first duty is to his own home, but he is not thereby excused from doing his duty to the state; for if he fails in this second duty it is under the penalty of ceasing to be a freeman. In the same way, while a nation's first duty is within its own borders, it is not thereby absolved from facing its duties in the world as a whole; and if it refuses to do so, it merely forfeits its rights to struggle for a place among the peoples that shape the destiny of mankind.

I have scant patience with those who fear to undertake the task of governing the Philippines, and who openly avow that they do fear to undertake it, or that they shrink from it because of the expense and trouble; but I have even scanter patience with those who make a pretense of humanitarianism to hide and cover their timidity, and who cant about "liberty" and "the consent of the governed," in order to excuse themselves for the unwillingness to play the part of men. Their doctrines, if carried out, would make it incumbent upon us to leave the Apaches of Arizona to work out their own salvation and to decline to interfere in a single Indian reservation. Their doctrines condemn your forefathers and mine for ever having settled in these United States.

When once we have put down armed resistance, when once our rule is acknowledged, then an even more difficult task will begin, for then we must see to it that the islands are administered with absolute honesty and with good judgment. If we let the public service of the islands be turned into the prey of the spoils politician we shall have begun to tread the path which Spain trod to her own destruction. We must send out there only good and able men, chosen for their fitness, and not because of their partisan service; and these men must not only administer impartial justice to the natives and serve their own government with honesty and fidelity, but they must also show the utmost tact and firmness, remembering that

with such people as those with whom we are to deal weakness is the greatest of crimes, and that next to weakness comes lack of consideration for their principles and prejudices.

I preach to you, then, my countrymen, that our country calls not for the life of ease, but for the life of strenuous endeavor. The twentieth century looms before us big with the fate of many nations. If we stand idly by, if we seek merely swollen, slothful ease, and ignoble peace,2 if we shrink from the hard contests where men must win at hazard of their lives and at the risk of all they hold dear, then the bolder and the stronger peoples will pass us by and will win for themselves the domination of the world. Let us therefore boldly face the life of strife, resolute to do our duty well and manfully; resolute to uphold righteousness by deed and by word; resolute to be both honest and grave to serve high ideals, yet to use practical methods. Above all, let us shrink from no strife, moral or physical, within or without the nation, provided that we are certain that the strife is justified; for it is only through strife, through hard and dangerous endeavor, that we shall ultimately win the goal of true national greatness.

Is "happy is the nation that has no history" true from the point of view of modern historical method?

Compare the great issues of which Roosevelt spoke in 1899 with those that confronted Wilson in 1916.

What do you think of Roosevelt's practical politics as reflected in his reference to the roll-calls of Congress?

In what respects is peace for man or nation not an end in itself?

Nietzsche said "live dangerously." Looking at the matter from a broad point of view, which do you think is the better habit, peace or strife?

In what respects did Roosevelt by means of this speech attempt to alter the military policy of the United States?

Did Roosevelt recommend this change in military polity

through nervousness, a belligerent disposition, an intimate knowledge of public affairs, or vision?

Does this speech in your opinion preserve a proper balance between physical power and moral duty?

How did the Spanish War affect the foreign policy of the United States?

Was the new policy more democratic or less democratic than the old?

In what senses did the United States at the end of Spanish War become a world power?

Was Washington's advice against entangling alliances bad, was it outworn, or had it been misinterpreted?

Is Roosevelt truly democratic when he denies the right of self-government to Apaches and savage Philippinos?

Does Roosevelt in this speech recognize, in the words of Lincoln, a new birth of freedom"?

Is Roosevelt in this speech urging America to work for selfish ends, or is he advocating national altruism?

THE CALL TO ARMS

September 5, 1914

THE twenty-eighth of June, 1914, will probably be taken by historians as the beginning of the Great War. As a matter of fact the war was the inevitable outgrowth of a very insidious development that can be traced as far back as the downfall of Napoleon and the resulting diplomatic agreements of the Congress of Vienna.

As a consequence of secret conventions made at this conference, liberty and democracy found thereafter their haven in the freedom-loving lands of England and France, while autocracy and absolutism were nourished in Germany, Austria, and Russia. France developed a republican form of government, and her people like the people of England decided for themselves how they were to be ruled. In Germany, on the other hand, a Prussian military clique, under the leadership of the Kaiser, seized the reins of state and drove the people into a highly organized system of autocratic control.

The constitution of Germany, in contrast with that of the United States, was made by hereditary rulers and never was approved by vote of the people. Not even the Kaiser was accountable directly to his subjects, for he maintained that he ruled by Divine Right. The chief legislative body of the Empire was the Bundesrath, the members of which were appointed by the rulers of the various German states. As the Kaiser had twenty votes in this council of sixty-one

members, he was able both to control legislation and, with the use of but fourteen of his votes, to block changes in the constitution. The Reichstag, the popular assembly, was given very little political power and was utterly unable to secure for Germany democratic government. Constitutional or other radical reform could come only through revolution.

When in 1871 at the time of the Franco-Prussian war, the German army in eight months overran France and secured an indemnity of $1,000,000,000, and the two invaluable provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, the German rulers became war-mad and lost their desire to win greatness slowly through the arts of peace. They planned to found a great empire by means of the sword. Year after year they drilled, increased, and perfected their army until it became the most formidable in Europe. In 1900 they began to construct a powerful navy. So the power of the military authorities grew until it might be said that Germany was not a country that possessed an army; it was an army that possessed a country.

In a shameless way, moreover, the German people furthered the plan of their rulers for conquest and dominion. They submitted blindly to arbitrary authority. They planned to build in time a railway which was to extend from Berlin to Bagdad and was to be the artery of a greater German Empire that would in time add to Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey, and Persia, and India.

In 1914 the Kiel naval canal connecting the North Sea and the Baltic was completed. The Great Army bill of 1913 had brought the army to an unprecedented size, and it had been drilled until it was fit. All was ready. But little Servia was in the way. The Bagdad railway passed through her territories and she placed