"Questo breve Poema altrui propone In lungo fcritto altrui fi può far fraude; O fe per tutto egual non fi diftende, E che mal fi foftiene, e mal fi regge Lafcia a color che a tanto il ciel deftina Via più la mano, e più l'ingegno affina." P. 95. Subjoined to this Poem, though not mentioned in the title, is a letter from the editor to a friend, on the merit of a Canzone, or Ode of Da Ponte, upon the death of the Emperor Jofeph II. and the acceffion of Leopold II. The Ode itself is added, and juftifies the praifes of Mr. Mathias. Every reader may not perhaps know, that Da Ponte, the author thus praifed, was long fettled in London, and wrote frequently for our Opera. The neceflity of the times forced him into trade, and he kept for feveral years a fhop, ftored with all the best Italian books. We are forry to add, that, within these twelve months, the books were obliged to be fold off by auction, and the bufinefs given up, for want of fufficient patronage in England to fupport a fhop exclufively for Italian literature. All the efforts of Mr. Mathias could not refcue us from this public difgrace. 5. The next article is the Dithyrambic of Redi; with a life of the author, a Differtation on Dithyrambic Poetry *, By Teobaldo Ceva. and and other illuftrations. The Italians are the only moderns, who have attempted to revive the Grecian Dithyrambic ftyle, as characterized by Horace in fpeaking of Pindar: Seu per audaces nova dithyrambos Verba devolvit, numerifque fertur Lege folutis. But the licences allowed to this fpecies of Poetry, in the application of old words, and the fabrication of new, are fo extenfive, that to understand it becomes a feparate study; and Redi would be altogether unintelligible, even to good Italian scholars, without the explanations which fill his margin. The author of the Differtation says, "Più che al femplice lirico è lecito al Ditirambico l'ufare metafore ardite, iperboli forti, frafi nuove, voci compofte, e tratte eziandio con gentilezza da foreftiere contrade. Il Redi è fingolare in tutte quefte cofe: chiama egli il vino topazio, crifolito, fangue del uve, ambra liquida che infernifoca: adopera con galanteria le voci Francefi courier, doré." &c. P. xli. Such a fpecimen of Poetry is, in this country at leaft, a literary curiofity, and if English readers fhould not relish it as much as the editor appears to do, they will at all events have an obligation to him for enabling them to become acquainted with it. Redi was born in 1626, and died in 1697. 4. On the fourth of these publications we fhall fay the lefs at prefent, because we shall very foon have occafion to notice Mr. Boyd's tranflation of the Poem it contains; at which time it will be moft convenient to speak alfo of the original. This book is addreffed, in a very elegant dedication, to the Attorney General. With the well-deferved character which Mr. Mathias gives of this valuable friend we fhall close the prefent article. "A voi, in cui si vagamente rifplendono l'urbanità, la coltura, la ricerca del vero, l'amor e il patrocinio della bella letteratura, un' eloquenza dotta e poffente, un giudizio corretto, ed una leggiadriffima vivacità d'ingegno, con ottimi ed ornati coftumi, non è fpiaciuta questa mia intenzione e zelo verfo le amene lettere." P. vi. He then particularly recommends the poem itself to the notice of his friend, and concludes with a pleafing commemoration of their early connection at Cambridge. Such intercourse forms one of the moft ftriking charms of litera ture. ART. ART. XIV. Obfervations on the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, concerning the Relation of Caufe and Effect. 8vo. 46 pp. 1s. Mundell and Sons, Edinburgh. Longman, Hurft, &c. London. THIS is another publication on a most important subject to which the late appointment of a profeffor of mathematics in the Univerfity of Edinburgh has given rife*; and we are told that, like Mr. Profeffor Stewart's pamphlet, it was the work of a few days. It bears indeed the marks of hafte in its compofition; for, though the anonymous author is evidently an acute man, and though we have the honour to agree with him in most of the great conclufions which he labours to establish, yet there are fome of his incidental obfervations which we cannot admit, and fome expreffed in language that we do not perfectly understand. What is unintelligible to us, we may, without much arrogance, fuppofe to have been unintelligible to fome of those reverend gentlemen, for whofe inftruction the obfervations were publifhed. It is therefore not impoflible that the author may have bewildered minds which he wished to enlighten: while he has paffed over, with very little notice, the only pofition advanced by Mr. Hume on the fubject of caufe and effect, which, as it appears to us, the General Affembly of the Church of Scotland could be called upon to cenfure. Having juftly obferved that the series of propofitions on which Mr. Hume builds his theory, is inceffantly broken by a repetition of the fame "fceptical doubts;" and having hence inferred the expediency of arranging the theory into feparate propofitions, and confidering thele in a regular order; he flates, as the firft propofition of Mr. Hume's theory, "That the relation of caufe and effect cannot be discovered, a priori. In every cafe, the fecond phænomenon muft have been previously witneffed: for there is nothing in the firft appearance of any object, which can lead us to predict the appearance of a particular object, rather than of any other, as immediately fucceffive." This propofition is incontrovertible; nor