4. If the British Force cannot arrive so as to be in Time for the Attack about to take place, would it not be well that its March fhould be arranged with a View to the Poffifibility of Misfortune?

5. There are two principal Routes into Spain, one along the Tagus direct to Madrid, the other from Almeida towards the North of Spain. I underftand that the firft Divifions of the English Army were to march, and probably have marched towards the Frontier of Spain, that is, to Almeida; I am not certain but that a Part of the Army may have moved towards that Point of the Frontier in the Direction of the Tagus?

6. In the Event of the Expulfion of the French, and of their not being able to return, it might perhaps be

4. It is always right in military Affairs to confider the Reverses of Fortune as poffible; confequently, it is highly proper that the English Army fhould fo regulate its Marches as to become a Point of Re-union for the Troops,if, as General Caftanos certainly does not expect, the Spanish Army fhould be defeated.

5. General Caftanos is of Opinion that the Englifh Army fhould direct its March through Cindad, Rodrigo, &c. to Burgos; and this Line of March will keep the Army in the Situation indicated in the preceding Article.

6. It is evident that if the Nation were entirely free from Alarm on the Part of the French, it would

be most convenient for the Sake of Subfiftence, that the Army should march in feparate Divifions by feparate Routes to any Point in the North of Spain that might hereafter be detcrmined. But would it not be wife to calculate upon the worst. First, to fuppose the Poffibility of the Main Army being beaten; and fecondly, or if not beaten and the French now expelled, that hereafter, that is, in the Course even of a fhort Time, the French may return with augmented Force, and oblige the Spaniards to retire. It would be right to confider how far this latter Suppofition may or may not be practicable? Note. In the Course of our Converfation, General Caftanos, in Refe. rence to the poffible Return of the French, faid that he did not confider it practicable, as in a very fhort Time the Snow would render the Western Pafs to Bay. onne nearly impaffable. He mentioned that the

would be convenient for the auxiliary Army, as well as Spain, that the March fhould be made in finall Divifions, and by different Routes; but as, unfortunately, this is not the Cafe, it is abfolutely neceffary that the English Army, at least from a certain Point (that is, when it approaches the Enemy), fhould march in large Di vifions and follow the fame Route, in order to enfure an eafy and ready Reunion, in cafe the Fortune of War fhould realize the Suppofition indicated in

General Lord W. Bentinck's Note.

Paffes in Catalonia were numerous and easy at all Seasons.

In either of these fuppofed Cafes, the Union of all the British Force at a Point from whence they may either fall upon the Flanks of the Enemy if he attempts to penetrate into Spain, or from whence it will become impoffible for French to enter Spain without firft difperfing the English Army, feems a most important Object.

the

7. It must be alfo obferved, that the moft important Part of the English Force (the Cavalry) is not arrived. It is of great Confequence that this Force fhould immediately come and be landed at that Spot nearest to England, and to the Theatre of Operations. This Point feems to be Corunna ?

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7. General Caftanos agrees with Lord W. Bentinck, that the moft proper Point of Debarkation for the Cavalry and Infantry expected from England, is Corunna, from whence, through good and well frequented Roads, the Junction with the main Body of the Army may be easily effected.

that the Junction of the Cavalry and Infantry with the British Army now here fhould be eafy and fecure. It feems that this Object would be effected by the March of the Army in the Direction of Burgos. According to the Pofition of the French, they might be more or lefs advanced. Their Left would be covered by Blake's Corps, and, united, they would be enabled, it is imagined, to make Head againft the Enemy. Under this Plan of Operations, it would feem not defirable that any Portion of the Army fhould march by Madrid, much less that any Part of it should be detached to Catalonia?

Debarkation. The present Pofitions of the Spanish Armies, and the proposed March of that of His Britannic Majefty, will completely effect this Object, as Things now fland; but in cafe of a Reverfe of Fortune hereafter, this interefling Object must never be loft Sight of, and the Direction of the March must be altered accordingly.

9. The first Thing to be done, according to the Opinion of General Caf tanos, is to fend Officers and Commiffaries to reconnoitre the Route of March which the English Army will follow from the Frontier of Portugal up to Burgos, and to examine into the Means of Sub

fiftence

of the Country, and its Capacity to fubfift the Army. This Officer fhould be detached immediately, and might be directed to proceed from thence to the Head Quarters of Sir Hew Dalrymple, for the Purpofe of giving the Information which may be required?

Note. As Sir H. Dalrymple might wish to have, without Lofs of Time, Information upon many Points, which can only be given by a Spanish Officer, I have propofed to General Caftanos that an intelligent Officer fhould be immediately fent to the British Head Quarters, and that other Officers fhall be fent under his Directions to examine the Road and afcertain the Means of Subfift

ence. Their Reports will be fent to Almeida, from whence they can be forwarded by General Anftruther, whom I will advife of this Arrangement.

fiftence which the Country affords. The Supreme Government has juft inftituted a Board of Military Subfiftence: from this Board will be iffued every neceffary Order to enfure to His Britannic Majefty's Forces every Thing of which they can ftand in Need on their March. One of the moft intelligent amongst the Officers employed to examine the Routes to be followed by the British Army, will be ordered to proceed to the Head Quarters of Sir Hew Dalrymple, to communicate to his Excellency every Information he may require.

10. Some