denounce the body's return to duft," with what, after the Bishop of Lincoln, we have really faid on that fubje&t at p. 601 of our 21ft volume; and as a reward for his trouble, he will find a new proof of our prefbyter's veracity ! ART. III. Naval and from 1727 to 1783. Military Memoirs of Great Britain, THIS is the fecond edition of the first three volumes of this work; the fourth, fifth, and fixth are now added. The first volume begins with the fickness and death of George I, in June, 1727, and ends with our naval and military transactions in 1756. The fecond commences with the proceedings of adminiftration in 1757, and ends with the maval and military operations of 1762, with fome observations on the peace between Great Britain, France, and Spain, figned at Fontainbleau the 3d of November that year. The third volume is an appendix to the firft and fecond, containing authentic official papers and documents, defcriptions of places, public letters, capitulations, naval and military returns, lines of battle, &c. &c. The fourth volume commences from the peace of Fontainbleau, and concludes with the naval and military tranfactions of this country in 1779. The fifth contains an account of our operations by fea and land, during 1780, 1781, &c. down to the formation of the Portland Adminiftration, the 2d of April, 1803, And the fixth volume is fuch an appendix to the fourth and fifth volumes as the third is to the first and second. The author contents himfelf with calling this work Naval and Military Memoirs, and declines giving it the name of history, both from diffidence, as he modeilly obferves, in his own abilities, to give it the high polifh and finishing which a wellwritten hiftory requires, and because it contains a more minute account of particular fervices than general hiftory admits, without comprifing that variety of different materials, of which hiftory ought to be compofed. His object is to furnifh the inhabitants of this country, with an authentic and circumfiantial detail of her naval tranfactions from 1727 to 1783 inclufive, during which period, as well as every other of our hiftory, they have been intimately connected with her commercial and political interefts. He could not however with propriety have called this work the hiftory, even of the naval and military tranfactions of Great Britain during that 3 period, period, fince the military operations defcribed and recorded in these volumes are only fuch as have fome relation to maritime affairs, or to the naval fervices, which form the primary and principal object of his narrative. But as many of our naval expeditions have been connected with land fervice, he has conceived that great advantages might refult from a faithful defcription and accurate examination of fuch combined operations, and has therefore been minutę in detailing them. Dr. Beatfon has deemed it effential to the plan of his performance to be full and complete in his defcription of naval tranfactions, by giving a particular and circumftantial account not only of the operations of fleets and fquadrons, but alfo of the actions fought by fingle fhips, and of every inftance of individual meritorious naval fervice, conceiving that in defcribing all thefe with minutenefs, he would afford not only benefit but fatisfaction to his country. He has purpofely, and we think very judiciously, avoided incumbering his narrative with defcriptions of places, with public letters, capitulations, naval and military returns, lines of battle, &c. &c. and has thrown all thefe, carefully collected, and chronologically arrranged for the information of his readers, into the third and fixth volumes by themselves. Such in general is the plan and arrangement of his work; and he feems to have executed it not only with fidelity and a regard to truth, which ought to be the paramount confideration in all narratives, but al o with ability and judgment. We will now lay before our readers a few fpecimens of Dr. Beatfon's correct and unaffected manner of defcribing naval engagements. The firft is that between Admiral Hawke and the French, on the 14th of October 1747. "Information having been received, that the enemy were col. lecting a great number of merchant-fhips in Bafque road, near Rochelle, for the Weft Indies; and that a ftrong fquadron of fhips of war had failed from Breft to escort them to their different defti. nations, it was refolved, if poffible, to intercept them. For this purpofe, Rear Admiral Hawke was difpatched with fourteen fail of the line, and fome frigates. He failed from Plymouth on the 9th of Auguft. The French fleet failed from the Ifle of Aix on the 6th of October. On the 14th, at feven in the morning, in latitude 47. 