are we aware that it was ever controverted, at leaft fince the employment of Bacon's novum organum in philofophical research. It is * See British Critic for July laft, p. 33. certainly certainly no part of any theory peculiar to Mr. Hume; fince it is obvious, that previous to all experience, it would be just as probable to man, that heat would harden wax and foften clay, as that it would harden clay and foften wax: for previous to all experience, no man could form fo much as a rational conjecture that it would produce either of these effects. This propofition, however, the prefent author thinks it incumbent upon him to illuftrate, if not to fupport; but in the course of the illuftration, he confounds defire and volition, and affirms what we apprehend no unfophifticated understanding will admit. "It has been afferted, that from mind alone we derive our idea of power; and that the idea, acquired by the consciousness of our own exertion, is transferred to the apparent changes of external matter. But, unless we fuppofe the idea of power to have been otherwife acquired, what we call exertion is nothing more than the fequence of motion to defire, as magnetifm is the fequence of iron to the approach of a loadstone." P. 5. If what we feel be transferred, it is evidently defire which we feel. Till the mufcular motion has taken place, it is defire alone; it is afterwards defire, combined with the knowledge that a mufcular motion has been its confequence. It is, perhaps, even too much authority which Mr. Hume gives to this error, when he allows, that the animal nifus, which we experience, enters very much into the vulgar idea of power. It is more probable, that the feeling of this animal nifus, though derived from cafes in which the exertion has eventually fucceeded, enters largely into the vulgar idea of restraint or want of power." P. 6. "The idea of power, we may therefore conclude, is not derived from the phænomena of mind, more than from those of matter, both which furnish traits of fequences, that differ only as their own refpective fequences differ among themfelves. The very feeling of power, as of connection, would be itself only a new part of a fequence. Pp. 8, 9. To thefe pofitions we cannot affent, though it may be difficult to confute them; because truths felf-evident admit not of proof. That our notion of power is fomething very dif tinct from our notion of connection, we know by the most convincing of all evidence, the evidence of confcioufnefs; but if this author chooses to perfift in affirming that his notion of power is not diftin&t from his notion of connection, we can make no other reply to him than we should to the man who might affirm that he did not believe any one of Euclid's axioms. By whatever procefs we first acquire the notion of power-whether from the phænomena of mind or of matter -we are perfuaded that the unlettered man of a found un 7 derflanding derstanding would ftare at us, were we gravely to affure him that the power of a horse confifts in his connection with the plough, which he drags through the foil; and that the horse when unyoked from the plough, and driven into the stable, is completely divefted of all power! The notion of power is fo familiar to every man, that in common language it is never confounded with fequence or connection, or indeed with any thing else. Thus, fuppofe a plough in motion to be fuddenly flopt by a large ftone, a phænomenon which has often occurred; fuppofe the horses or oxen to be exerting all their power in vain, during the time that the ploughmen are endea vouring to remove the ftone; and fuppofe the ftone removed and the plough to proceed; whether is the removal. of the ftone, or the exertion of the horfes, the efficient or powerful caufe of the renewed motion? That motion is evidently connected with the removal of the ftone, as well as with the exertion of the horfes; it is likewife a fequence to the one event as well as to the other; and yet there is probably no man except this anonymous author (if indeed! he be an exception) who would hefitate to fay that its efficient caufe, or the power by which it is produced, is the exertion of the horses, and not the removal of the ftone. Power therefore is neither fequence nor connection; nor could we ever have acquired the notion of power from the mere observation of fequence, were we not confcious of our own voluntary exertions. When the author calls "exertion the fequence of motion to defire," and affirms that "till the muscular motion has taken place, it is defire alone' that we feel," he talks a language which we do not understand. Defire, in the proper fenfe of the word, is the wish which every man feels to obtain any thing of which the want occa fions uneafinefs in his mind; but this is furely not the feeling which pervades and accompanies every exertion. No man makes a voluntary exertion to obtain what he is convinced can be obtained by no exertion of his own; but he cannot avoid feeling on many occafions defires, which he is fully aware he cannot gratify. Volition is the feeling which accompanies exertion, and, to fpeak more correctly, volition is the only mental exertion of which we are ever conscious; but volition is not defire, nor is it always preceded by defire. A man of fedentary and ftudious habits often walks out into the open air, for the benefit of his health, with great reluctance; and when he does fo he exerts volitions contrary to his defires, and even to his habits grafted on those defires. The king, we are perfuaded, has X BRIT. CRIT. VOL. XXVI. SEPT, 1805. often |