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ours ; not only during the war, but even for more || So far as to our trade. With regard to our than a year after the peace. The author, I hope, navigation, he is still more uneasy at our situation, will not again venture upon so rash and discourag- and still more fallacious in his state of it. In his ing a proposition concerning the nature and effect text, he affirms it“ to have been entirely engrossed of those conquests, as to call them a convenience “ by the neutral nations.” | This he asserts roundly to the remittances of France; he sees, by this and boldly, and without the least concern; alaccount, that what he asserts is not only without though it cost no more than a single glance of the foundation, but even impossible to be true. eye upon his own margin to see the full refutation

As to our trade at that time, he labours with all of this assertion. His own account proves against his might to represent it as absolutely ruined, or him, that, in the year 1761, the British shipping on the very edge of ruin. Indeed, as usual with amounted to 527,557 tons—the foreign to no him, he is often as equivocal in his expression, as more than 180,102. The medium of his six

years he is clear in his design. Sometimes he more than British, 2,449,555 tons—foreign only 905,690. insinuates a decay of our commerce in that war ; This state (his own) demonstrates that the neutral sometimes he admits an encrease of exports; but nations did not entirely engross our navigation. it is in order to depreciate the advantages we might I am willing from a strain of candour to admit appear to derive from that encrease, whenever it that this author speaks at random; that he is only should come to be proved against him. He tells slovenly and inaccurate, and not fallacious. In you,* “ that it was chiefly occasioned by the de- matters of account, however, this want of care is « mands of our own fleets and armies, and, in- not excusable : and the difference between neu“ stead of bringing wealth to the nation, was to tral nations entirely engrossing our navigation, “ be paid for by oppressive taxes upon the people of and being only subsidiary to a vastly augmented “ England.” Never was any thing more destitute trade, makes a most material difference to his of foundation. It might be proved, with the great argument. From that principle of fairness, though est ease, from the nature and quality of the goods the author speaks otherwise, I am willing to supexported, as well as from the situation of the places pose he means no more than that our navigation to which our merchandize was sent, and which the had so declined as to alarm

is with the prowar could no wise affect, that the supply of our bable loss of this valuable object. I shall howfleets and armies could not have been the cause of ever shew, that his whole proposition, whatever this wonderful encrease of trade : its cause was modifications he may please to give it, is without evident to the whole world; the ruin of the trade foundation ; that our navigation had not decreasof France, and our possession of her colonies. ed; that, on the contrary, it had greatly encreased What wonderful effects this cause produced the in the war; that it had encreased by the war; reader will see below;t and he will form on that and that it was probable the same cause would account some judgment of the author's candour continue to augment it to a still greater height; cr information

to what an height it is hard to say, had our sucAdmit however that a great part of our export, cess continued. though nothing is more remote from fact, was But first I must observe, I am much less soliowing to the supply of our fleets and armies; was citous whether his fact be true or no, than whether it not something? - was it not peculiarly fortunate his principle be well established. Cases are dead for a nation, that she was able from her own things, principles are living and productive. I bosom to contribute largely to the supply of her affirm then, that, if in time of war our trade had armies militating in so many distant countries? the good fortune to encrease, and at the same The author allows that France did not enjoy the time a large, nay the largest, proportion of carsame advantages. But it is remarkable, through-riage had been engrossed by neutral nations, it out his whole book, that those circumstances ought not in itself to have been considered as a which have ever been considered as great benefits, circumstance of distress. War is a time of inconand decisive proofs of national superiority, are, venience to trade; in general it must be straitenwhen in our hands, taken either in diminution of ed, and must find its way as it can. It is often some other apparent advantage, or even sometimes happy for nations that they are able to call in neuas positive misfortunes. The opticks of that tral navigation. They all aim at it.

They all aim at it. France enpolitician must be of a strange conformation, who deavoured at it, but could not compass it. Will beholds every thing in this distorted shape. this author say, that, in a war with Spain, such # P. 6.