49 N. and longitude 1, 2 W, off Cape Finifterre, they fell in with the British fquadron, when the Edinburgh made the fignal for feeing feven fail in the fouth-eaft quarter; upon which Rear Admiral Hawke immediately made the fignal for the whole 1 fleet to chafe. About eight, he saw a number of the enemy's fhips, but fo crowded together, that it was impoffible to count them. A great number of them however, appearing to be large, at ten he made the fignal for forming a line of battle a head. The French Commodore, when he got fight of the British fquadron in chafe with all their fails fet, at firft miftook them for fome of his convoy, who had separated from him in the night; but no fooner did he discover his error, than he made the fignal for the merchantfhips to make the beft of their way. He did not leave them wholly unprotected, as he fent the Content of fixty-four guns, be longing to the Eaft India Company, and feveral large frigates, along with them. He next directed his attention to the line of battle fhips, to whom he made the fignal to form a line of battle ahead: the Intrepide, Trident, and Terrible compofing the van; the Tonant and Monarch the centre; and the Severn, Fougueux, and Neptune the rear. M. de Letendeur faw that it was of the utmost importance that his fleet should form the line immediately; but, regarding the fafety of his convoy as his principal concern, he was under the neceffity of leaving large fpaces for the merchant fhips to pafs through; fo that a confiderable time elapsed, before the fhips of war could clofe the line, agreeable to order. In the mean time, Rear Admiral Hawke with his fleet approached the enemy very faft; and finding that M. de Letendeur's defign was to favour the efcape of his convoy, he hauled down the fignal for the line of battle, and made the fignal for a general chafe. In half an hour afterwards, judging the headmoft fhips had got within a proper diftance of the enemy, he made the fignal to engage, which was inftantly complied with by the Lion and Princefs Louifa, the two headmoft fhips, who began the action about a quarter before twelve, paffing through a terrible fire, from the rear to the van of the French fleet, who had the weather-gage, and were well prepared to receive the Britifh fhips. The Tilbury, Eagle, Windfor, Monmouth, Yarmouth, and Edinburgh, prefently feconded the two firft fhips with the greateft bravery. Rear Admiral Hawke received feveral flot before he could get near enough to engage the Severn, which he foon filenced; leaving that vellel to be picked up by the frigates aftern. The Admiral at this time perceiving the Eagle and Edinburgh to be fomewhat difabled by the Tonant, kept as near the wind as poffible, in order to affift them; but in this defign he was fruftrated, by the Eagle's falling twice on board of the Devonshire, having had her wheel fhot to pieces, all the men at it killed, and all her braces and bowlings gone. This unfortunately forced the Rear Admiral to leeward, and prevented his attacking either the Monarch or Tonant, within a proper diftance to do any execution. He however attempted both, efpecially the latter; but while he was engaged with her, the breechings of all the lower deck guns of the Devonshire broke, and the guns flew fore and aft, which obliged her to fhoot ahead, becaufe because her upper and quarter deck guns could not reach the Tonant. Captain Harland in the Tilbury, obferving that the Tonant fired fingle guns at the Devonshire, with a view to difmaft her, tacked and flood in between her and the Devonshire, pouring into the Tonant a very fmart fire. By this time the new breechings. were all feized on board the Devonshire, and the Rear Admiral got again into action, by attacking the Trident very closely, whom he foon filenced. At this time, obferving the Kent a little aftern of the Tonant, who had loft her main-top-maft, he threw out a fignal to Captain Fox to make fail ahead, and engage her; but unluckily this fignal was mifunderstood; and the fervice was not performed. The Admiral perceiving fome of his fquadron not fo clofely engaged as he could have wifhed, made the fignal for coming to a clofe engagement; and foon after the Devonshire got very near the Terrible, who was forced to furrender about feven o'clock in the evening; the Trident having ftruck a little before. All the Captains who had the good fortune to bring their ships into the action, behaved with great intrepidity, particularly Captain Saunders in the Yarmouth, who lay two hours clofe along fide the Neptune, whom he forced to ftrike about four o'clock, all' her mafts being