maintain in that country; since we could, by our superior fleets, have made it impossible for the French and Spaniards to maintain great armies in that country.

No other reason can therefore be assigned for the Queen of Hungary's refusal of the terms proposed to her for restoring the tranquillity of Germany than this alone, that we had promised to assist her so effectually as to enable her to conquer a part of France, by way of equivalent for what she had lost in Germany and Italy. Such assistance it was neither our interest nor in our power to give, considering the circumstances of Europe. I am really surprised that the Queen of Hungary came to trust a second time to our promises; for I may venture to prophesy that she will find herself again deceived. We shall put ourselves to a vast unnecessary expense, as we did when she was first attacked by Prussia; and without being able to raise a jealousy in the other powers of Europe, we shall give France a pretense for conquering Flanders, which, otherwise, she would not have done. We may bring the Queen of Hungary a second time to the verge of destruction, and leave her there; for that we certainly shall do, as soon as Hanover comes to be a second time in danger From all which I must conclude, that our present scheme of politics is fundamentally wrong, and that the longer we continue to build upon sach a foundation, the more dangerous it will be for us. The whole fabric will involve this unfortunate nation in its ruins.

got the better of their discretion, as well as cf their military discipline. This made them at tack, instead of waiting to be attacked; and then by the bravery of the English foot, and the cow ardice of their own, they met with a severe repulse, which put their whole army into confusion, and obliged them to retire with precipita tion across the Mayn. Our army thus escaped the snare into which they had been led, and wa enabled to pursue its retreat to Hanau.

This, sir, was a signal advantage; but was t followed up? Did we press upon the enemy in their precipitate retreat across a great river, where many of them must have been lost had they been closely pursued? Did we endeavor to take the least advantage of the confusion into which their unexpected repulse had thrown them? No, sir; the ardor of the British troops was restrained by the cowardice of the Hanoverians; and, instead of pursuing the enemy, we ourselves ran away in the night with such haste that we left all our wounded to the mercy and care of the enemy, who had the honor of burying our dead as well as their own. This action may, therefore, on our side, be called a fortunate escape; I shall never give my consent to honor it with the name of victory.

After this escape, sir, our army was joined by a very large re-enforcement. Did this revive our courage, or urge us on to give battle? Not in the least, sir; though the French continued for some time upon the German side of the Rhine, we never offered to attack them, or to give them the least disturbance. At last, upon Prince Charles's approach with the Austrian army, the French not only repassed the Rhine, but retired quite out of Germany. And as the Austrian army and the allied army might then have joined, and might both have passed the Rhine without opposition at Mentz, or almost any where in the Palatinate, it was expected that both armies would have marched together into Lorraine, or in search of the French army, in order to force them to a battle. Instead of this, sir, Prince Charles marched up the German side of the Rhine-to do what? To pass that great river, in the sight of a French army equal in number to his own, which, without some extra. ordinary neglect in the French, was impracticable; and so it was found by experience. Thus the whole campaign upon that side was con sumed in often attempting what so often appeared to be impracticable.

III. But now, sir, let us see how we have Conduct of prosecuted this scheme, bad as it is, durthe war. ing the last campaign. As this nation must bear the chief part of the expense, it was certainly our business to prosecute the war with all possible vigor; to come to action as soon as possible, and to push every advantage to the utmost. Since we soon found that we could not attack the French upon the side of Flanders, why were our troops so long marching into Germany? Or, indeed, I should ask, why our armies were not first assembled in that country? Why did they continue so long inactive upon the Mayn? If our army was not numerous enough to attack the French, why were the Hessians left behind for some time in Flanders? Why did we not send over twenty thousand of those regular troops that were lying idle here at home? How to answer all those questions I can not tell; but it is certain we never thought of attacking the French army in our neighbor- On the other side-I mean that of the allied hood, and, I believe, expected very little to be army-was there any thing of consequence perattacked ourselves. Nay, I doubt much if any formed? I know of nothing, sir, but that of action would have happened during the whole sending a party of hussars into Lorraine with a campaign, if the French had not, by the miscon- manifesto. The army, indeed, passed the Rhine duct of some one or other of our generals, caught at Mentz, and marched up to the French lines our army in a hose-net, from which it could not upon the frontier of Alsace, but never offered to have escaped, had all the French generals ob- pass those lines until the French had abandoned served the direction of their commander-in-chief; them, I believe with a design to draw our army had they thought only of guarding and fortifying into some snare; for, upon the return of the themselves in the defile [Dettingen], and not of French toward those lines, we retired with much marching up to attack our troops. Thank God, greater haste than we had advance i, though the sir, the courage of some of the French generals | Dutch auxiliaries were then come up and pro