£. 8. d. + 1754. Total exports of all kinds,

14,558, 288 199 Total export of British goods, value, 8,317,506 15 3 Total imports,

9,291,915 16 Ditto of foreign goods in time,

2,910,836 14 9 Ditto of ditto out of time, 559,485 2 10 Balance in favour of England

8. 5,23,373 18 3 Total exports of all kinds,

Here is the state of our trade in 1761, compared with a very good Total imports,

year of profound peace: both are taken from the authentick en

tries at the custom-house. How the author can contrive to make Balance in favour of England,

£. 3,691,355 17 10 this encrease of the export of English produce agree with his

account of the dreadful want of hands in England, p. 9, unless he 1761.

supposes manufactures to be made without hands, I really do not Total export of British goods,

see. It is painful to be so frequently obliged to set this author Ditto of foreign goods in time,

right in matters of fact. This state will fully refute all that he Ditto of ditto out of time,

has said or insinuated upon the difficulties and decay of our

trade, p. 6, 7, and 9. 14,558,288 199 I P. 7. See also p. 13.

8. d.

11.787,829 12 10
8,093,472 15 0

£. 8. d.
10.619,581 1? 6
3,573,692 7 1

327,015 0 2

Carried up



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an assistance would not be of absolute nécessity ? I have done fairly, and even very moderately, that it would not be the most gross of all follies to in taking this year, and not his average, as the refuse it?

standard of what might be expected in future, had In the next place, his method of stating a me- the war continued. The author will be compelled dium of six years war,

and six

years peace, to allow it, unless he undertakes to shew, first, to decide this question, is altogether unfair. To that the possession of Canada, Martinico, Guadasay, in derogation of the advantages of a war, loupe, Grenada, the Havannah, the Philippines, that navigation was not equal to what it was in time the whole African trade, the whole East India of peace, is what hitherto has never been heard of trade, and the whole Newfoundland fishery, had No war ever bore that test but the war which he

no certain inevitable tendency to encrease the so bitterly laments. One may lay it down as a British shipping; unless, in the second place, he maxim, that an average estimate of an object in a can prove that those trades were, or might be, by steady course of rising or of falling, must in its law or indulgence, carried on in foreign vessels; nature be an unfair one; more particularly if the and unless, thirdly, he can demonstrate that the cause of the rise or fall be visible, and its continu- premium of insurance on British ships was rising ance in any degree probable. Average estimates as the war continued. He can prove not one of are never just but when the object fluctuates, and these points. I will shew him a fact more that is no reason can be assigned why it should not con- mortal to his assertions. It is the state of our tinue still to fluctuate. The author chooses to allow shipping in 1762. The author had his reasons for nothing at all for this : he has taken an average of stopping short at the preceding year. It would six years of the war. He knew, for every body have appeared, had he proceeded farther, that our knows, that the first three years were on the whole tonnage was in a course of uniform augmentation, rather unsuccessful; and that, in consequence of owing to the freight derived from our foreign this ill success, trade sunk, and navigation declined conquests, and to the perfect security of our naviwith it; but that grand delusion of the three last gation from our clear and decided superiority at years turned the scale in our favour. At the be- sea. This, I say, would have appeared from the ginning of that war (as in the commencement of state of the two years : every war) traders were struck with a sort of panick. Many went out of the freighting business. 1761. British,

527,557 tons. But by degrees, as the war continued, the terrour 1762. Ditto,

559,537 tons. wore off; the danger came to be better appreciated, 1761. Foreign,

180,102 tons. and better provided against; our trade was car- 1762. Ditto,

129,502 tons. ried on in large fleets, under regular convoys, and with great safety. The freighting business revived. The two last years of the peace were in no degree The ships were fewer, but much larger; and equal to these. Much of the navigation of 1763 though the number decreased, the tonnage was was also owing to the war; this is manifest from vastly augmented; insomuch that in 1761 the the large part of it employed in the carriage from British shipping had risen by the author's own the ceded islands, with which the communication account 527,557 tons.- In the last year he has still continued open. No such circumstances of given us of the peace, it amounted to no more glory and advantage ever attended upon a war. than 494,772; that is, in the last year of the war Too happy will be our lot, if we should again be it was 32,785 tons more than in the correspondent forced into a war, to behold any thing that shall year of his peace average. No year of the peace resemble them; and if we were not then the better exceeded it except one, and that but little. for them, it is not in the ordinary course of God's