shot away, her Captain and one hundred men killed, and one hundred and forty wounded. About five o'clock the Monarch, the Fougueux, and Severn furrendered. "The Count de Vaudreuil, commander of the Intrepide, behaved with great fpirit and conduct in the heat of the battle. Perceiv ing how defperately his Admiral in the Tonant was befet, he tack. ed and went to his affiftance, paffing through the midst of the British fhips, and receiving a dreadful fire. Having got close to the ftern of the Tonant, he warmly engaged the fhips that were attacking her. Finding that fix of their fhips had been obliged to fubmit, and night coming on, their only chance of not fharing the fame fate, was to fet all the fail they could, and en. deavour to escape. This was not unperceived by Captain Saunders of the Yarmouth; who, enraged at feeing the French Admiral, with the Intrepide, getting away, propofed to Captain Saumarez of the Nottingham, and Captain Rodney of the Eagle, who were within hail, to follow him. "Nothing could be more agrecable to thefe two gallant offi.** rers; and the meafure was no fooner propofed, than immediately put in execution. They came up with the flying Frenchmen, and the three British fhips engaged them near an hour: but Captain Saumarez being unfortunately killed by a fhot from the Tonant, the Nottingham hauled her wind, which gave the enemy an opportunity of cfcaping. They altered their courfe in the night; and, the next day, the Intrepide was obliged to take the Tonant in tow. Afraid to fleer towards Breft, left they should be purfued and overtaken, they took a N. W. courfe, until they got about one hundred leagues weft off Ufhant, a track not much fre quented quented, where they lay-to and repaired their damages, which were very confiderable, in the beft manner they were able, and then pro... ceeded to Breft. M. de Letendeur was much wounded in the battle; and his Captain, M. du Chaffaut, (of whom we shall have occafion to speak again) was wounded in the face. Both fhips were much damaged, and had a great many men killed and wounded." Page 365, Vol. I. The fecond which we fhall felect is the action between Vice Admiral Pocock, in the Eaft Indies, and Count D'Aché, on the 3d of August, 1758. "At ten o'clock in the forenoon of the 1st of Auguft, the Admiral once more obtained fight of the French fquadron, as they were getting under fail off Tranquebar. They foon after formed a line of battle ahead, with their starboard tacks on board, and feemed to edge down towards him: but when he made fail and ftood for them, they hauled upon a wind till one o'clock, when they formed a line of battle abreast, and bore down upon him with an eafy fail. At half paft one, he made the fignal for his fquadron to form a line of battle ahead with the ftarboard tacks on board; and ftood to the eastward, under top-fails, fometimes the main-topfails fquare, as the fhips ftations in the line required, waiting for the enemy. At five, the enemy's van was abreast of our centre, and at about two miles diftance. They ftood on till their van was abreast of the British van; and kept about the fame distance, till half an hour past fix, when they hoifted their top-fails, fet their courfes, and food to the fouth-east. Admiral Pocock then made the fignal for his van to fill and ftand on, and make fail to the fouthward, keeping in a line till twelve o'clock: when judging by the enemy's fignal guns that they had tacked, he made the fignal to near, and flood on to the weftward after them; but at day, Jight they were not to be feen. In the evening of the 2d, he defcried four fhips in fhore to the north-weft; and, on the 3d, at five in the morning, got fight of the enemy's fleet off Negapatnam, about a league to the windward, formed in a line of battle ahead, with their ftarboard-tacks on board; on which he also formed a line of battle ahead with the ftarboard-tacks on board, and stood towards them. Fearing that the enemy's fhip which led their van*, would be an over-match for the Tyger, which led his van, he made the fignal for the Elizabeth to change places with the Tyger. At eleven, the wind dying away, the British fleet were left quite becalmed; while the enemy were fo fortunate as to be favoured with a light breeze from the land, with which they flood on, their line extending from caft to weft, and paffed fo near the rear of the British line at right angles, that they might eafily have cut off the Cumberland and Newcastle, the fternmost fhips, as they could not have received any affiftance from the others, who lay becalmed with their fterns towards the enemy. They did not • The Comte de Provence, of 74 guns. avail |