1743.

MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS.

.0

ended, at least, to be ready to join our army. | present happy establishment to consider what I have heard, however, that they found a pre- might be the consequence of the Pretender's text for never coming into the line; and I doubt landing among us at the head of a French army much if they would have marched with us to at- Would he not be looked upon by most men as a tack he French army in their own territories, savior? Would not the majority of the peopie or to invest any of the fortified places; for I must join with him, in order to rescue the nation from observe that the French lines upon the Queich those that had brought it into such confusion? were not all of them within the territories of This danger, sir, is, I hope, imaginary, but I am France. But suppose this Dutch detachment sure it is far from being so imaginary as that had been ready to march with us to attack the which has been held out in this debate, the danFrench in their own territories, or to invest some ger of all the powers of the continent of Europe of their fortified places, I can not join in any being brought under such a slavish dependence congratulation upon that event; for a small de- upon France as to join with her in conquering tachment of Dutch troops can never enable us this island, or in bringing it under the same to execute the vast scheme we have undertaken. slavish dependence with themselves. The whole force of that republic would not be sufficient for the purpose, because we should have the majority of the Empire against us; and, therefore, if the Dutch had joined totis viribus in our scheme, instead of congratulating, I should have bemoaned their running mad by our example and at our instigation.

IV. Having now briefly examined our past Prospects for conduct, from the few remarks I have the future. made, I believe, sir, it will appear that, supposing our scheme to be in itself possible and practicable, we have no reason to hope for success if it be not prosecuted with more vigor and with better conduct than it was during the last campaign. While we continue in the prosecution of this scheme, whoever may lose, the Hanoverians will be considerable gainers. They will draw four or five hundred thousand pounds yearly from this nation over and above what they have annually drawn, ever since they had the good fortune to be united under the same 30vereign with ourselves. But we ought to consider-even the Hanoverians ought to consider -that this nation is not now in a condition to earry on an expensive war for ten or twelve years, as it did in the reign of Queen Anne. We may fund it out for one, two, or three years; but the public debt is now so large that, if we go on adding millions to it every year, our credit will at last (sooner, I fear, than some among us may imagine) certainly be undone; and if this misfortune should occur, neither Hanover nor any other foreign state would be able to draw another shilling from the country. A stop to our public credit would put an end to our paper currency. A universal bankruptcy would ensue, and all the little ready money left among us would be locked up in iron chests, or hid in by-corners by the happy possessors. It would then be impossible to raise our taxes, and consequently impossible to maintain either fleets or armies. Our troops abroad would be obliged to enter into the service of any prince that could maintain them, and our troops at home would be obliged to live upon free quarter. But this they could not do long; for the farmer would neither sow nor reap if he found his produce taken from him by the starving soldier. In these circumstances, I must desire the real friends of our

With all their forces.