The fair account of the matter is this. Our providence to mend our condition. trade had, as we have just seen, encreased to so In vain does the author declaim on the high preastonishing a degree in 1761, as to employ British miums given for the loans during the war. His and foreign ships to the amount of 707,659 tons, long note swelled with calculations on that subject which is 149,500 more than we employed in the (even supposing the most inaccurate of all calculast year of the peace. Thus our trade encreased lations to be just) would be entirely thrown away, more than a fifth; our British navigation had en- did it not serve to raise a wonderful opinion of his creased likewise with this astonishing encrease of financial skill in those who are not less surprised trade, but was not able to keep pace with it; and than edified, when, with a solemn face and mystewe added about 120,000 tons of foreign shipping rious air, they are told that two and two make to the 60,000, which had been employed in the four. For what else do we learn from this note? last year of the peace. Whatever happened to our That the more expence is incurred by a nation, the shipping in the former years of the war, this would more money will be required to defray it; that be no true state of the case at the time of the in proportion to the continuance of that expence, treaty. If we had lost something in the beginning, will be the continuance of borrowing: that the we had then recovered, and more than recovered, encrease of borrowing and the encrease of debt all our losses. Such is the ground of the dole- will go hand in hand ; and lastly, that the more ful complaints of the author, that the carrying money you want, the harder it will be to get it; trade was wholly engrossed by the neutral na- and that the scarcity of the commodity will entions.

hance the price. Who ever doubted the truth, or

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the insignificance, of these propositions ? what do ed to credit the nation for the Havannah itself; a they prove? that war is expensive, and peace de place surely full as well situated for every external sirable. They contain nothing more than a com- purpose as Pensacola, and of more internal benefit mon-place against war; the easiest of all topicks. than ten thousand Pensacolas. To bring them home to his purpose, he ought to

The author sets very little by conquests ; || I suphave shewn that our enemies had money upon pose it is because he makes them so very lightly. better terms; which he has not shewn, neither On this subject he speaks with the greatest cer

I shall speak more fully to this point in tainty imaginable. We have, according to him, another place. He ought to have shewn that the nothing to do, but to go and take possession, whenmoney they raised, upon whatever terms, had pro- ever we think proper, of the French and Spanish cured them a more lucrative return. He knows settlements. It were better that he had examined that our expenditure purchased commerce and a little what advantage the peace gave us towards conquest : theirs acquired nothing but defeat and the invasion of these colonies, which we did not bankruptcy.

possess before the peace. It would not have been Thus the author has laid down his ideas on the amiss if he had consulted the publick experience, subject of war. Next follow those he entertains and our commanders, concerning the absolute ceron that of peace. The treaty of Paris upon the tainty of those conquests on which he is pleased to whole has his approbation. Indeed, if his account found our security. And if, after all, he should have of the war be just, he might have spared himself discovered them to be so very sure, and so very all further trouble. The rest is drawn on as an easy, he might at least, to preserve consistency, inevitable conclusion.* If the house of Bourbon have looked a few pages back, and (no unpleasing had the advantage, she must give the law; and thing to him) listened to himself, where he says, the peace, though it were much worse than it is, “ that the most successful enterprise could not had still been a good one. But, as the world is compensate to the nation for the waste of its peoyet deluded on the state of that war, other argu- “ ple, by carrying on war in unhealthy climates." ments are necessary; and the author has in my A position which he repeats again, page 9.opinion very ill supplied them. He tells of many So that, according to himself, his security is not things we have got, and of which he has made worth the suit; according to fact, he has only a out a kind of bill. This matter may be brought chance, God knows what a chance, of getting within a very narrow compass, if we come to con- at it ; and therefore, according to reason, the sider the requisites of a good peace under some giving up the most valuable of all possessions, in plain distinct heads. I apprehend they may be hopes to conquer them back, under any advantage reduced to these: 1. Stability; 2. Indemnifica- of situation, is the most ridiculous security that tion ; 3. Alliance.

