always be effected whenever France, or any one of the powers of Europe, shall endeavor to enslave the rest. I have said, sir, that the balance of power in Europe may be maintained as securely by a confederacy as it can be by opposing any one rival power to the power of France. Now, let us examine to which of these two methods we ought to have resorted in February, 1742. The imperial diadem was then fallen from the house of Austria; and although the troops of the Queen of Hungary had met with some success during the winter, that sovereign was still stripped of great part of the Austrian dominions. The power of that house was therefore greatly inferior to what it was at the time f the late emperor's death; and still more inferior to what it had been in 1716, when we considered it necessary to add Naples and Sardinia to its former acquisitions, in order to ren- A resolution was taken, and preparations were der it a match for France. Besides this, there made, for sending a body of troops to Flanders, existed in 1742 a very powerful confederacy even before we had any hopes of the King of against the house of Austria, while no jealousy Prussia's deserting his alliance with France, was harbored by the powers of Europe against | and without ur being called on to do so by any

II. But our new minister, as I have said, ran into an extreme quite opposite to that of Carteret. the old. Our former minister thought policy. of nothing but negotiating when he ought to have thought of nothing but war; the present minister has thought of nothing but war, or at least its resemblance, when he ought to have thought of nothing but negotiation.

one power in Europe I say, sir, by any one power in Europe; for 1 defy our ministers to show that even the Queen of Hungary desired any such thing before it was resolved on. I believe some of her ministers were free enough to declare that the money those troops cost would have done her much more service; and I am sure we were so far from being called on by the Dutch to do so, that it was resolved on without their participation, and the measures carried into execution, I believe, expressly contrary to their advice.

A peace

pain of being entirely deserted by us
was offered both by the Emperor and the French,
upon the terms of uti possidetis, with respect to
Germany; but, for what reason I can not com-
prehend, we were so far from advising the Queen
of Hungary to accept, that I believe we advised
her to reject it.

This, sir, was a conduct in our ministers su very extraordinary, so directly opposite to the interest of this nation, and the security of the balance of power, that I can suggest to myself no one reason for it, but that they were resolved to put this nation to the expense of maintaining sixteen thousand Hanoverians. This I am afraid was the true motive with our new ministers for all the warlike measures they resolved on. Nothing would now satisfy us but a conquest of Alsace and Lorraine in order to give them to the Queen of Hungary, as an equivalent for what she had lost. And this we resolved on, or at least pretended to resolve on, at a time when France and Prussia were in close conjunction; at a time when no one of the powers of Europe could assist us; at a time when none of them entertained a jealousy of the ambitious designs of France; and at a time when most of the princes of Germany were so jealous of the power of the house of Austria, that we had great reason to apprehend that the most considerable of these would join against us, in case we should meet with any success.

This resolution, sir, was so far from having any influence on the King of Prussia, that he cor.tinued firm to his alliance with France, and fought the battle of Czaslau after he knew such a resolution was taken. If he had continued firm in the same sentiments, I am very sure our troops neither would nor could have been of the least service to the Queen of Hungary. But the battle of Czaslau fully convinced him that the French designed chiefly to play one German prince against another, in order to weaken both; and perhaps he had before this discovered, that, according to the French scheme, his share of Silesia was not to be so considerable as he expected. These considerations, and not the eloquence or address of any of our ministers, inclined him to come to an agreement with the Queen of Hungary. As she was now convinced that she could not depend upon our promises, she readily agreed to his terms, though his demands were now much more extravagant than they were at first; and, what is worse, they were now unaccompanied with any one promise or consideration, except that of a neutrality; whereas his first demands were made palatable by the tender of a large sum of money, and by the promise of his utmost assistance, not only in supporting the Pragmatic Sanction, but in rais-prove their conduct. ng her husband, the Duke of Lorraine, to the mperial throne. Nay, originally, he even ininuated that he would embrace the first opporunity to assist in procuring her house an equivlent for whatever part of Silesia she should resign to him.

This accommodation between the Queen of Hungary and the King of Prussia, and that which soon after followed between her and the Duke of Saxony, produced a very great alteration in the affairs of Europe. But, as these last powers promised nothing but a neutrality, and as the Dutch absolutely refused to join, either with the Queen of Hungary or with ourselves, in any of ensive measures against France, it was still impossible for us to think of restoring the house of Austria to such power as to render it a match for the power of France. We ought, therefore, still to have thought only of negotiation, in order to restore the peace of Germany by an accomodation between her and the Emperor. The distresses to which the Bavarian and French armies in Germany were driven furnished us with such an opportunity: this we ought by all means to have embraced, and to have insisted on the Queen of Hurgary's doing the same, under the

|

Sir, if our ministers were really serious in this scheme, it was one of the most romantic that ever entered the head of an English Quixote. But if they made it only a pretext for putting this nation to the expense of maintaining sixteen thousand Hanoverians, or of acquiring some new territory for the Electorate of Hanover, I am sure no British House of Commons can ap

It is absurd, sir, to say

that we could not advise the Queen of Hungary to accept of the terms offered by the Emperor and France, at a time when their troops were cooped up in the city of Prague, and when the terms were offered with a view only to get their troops at liberty, and to take the first opportu nity to attack her with more vigor. This, I say, is absurd, because, had she accepted the terms proposed, she might have had them guaranteed. by the Dutch, by the German body, and by all the powerful princes of Germany; which would have brought all these powers into a confederacy with us against the Emperor and France, if they had afterward attacked her in Germany; and all of them, but especially the Dutch, and the King of Prussia, would have been ready to join us, had the French attacked her in Flanders. It is equally absurd to say that she could not accept of these terms, because they contained nothing for the security of her dominions in Italy For suppose the war had continued in Italy, if the Queen of Hungary had been safe upon the side of Germany, she could have poured such a number of troops into Italy as would have been sufficient to oppose and defeat all the armies that both the French and Spaniards could send to and

« AnteriorContinuar »