I had almost forgotten, sir (I wish future nations may forget), to mention the Treaty of Worms. I wish that treaty could be erased from our annals and our records, so as never to be mentioned hereafter: for that treaty, with its appendix, the convention that followed, is one of the most destructive, unjust, and absurd that was ever concluded. By that treaty we have taken upon ourselves a burden which I think it impossible for us to support; we have engaged in such an act of injustice toward Genoa as must alarm all Europe, and give to the French a most signal advantage. From this, sir, all the princes of Europe will see what regard we have to jus tice when we think that the power is on our side; most of them, therefore, will probably join with France in curtailing our power, or, at least, in preventing its increase.

fensive alliance, concluded on the 2d of September, 1743, between England, Austria, and Sardinia. By it the Queen of Hungary agreed to transfer to the King of Sardinia the city and part of the duchy of Placentia, the Vigevanesco, part of the duchy of Pa via, and the county of Anghiera, as well as her claims to the marquisate of Finale, which had been ceded to the Genoese by the late Emperor Charles VI. for the sum of 400,000 golden crowns, for which it had been previously mortgaged. The Queen o Hungary also engaged to maintain 30,000 men in Italy, to be commanded by the King of Sardinia. Great Britain agreed to pay the sum of £300,000 for the cession of Finale, and to furnish an annual subsidy of £200,000, on the condition that the King of Sardinia should employ 45,000 men. In addition tc supplying these sums, Great Britain agreed to send a strong squadron into the Mediterranean, to act in concert with the allied forces. By a separate and secret convention, agreed to at the same time and place as the treaty, but which was never ratified nor publicly avowed, it was stipulated that Great Britain should pay to the Queen of Hungary an annual subsidy of £300,000, not merely during the war, but so long "as the necessity of her affairs should require." The terms of the Treaty of Worms rela tive to the cession of the marquisate of Finale to since that territory had been guaranteed to them by Sardinia were particularly unjust to the Genoese, the fourth article of the Quadruple Alliance, con cluded on the 2d of August, 1718, between Great Britain, France, Austria, and Holland.--Coxe's Aus tria, chap. civ. Lord Mahon's Hist. of England, vol iii., p. 231. Belsham's Hist of England, vel. iv., p,

4 The Treaty of Worms was an offensive and de

82, et seq.

SPEECH

OF LORD CHATHAM ON AN ADDRESS TO THE THRONE, IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF TAXING AMERICA IS DISCUSSED, DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, JANUARY 14, 1766.

INTRODUCTION.

MR. GEORGE GRENVILLE, during his brief administration from 1763 to 1765, adopted a plan for replen ishing the exhausted treasury of Great Britain, which had been often proposed before, but rejected by every preceding minister. It was that of levying direct taxes on the American colonies. His famous Stamp Act was brought forward February 7th, 1765. It was strongly opposed by Colonel Barré, who thas indignantly replied to the charge of ingratitude, brought by Charles Townsend against the Ameri cans, as "children planted by our care, nourished by our indulgence, and protected by our arms," &c. "They planted by your care?" said Colonel Barré: "No! Your oppressions planted them in America They fled from your tyranny to a then uncultivated and inhospitable country, where they exposed thereselves to almost all the hardships to which human nature is liable; and, among others, to the cruelties of a savage foe, the most subtle, and, I will take it upon me to say, the most formidable of any people or earth; and yet, actuated by principles of true English liberty, they met all hardships with pleasure, com

pared with those they suffered in their native land from the hands of those who should have been their friends. They nourished by your indulgence? They grew by your neglect of them! As soon as you began to care about them, that care was exercised in sending persons to rule them, who were, per. haps, the depcties of deputies to some members of this House-sent to spy out their liberties, to misrepresent the actions, and to prey upon them-men promoted to the highest seats of justice; some of whom, to my knowledge, were glad, by going to a foreign country, to escape being brought to the bar of a court of justice in their own. They protected by your arms? They have nobly taken up arns in your defense; have exerted a valor, amid their constant and laborious industry, for the de fense of a country whose frontier was drenched in blood, while its interior yielded all its little savings to your emolument. And-believe me--remember I this day told you so-that same spirit of freedom which actuated that people at first, will accompany them still. But prudence forbids me to say more. God knows I do not, at this time, speak from motives of party heat. What I deliver are the genuine senti. ments of my heart. However superior to me in general knowledge and experience the respectable body of this House may be, I claim to know more of America than most of you, having seen and been conver sant with that country. The people are, I believe, as truly loyal as any subjects the King has; but a people jealous of their liberties, and who will vindicate them, if they should ever be violated." This prophetic warning was in vain. The bill was passed on the 22d of March, 1765.