ever was imagined for the peace of a nation. It As to the first, the author more than obscurely is true his friends did not give up Canada; they hints in several places, that he thinks the peace not could not give up every thing; let us make the likely to last. However, he does furnish a secu- most of it. We have Canada, we know its value. rity; a security, in any light, I fear, but insuffi-We have not the French any longer to fight in cient; on his hypothesis, surely a very odd one: North America; and from this circumstance we + “By stipulating for the entire possession of the derive considerable advantages. But here let me “ continent, (says he,) the restored French islands rest a little. The author touches upon a string “ are become in some measure dependent on the which sounds under his fingers but a tremulous “ British empire; and the good faith of France in and melancholy note. North America was once “observing the treaty guaranteed by the value at indeed a great strength to this nation, in opportu" which she estimates their possession.” This au- nity of ports, in ships, in provisions, in men. We thor soon grows weary of his principles. They found her a sound, an active, a vigorous member seldom last him for two pages together. When of the empire. I hope, by wise management, she the advantages of the war were to be depreciated, will again become so. But one of our capital prethen the loss of the ultramarine colonies lightened sent misfortunes is her discontent and disobedithe expences of France, facilitated her remittances,

To which of the author's favourites this and therefore her colonists put them into our hands. discontent is owing, we all know but too suffiAccording to this author's system, the actual pos- ciently. It would be a dismal event, if this founsession of those colonies ought to give us little or dation of his security, and indeed of all our publick no advantage in the negociation for peace; and strength, should, in reality, become our weakness ; yet the chance of possessing them on a future oc- and if all the powers of this empire, which ought casion gives a perfect security for the preservation to fall with a compacted weight upon the head of of that peace. The conquest of the Havannah, our enemies, should be dissipated and distracted by if it did not serve Spain, rather distressed England, a jealous vigilance, or by hostile attempts upon says our author. But the molestation which her one another. Ten Canadas cannot restore that galleons may suffer from our station in Pensacola security for the peace, and for every thing valugives us advantages, for which we were not allow- able to this country, which we have lost along with


• P. 12, 13

P. 17.

1 P. 6.

" them for their goods sent to America." State of the Nation, $ “Our merchants suffered by the detention of the galleons, p. 7. as their correspondents in Spain were disabled from paying

1 P. 12, 13.

SP. 6.


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in enr

the affection and the obedience of our colonies. except to shew our dispositions to be quite equal He is the wise minister, he is the true friend to at least towards both powers; and they enabled Britain, who shall be able to restore it.

France to compensate Spain by the gift of LouiTo return to the security for the peace. The siana ; loading us with all the harshness, leaving author tells us, that the original great purposes of the act of kindness with France, and opening the war were more than accomplished by the treaty. thereby a door to the fulfilling of this the most Surely he has experience and reading enough to consolidating article of the family compact. Acknow, that, in the course of a war, events may cordingly that dangerous league, thus abetted and happen, that render its original very far from authorized by the English ministry without an being its principal purpose. This original may attempt to invalidate it in any way, or in any of dwindle by circumstances, so as to become not a its parts, exists to this hour; and has grown purpose of the second or even the third magni- stronger and stronger every hour of its existtude. I trust this is so obvious that it will not

ence. be necessary to put cases for its illustration. In As to the second component of a good peace, that war, as soon as Spain entered into the quar- compensation, I have but little trouble; the author rel, the security of North America was no longer has said nothing upon that head. He has nothing the sole nor the foremost object. The Family Com- to say. After a war of such expence, this ought pact had been I know not how long before in agi- to have been a capital consideration. But on what tation. But then it was that we saw produced he has been so prudently silent, I think it is right into daylight and action the most odious and most to speak plainly. All our new acquisitions togeformidable of all the conspiracies against the liber- ther, at this time, scarce afford matter of revenue, ties of Europe that ever has been framed. The either at home or abroad, sufficient to defray the war with Spain was the first fruits of that league; expence of their establishments ; not one shilling and a security against that league ought to have towards the reduction of our debt. Guadaloupe been the fundamental point of a pacification with or Martinico alone would have given us material the powers who compose it. We had materials in aid; much in the way of duties, much in the way our hands to have constructed that security in such of trade and navigation. A good ministry would a manner as never to be shaken. But how did have considered how a renewal of the Assiento the virtuous and able men of our author labour might have been obtained. We had as much right for this great end? They took no one step to- to ask it at the treaty of Paris as at the treaty of wards it. On the contrary they countenanced, Utrecht. We had incomparably more in our hands and, indeed, as far as it depended on them, recog- to purchase it. Floods of treasure would have nized it in all its parts; for our plenipotentiary poured into this kingdom from such a source; and, treated with those who acted for the two crowns, under proper management, no small part of it as if they had been different ministers of the same would have taken a publick direction, and have monarch. The Spanish minister received his in- fructified an exhausted exchequer. structions, not from Madrid, but from Versailles. If this gentleman's hero of finance, instead of

This was not hid from our ministers at home, Aiying from a treaty, which, though he now deand the discovery ought to have alarmed them, if fends, he could not approve, and would not opthe good of their country had been the object of pose; if he, instead of shifting into an office, their anxiety. They could not but have seen that which removed him from the manufacture of the the whole Spanish monarchy was melted down into treaty, had, by his credit with the then great dithe cabinet of Versailles. But they thought this rector, acquired for us these, or any of these, obcircumstance an advantage; as it enabled them jects, the possession of Guadaloupe or Martinico, to go through with their work the more expedi- or the renewal of the Assiento, he might have held tiously. Expedition was every thing to them; his head high in his country; because he would because France might happen during a protracted have performed real service; ten thousand times negociation to discover the great imposition of our more real service, than all the economy of which victories.

this writer is perpetually talking, or all the little In the same spirit they negociated the terms of tricks of finance which the expertest juggler of the peace. If it were thought advisable not to the treasury can practise, could amount to in a take any positive security from Spain, the most thousand years. “But the occasion is lost; the obvious principles of policy dictated that the bur- time is gone, perhaps, for ever. then of the cessions ought to fall upon


As to the third requisite, alliance, there too the and that every thing which was of grace and fa- author is silent. What strength of that kind did vour should be given to Spain. Spain could not, they acquire? They got no one new ally; they on her part, have executed a capital article in the stript the enemy of not a single old one. They family compact, which obliged her to compensate disgusted (how justly, or unjustly, matters not) the losses of France. At least she could not do it every ally we had ; and from that time to this in America ; for she was expressly precluded by we stand friendless in Europe. But of this naked the treaty of Utrecht from ceding any territory condition of their country I know some people or giving any advantage in trade to that power. are not ashamed. They have their system of poWhat did our ministers? They took from Spain liticks; our ancestors grew great by another. In the territory of Florida, an object of no value this manner these virtuous men concluded the

The reader may

peace; and their practice is only consonant to and Barbadoes ; Exchequer bills; and Navy their theory

debt. The extreme fallacy of this state cannot Many things more might be observed on this escape any reader who will be at the pains to curious head of our author's speculations. But, compare the interest money, with which he affirms taking leave of what the writer says in his serious us to have been loaded, in his State of the Nation, part, if he be serious in any part, I shall only just with the items of the principal debt to which he point out a piece of his pleasantry. No man, I refers in his Considerations. The reader must obbelieve, ever denied that the time for making serve, that of this long list of nine articles, only peace is that in which the best terms may be ob- two, the exchequer bills, and part of the navy tained. But what that time is, together with the debt, carried any interest at all. The first amountuse that has been made of it, we are to judge by ed to 1,800,0001.; and this undoubtedly carried seeing whether terms adequate to our advantages, interest. The whole navy debt indeed amounted and to our necessities, have been actually obtained. to 4,576,9151. ; but of this only a part carried -- Here is the pinch of the question, to which interest. The author of the Considerations, &c. the author ought to have set his shoulders in labours to prove this very point in p. 18; and earnest. Instead of doing this, he slips out of the Mr. G. has always defended himself upon the harness by a jest; and sneeringly tells us, that, to same ground, for the insufficient provision he made determine this point, we must know the secrets of for the discharge of that debt. the French and Spanish cabinets,* and that par- see their own authority for it. liament was pleased to approve

the treaty


peace Mr. G. did in fact provide no more than without calling for the correspondence concerning 2,150,0001. for the discharge of these bills in two it. How just this sarcasm on that parliament may years.