A few months after, the ministry of Mr. Grenville came abruptly to an end, and was followed by the administration of Lord Rockingham. That able statesman was fully convinced that nothing but the repeal of the Stamp Act could restore tranquillity to the colonies, which, according to Colonel Barré's predictions, were in a state of almost open resistance. The news of this resistance reached England at the close of 1765, and Parliament was summoned on the 17th of December. The plan of the ministry was to repeal the Stamp Act; but, in accordance with the King's wishes, to re-assert (in doing so) the right of Par liament to tax the colonies. Against this course Mr. Pitt determined to take his stand; and when the ordinary address was made in answer to the King's speech, he entered at once on the subject of Ameri can taxation, in a strain of the boldest eloquence. His speech was reported by Sir Robert Dean, assisted by Lord Charlemont, and, though obvionsly broken and imperfect, gives us far more of the language actu ally used by Mr. Pitt than any of the preceding speeches.

SPEECH, &c.

MR. SPEAKER, I came to town but to-day. | own, I advised them to do it-but, notwithstandI was a stranger to the tenor of his Majesty's ing (for I love to be explicit), I can not give them speech, and the proposed address, till I heard my confidence. Pardon me, gentlemen [bowing them read in this House. Unconnected and un- to the ministry], confidence is a plant of slow consulted, I have not the means of information. growth in an aged bosom. Youth is the season I am fearful of offending through mistake, and of credulity. By comparing events with each therefore beg to be indulged with a second read-other, reasoning from effects to causes, methinks ing of the proposed address. [The address being I plainly discover the traces of an overruling in read, Mr. Pitt went on :] I commend the King's fluence.1 speech, and approve of the address in answer, as it decides nothing, every gentleman being left at perfect liberty to take such a part concerning America as he may afterward see fit. One word only I can not approve of: an "early," is a word that does not belong to the notice the ministry have given to Parliament of the troubles in America. In a matter of such importance, the communication ought to have been immediate!

I speak not now with respect to parties. I stand up in this place single and independent. As to the late ministry [turning himself to Mr. Grenville, who sat within one of him], every capital measure they have taken has been entirely wrong! As to the present gentlemen, to those at least whom I have in my eye [looking at the bench where General Conway sat with the lords of the treasury], I have no objection. I have never been made a sacrifice by any of them. Their characters are fair; and I am always glad when men of fair character engage in his Majesty's service. Some of them did me the honor to ask my opinion before they would engage. These will now do me the justice to

There is a clause in the Act of Settlement obliging every minister to sign his name to the advice which he gives to his sovereign. Would it were observed! I have had the honor to serve the Crown, and if I could have submitted to influence, I might have still continued to serve : but I would not be responsible for others. I have no local attachments. It is indifferent to me whether a man was rocked in his cradle on this side or that side of the Tweed. I sought for merit wherever it was to be found. It is my boast, that I was the first minister who looked for it, and found it, in the mountains of the North I called it forth, and drew into your service a hardy and intrepid race of men-men, who, when left by your jealousy, became a prey to the artifices of your enemies, and had gone nigh

1 Chas. Butler says in his Reminiscences, "Those who remember the air of condescending protection with which the bow was made and the look given will reculect how much they themselves, at the mo ment, were both delighted and awed; and what they themselves conceived of the immeasurable superi ority of the speaker over every other human being that surrounde' him"