It is much to be wished that these gentlebe, I say not; but how becoming in the author, i men would lay their heads together, that they

I leave it to his friends to determine.

would consider well this matter, and agree upon Having thus gone through the questions of war something. For when the scanty provision made and peace, the author proceeds to state our debt, for the unfunded debt is to be vindicated, then we and the interest which it carried, at the time of the are told it is a very small part of that debt which treaty, with the unfairness and inaccuracy, how- carries interest. But when the publick is to be ever, which distinguish all his assertions, and all his represented in a miserable condition, and the concalculations. To detect every fallacy, and rectify sequences of the late war to be laid before us in every mistake, would be endless. It will be enough dreadful colours, then we are to be told that the to point out a few of them, in order to shew how unfunded debt is within a trifle of ten millions, unsafe it is to place any thing like an implicit and so large a portion of it carries interest that we trust in such a writer.

must not compute less than 3 per cent. upon the The interest of debt contracted during


whole. is stated by the author at 2,614,8971. The par

In the year 1764, parliament voted 650,0001. ticulars appear in pages 14 and 15. Among them towards the discharge of the navy debt. This sum is stated the unfunded debt, 9,975,0171. supposed could not be applied solely to the discharge of bills to carry interest on a medium at 3 per cent. which carrying interest; because part of the debt due on amounts to 299,2501. We are referred to the seamen's wages must have been paid, and some bills Considerations on the Trade and Finances of the carried no interest at all. Notwithstanding this, Kingdom, p. 22, for the particulars of that un- we find by an account of the Journals of the house funded debt. Turn to the work, and to the place of commons, in the following session, that the navy referred to by the author himself, if you

debt carrying interest was, on the 31st of Decemmind to see a clear detection of a capital fallacy ber, 1764, no more than 1,687,4421. I am sure of this article in his account.

You will there see therefore that I admit too much when I admit the that this unfunded debt consists of the nine fol- navy debt carrying interest, after the creation of lowing articles: the remaining subsidy to the the navy annuities in the year 163, to have been duke of Brunswick; the remaining dedommage-2,200,0001. Add the exchequer bills; and the ment to the Landgrave of Hesse; the German whole unfunded debt carrying interest will be four demands; the army and ordnance extraordina- millions instead of ten; and the annual interest ries; the deficiences of grants and funds ; Mr. paid for it at 4 per cent. will be 160,0001. instead Touchett's claim; the debts due to Nova Scotia of 299,2501. An errour of no small magnitude,


have a


* Something however has transpired in the quarrels among those concerned in that transaction. It seems the good Genius of Britain, so much vaunted by our author, did his duty nobly. Whilst we were gaining such advantages, the court of France was astonished at our concessions. J'ai apporté à Versailles, "il est vrai, les Ratifications du Roi d'Angleterre à vostre grand étonnement, et à celui de bien d'autres. Je dois cela "au bontés du Roi d'Angleterre, à celles de Milord Bute, à “Mons. le Comte de Viry, à Mons. le Duc de Nivernois, et

en fin à mon scavoir faire." Lettres, &c. du Chev. D'Eon,

1 " The navy bills are not due till six months after they have “ been issued; six months also of the seamen's wages by act of “parliament must be, and in consequence of the rules prescribed

by that act, twelve months wages generally, and often much more are retained; and there has been besides at all times a

“ large arrear of pay, which, though kept in the account, could

never be claimed, the persons to whom it was due having left "neither assignees nor representatives. The precise amount of “such sums cannot be ascertained; but they can hardly be " reckoned less than 13 or 14 hundred thousand pounds. On 31st “ Dec. 1754, when the navy debt was reduced nearly as low as it "could be, it still amounted to 1,2996,5671. 188. 111d. consisting

chiefly of articles which could not then be discharged; such ar“ ticles will be larger now, in proportion to the encrease of the "establishment; and an allowance must always be made for " them in judging of the state of the navy debt, though they are not " distinguishable in the account. In providing for that which is “ payable, the principal object of the legislature is always to dis“ charge the bills, for they are the greatest article; they bear an " interest of 4 per cent.; and when the quantity of them is large, "they are a heavy incumbrance upon all money transactions."

p. 51.

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